research-article

On Multiple Keyword Sponsored Search Auctions with Budgets

Authors:

Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi,

Stefano Leonardi,

Monika Henzinger,

Martin StarnbergerAuthors Info & Claims

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC), Volume 4, Issue 1

Article No.: 2, Pages 1 - 34

https://doi.org/10.1145/2818357

Published: 07 December 2015 Publication History

Abstract

We study multiple keyword sponsored search auctions with budgets. Each keyword has multiple ad slots with a click-through rate. The bidders have additive valuations, which are linear in the click-through rates, and budgets, which are restricting their overall payments. Additionally, the number of slots per keyword assigned to a bidder is bounded.

We show the following results: (1) We give the first mechanism for multiple keywords, where click-through rates differ among slots. Our mechanism is incentive compatible in expectation, individually rational in expectation, and Pareto optimal. (2) We study the combinatorial setting, where each bidder is only interested in a subset of the keywords. We give an incentive compatible, individually rational, Pareto-optimal, and deterministic mechanism for identical click-through rates. (3) We give an impossibility result for incentive compatible, individually rational, Pareto-optimal, and deterministic mechanisms for bidders with diminishing marginal valuations.

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Cited By

Zhang RJiang CZhang JFan JRen JXia H(2023)Reinvigorating sustainability in Internet of Things marketing: Framework for multi-round real-time bidding with game machine learningInternet of Things10.1016/j.iot.2023.10092124(100921)Online publication date: Dec-2023
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iot.2023.100921
Hirai HSato R(2023)Polyhedral Clinching Auctions for Indivisible GoodsWeb and Internet Economics10.1007/978-3-031-48974-7_21(366-383)Online publication date: 31-Dec-2023
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48974-7_21
Nakagawa A(2021)EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS OF A MULTI-KEYWORD AUCTION – A CASE WHERE TWO ADVERTISERS HAVE THE SAME WEIGHTED AVERAGE VALUE複数キーワードオークションにおける均衡分析―2人の広告主の入札値が同じケース―Transactions of the Operations Research Society of Japan10.15807/torsj.64.20464(204-228)Online publication date: 2021
https://doi.org/10.15807/torsj.64.204
Show More Cited By

Index Terms

On Multiple Keyword Sponsored Search Auctions with Budgets
1. Applied computing
  1. Law, social and behavioral sciences
    1. Economics
2. Theory of computation
  1. Design and analysis of algorithms

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Published In

cover image ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Volume 4, Issue 1

December 2015

169 pages

ISSN:2167-8375

EISSN:2167-8383

DOI:10.1145/2852252

Editors:
Vincent Conitzer
Duke University
,
Preston McAfee
Google

Issue’s Table of Contents

Copyright © 2015 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 07 December 2015

Accepted: 01 June 2015

Revised: 01 May 2015

Received: 01 March 2013

Published in TEAC Volume 4, Issue 1

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Cited By

Zhang RJiang CZhang JFan JRen JXia H(2023)Reinvigorating sustainability in Internet of Things marketing: Framework for multi-round real-time bidding with game machine learningInternet of Things10.1016/j.iot.2023.10092124(100921)Online publication date: Dec-2023
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iot.2023.100921
Hirai HSato R(2023)Polyhedral Clinching Auctions for Indivisible GoodsWeb and Internet Economics10.1007/978-3-031-48974-7_21(366-383)Online publication date: 31-Dec-2023
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48974-7_21
Nakagawa A(2021)EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS OF A MULTI-KEYWORD AUCTION – A CASE WHERE TWO ADVERTISERS HAVE THE SAME WEIGHTED AVERAGE VALUE複数キーワードオークションにおける均衡分析―2人の広告主の入札値が同じケース―Transactions of the Operations Research Society of Japan10.15807/torsj.64.20464(204-228)Online publication date: 2021
https://doi.org/10.15807/torsj.64.204
Feng ZNarasimhan HParkes DAndre EKoenig SDastani MSukthankar G(2018)Deep Learning for Revenue-Optimal Auctions with BudgetsProceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3237383.3237439(354-362)Online publication date: 9-Jul-2018
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3237383.3237439

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