research-article

Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values

Authors:

Tim Roughgarden,

Inbal Talgam-CohenAuthors Info & Claims

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC), Volume 4, Issue 3

Article No.: 18, Pages 1 - 34

https://doi.org/10.1145/2910577

Published: 15 June 2016 Publication History

Abstract

We study interdependent value settings and extend several results from the well-studied independent private values model to these settings. For revenue-optimal mechanism design, we give conditions under which Myerson's virtual value-based mechanism remains optimal with interdependent values. One of these conditions is robustness of the truthfulness and individual rationality guarantees, in the sense that they are required to hold ex-post. We then consider an even more robust class of mechanisms called “prior independent” (“detail free”), and show that, by simply using one of the bidders to set a reserve price, it is possible to extract near-optimal revenue in an interdependent values setting. This shows that a considerable level of robustness is achievable for interdependent values in single-parameter environments.

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Eden AFeldman MMauras SMohan DKleinberg RSaban DBergemann D(2024)Private Interdependent Valuations: New Bounds for Single-Item Auctions and MatroidsProceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/3670865.3673581(448-464)Online publication date: 8-Jul-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3670865.3673581
Dütting PMirrokni VPaes Leme RXu HZuo SChua TNgo CKa-Wei Lee RKumar RLauw H(2024)Mechanism Design for Large Language ModelsProceedings of the ACM Web Conference 202410.1145/3589334.3645511(144-155)Online publication date: 13-May-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3589334.3645511
Chen MLiu YShen WShen YTang PYang Q(2024)A mechanism design approach for multi-party machine learningTheoretical Computer Science10.1016/j.tcs.2024.1146181003(114618)Online publication date: Jul-2024
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Index Terms

Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values
1. Theory of computation
  1. Theory and algorithms for application domains
    1. Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
      1. Algorithmic game theory

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Published In

cover image ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Volume 4, Issue 3

Special Issue on EC'13

June 2016

162 pages

ISSN:2167-8375

EISSN:2167-8383

DOI:10.1145/2905047

Editors:
Vincent Conitzer
Duke University
,
Preston McAfee
Microsoft

Issue’s Table of Contents

Copyright © 2016 ACM.

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Publication History

Published: 15 June 2016

Accepted: 01 March 2016

Revised: 01 December 2015

Received: 01 November 2014

Published in TEAC Volume 4, Issue 3

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Cited By

Eden AFeldman MMauras SMohan DKleinberg RSaban DBergemann D(2024)Private Interdependent Valuations: New Bounds for Single-Item Auctions and MatroidsProceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/3670865.3673581(448-464)Online publication date: 8-Jul-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3670865.3673581
Dütting PMirrokni VPaes Leme RXu HZuo SChua TNgo CKa-Wei Lee RKumar RLauw H(2024)Mechanism Design for Large Language ModelsProceedings of the ACM Web Conference 202410.1145/3589334.3645511(144-155)Online publication date: 13-May-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3589334.3645511
Chen MLiu YShen WShen YTang PYang Q(2024)A mechanism design approach for multi-party machine learningTheoretical Computer Science10.1016/j.tcs.2024.1146181003(114618)Online publication date: Jul-2024
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2024.114618
Balseiro SDésir A(2023)Incentive-Compatible Assortment Optimization for Sponsored ProductsManagement Science10.1287/mnsc.2022.460369:8(4668-4684)Online publication date: Aug-2023
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4603
Eden AFeldman MGoldner KMauras SMohan D(2023)Constant Approximation for Private Interdependent Valuations2023 IEEE 64th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS)10.1109/FOCS57990.2023.00018(148-163)Online publication date: 6-Nov-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/FOCS57990.2023.00018
Vikram A(2023)Worst-case efficient and budget-balanced mechanism for single-object allocation with interdependent valuesSocial Choice and Welfare10.1007/s00355-023-01479-x62:1(89-108)Online publication date: 30-Aug-2023
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01479-x
Chen MLiu YShen WShen YTang PYang Q(2023)A Mechanism Design Approach for Multi-party Machine LearningFrontiers of Algorithmic Wisdom10.1007/978-3-031-20796-9_18(248-268)Online publication date: 1-Jan-2023
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20796-9_18
Wang DXu X(2022)Optimal equity auction with interdependent valuationsJournal of Mathematical Economics10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102623100(102623)Online publication date: May-2022
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102623
Lu PSun EZhou C(2022)Better Approximation for Interdependent SOS ValuationsWeb and Internet Economics10.1007/978-3-031-22832-2_13(219-234)Online publication date: 9-Dec-2022
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22832-2_13
Gkatzelis VPatel RPountourakis ESchoepflin D(2021)Prior-Free Clock Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent ValuesAlgorithmic Game Theory10.1007/978-3-030-85947-3_5(64-78)Online publication date: 21-Sep-2021
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