research-article

Optimal and near-optimal mechanism design with interdependent values

Authors:

Tim Roughgarden,

Inbal Talgam-CohenAuthors Info & Claims

EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce

Pages 767 - 784

https://doi.org/10.1145/2492002.2482606

Published: 16 June 2013 Publication History

Abstract

We study optimal and approximately-optimal mechanism design questions in the interdependent values model, which generalizes the standard setting of independent and private values. We focus our attention on ex post incentive compatible and individually rational mechanisms, and develop an analog of Myerson's optimal auction theory that applies to many interdependent settings of interest. We demonstrate two applications for specific interdependent settings: First, a parallel result to the well-known optimality of the second-price auction with reserve for i.i.d.~bidders, where the English auction replaces the second-price one. Second, we identify good prior-independent auctions --- auctions with near-optimal expected revenue across a wide range of priors --- for certain interdependent value settings.

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Cited By

Albert MConitzer VLopomo GStone P(2022)Mechanism Design for Correlated Valuations: Efficient Methods for Revenue MaximizationOperations Research10.1287/opre.2020.209270:1(562-584)Online publication date: Jan-2022
https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2020.2092
Bhargava HCsapó GMüller R(2020)On Optimal Auctions for Mixing Exclusive and Shared Matching in PlatformsManagement Science10.1287/mnsc.2019.330966:6(2653-2676)Online publication date: 1-Jun-2020
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3309
Koçyiğit ÇIyengar GKuhn DWiesemann W(2020)Distributionally Robust Mechanism DesignManagement Science10.1287/mnsc.2018.321966:1(159-189)Online publication date: 1-Jan-2020
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3219
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Index Terms

Optimal and near-optimal mechanism design with interdependent values
1. Theory of computation

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We study optimal and approximately-optimal mechanism design questions in the interdependent values model, which generalizes the standard setting of independent and private values. We focus our attention on ex post incentive compatible and individually ...

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Published In

cover image ACM Conferences

EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce

June 2013

924 pages

ISBN:9781450319621

DOI:10.1145/2492002

General Chair:
Michael Kearns
University of Pennsylvania., USA
,
Program Chairs:
Preston McAfee
Google, USA
,
Éva Tardos
Cornell University, USA

Copyright © 2013 ACM.

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Published: 16 June 2013

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EC '13: ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

June 16 - 20, 2013

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EC '13 Paper Acceptance Rate 72 of 223 submissions, 32%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%

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Cited By

Albert MConitzer VLopomo GStone P(2022)Mechanism Design for Correlated Valuations: Efficient Methods for Revenue MaximizationOperations Research10.1287/opre.2020.209270:1(562-584)Online publication date: Jan-2022
https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2020.2092
Bhargava HCsapó GMüller R(2020)On Optimal Auctions for Mixing Exclusive and Shared Matching in PlatformsManagement Science10.1287/mnsc.2019.330966:6(2653-2676)Online publication date: 1-Jun-2020
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3309
Koçyiğit ÇIyengar GKuhn DWiesemann W(2020)Distributionally Robust Mechanism DesignManagement Science10.1287/mnsc.2018.321966:1(159-189)Online publication date: 1-Jan-2020
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3219
Li MMei LXu YZhang GZhao YElkind EVeloso MAgmon NTaylor M(2019)Facility Location Games with ExternalitiesProceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3306127.3331856(1443-1451)Online publication date: 8-May-2019
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3306127.3331856
Albert MConitzer VStone PSingh SMarkovitch S(2017)Automated design of robust mechanismsProceedings of the Thirty-First AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3298239.3298286(298-304)Online publication date: 4-Feb-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3298239.3298286
Adamczyk MBorodin AFerraioli DKeijzer BLeonardi S(2017)Sequential Posted-Price Mechanisms with Correlated ValuationsACM Transactions on Economics and Computation10.1145/31570855:4(1-39)Online publication date: 22-Dec-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3157085
Caragiannis IKaklamanis CKyropoulou M(2016)Limitations of Deterministic Auction Design for Correlated BiddersACM Transactions on Computation Theory10.1145/29343098:4(1-18)Online publication date: 29-Jun-2016
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2934309
Tzamos CWilkens C(2016)Anonymous Auctions Maximizing RevenueProceedings of the 12th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics - Volume 1012310.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_14(188-206)Online publication date: 11-Dec-2016
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_14
Goldner KKarlin A(2016)A Prior-Independent Revenue-Maximizing Auction for Multiple Additive BiddersProceedings of the 12th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics - Volume 1012310.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_12(160-173)Online publication date: 11-Dec-2016
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_12
Minooei HSwamy C(2015)Near-Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design for Covering Problems with Correlated PlayersACM Transactions on Economics and Computation10.1145/27901333:4(1-24)Online publication date: 31-Jul-2015
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2790133
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