research-article

Network formation games with heterogeneous players and the internet structure

Authors:

Ariel OrdaAuthors Info & Claims

EC '14: Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation

Pages 735 - 752

https://doi.org/10.1145/2600057.2602862

Published: 01 June 2014 Publication History

Abstract

We study the structure and evolution of the Internet's Autonomous System (AS) interconnection topology as a game with heterogeneous players. In this network formation game, the utility of a player depends on the network structure, e.g., the distances between nodes and the cost of links. We analyze static properties of the game, such as the prices of anarchy and stability and provide explicit results concerning the generated topologies. Furthermore, we discuss dynamic aspects, demonstrating linear convergence rate and showing that only a restricted subset of equilibria is feasible under realistic dynamics. We also consider the case where utility (or monetary) transfers are allowed between the players.

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Thodi MPhokeer AChavula J(2024)Balancing Interests: A Policy-Based Approach to Internet Peer Selection2024 IEEE 13th International Conference on Cloud Networking (CloudNet)10.1109/CloudNet62863.2024.10815879(1-6)Online publication date: 27-Nov-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/CloudNet62863.2024.10815879
Bullinger MLenzner PMelnichenko A(2024)Network creation with homophilic agentsSocial Choice and Welfare10.1007/s00355-024-01562-xOnline publication date: 5-Nov-2024
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01562-x
Kiffer LRajaraman R(2024)Stability of P2P Networks Under Greedy PeeringStructural Information and Communication Complexity10.1007/978-3-031-60603-8_20(359-383)Online publication date: 23-May-2024
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-60603-8_20
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Network formation games with heterogeneous players and the internet structure

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Published In

cover image ACM Conferences

EC '14: Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation

June 2014

1028 pages

ISBN:9781450325653

DOI:10.1145/2600057

General Chair:
Moshe Babaioff
Microsoft Research
,
Program Chairs:
Vincent Conitzer
Duke University
,
David Easley
Cornell University

Copyright © 2014 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

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SIGecom: Special Interest Group on Economics and Computation

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Association for Computing Machinery

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Published: 01 June 2014

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EC '14: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

June 8 - 12, 2014

California, Palo Alto, USA

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EC '14 Paper Acceptance Rate 80 of 290 submissions, 28%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%

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https://doi.org/10.1109/CloudNet62863.2024.10815879
Bullinger MLenzner PMelnichenko A(2024)Network creation with homophilic agentsSocial Choice and Welfare10.1007/s00355-024-01562-xOnline publication date: 5-Nov-2024
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01562-x
Kiffer LRajaraman R(2024)Stability of P2P Networks Under Greedy PeeringStructural Information and Communication Complexity10.1007/978-3-031-60603-8_20(359-383)Online publication date: 23-May-2024
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-60603-8_20
Friedrich TGawendowicz HLenzner PZahn AOshman RNolin AHalldorsson MBalliu A(2023)The Impact of Cooperation in Bilateral Network CreationProceedings of the 2023 ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing10.1145/3583668.3594588(321-331)Online publication date: 19-Jun-2023
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Scherrer STabaeiaghdaei SPerrig A(2023)Quality competition among internet service providersPerformance Evaluation10.1016/j.peva.2023.102375162(102375)Online publication date: Nov-2023
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Bilò DFriedrich TLenzner PMelnichenko AScheideler CBerenbrink P(2019)Geometric Network Creation GamesThe 31st ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures10.1145/3323165.3323199(323-332)Online publication date: 17-Jun-2019
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Abam MQafari M(2019)Geometric spanner gamesTheoretical Computer Science10.1016/j.tcs.2019.07.020Online publication date: Jul-2019
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Bilò DLenzner P(2019)On the Tree Conjecture for the Network Creation GameTheory of Computing Systems10.1007/s00224-019-09945-9Online publication date: 16-Aug-2019
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Avin CCohen AFraigniaud PLotker ZPeleg DChampin PGandon FMédini LLalmas MIpeirotis P(2018)Preferential Attachment as a Unique EquilibriumProceedings of the 2018 World Wide Web Conference10.1145/3178876.3186122(559-568)Online publication date: 10-Apr-2018
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Trajanovski SKuipers FHayel YAltman EVan Mieghem P(2018)Designing Virus-Resistant, High-Performance Networks: A Game-Formation ApproachIEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems10.1109/TCNS.2017.27478405:4(1682-1692)Online publication date: Dec-2018
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