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Dynamic Proportional Sharing: A Game-Theoretic Approach

Authors:

Rupert Freeman,

Seyed Majid Zahedi,

Vincent Conitzer,

Benjamin C. LeeAuthors Info & Claims

Proceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems, Volume 2, Issue 1

Article No.: 3, Pages 1 - 36

https://doi.org/10.1145/3179406

Published: 03 April 2018 Publication History

Abstract

Sharing computational resources amortizes cost and improves utilization and efficiency. When agents pool their resources together, each becomes entitled to a portion of the shared pool. Static allocations in each round can guarantee entitlements and are strategy-proof, but efficiency suffers because allocations do not reflect variations in agents' demands for resources across rounds. Dynamic allocation mechanisms assign resources to agents across multiple rounds while guaranteeing agents their entitlements. Designing dynamic mechanisms is challenging, however, when agents are strategic and can benefit by misreporting their demands for resources.

In this paper, we show that dynamic allocation mechanisms based on max-min fail to guarantee entitlements, strategy-proofness or both. We propose the fbp (FBPA) mechanism and show that it satisfies strategy-proofness and guarantees at least half of the utility from static allocations while providing an asymptotic efficiency guarantee. Our simulations with real and synthetic data show that the performance of the fbp mechanism is comparable to that of state-of-the-art mechanisms, providing agents with at least 0.98x, and on average 15x, of their utility from static allocations. Finally, we propose the T-period mechanism and prove that it satisfies strategy-proofness and guarantees entitlements.

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Cited By

Lackner MMaly JWilliams BChen YNeville J(2023)Proportional decisions in perpetual votingProceedings of the Thirty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Thirty-Fifth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence and Thirteenth Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence10.1609/aaai.v37i5.25710(5722-5729)Online publication date: 7-Feb-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1609/aaai.v37i5.25710
Elkind EKraiczy STeh N(2022)Fairness in Temporal Slot AssignmentAlgorithmic Game Theory10.1007/978-3-031-15714-1_28(490-507)Online publication date: 12-Sep-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-031-15714-1_28
Pujol DWu YFain BMachanavajjhala A(2021)Budget sharing for multi-analyst differential privacyProceedings of the VLDB Endowment10.14778/3467861.346787014:10(1805-1817)Online publication date: 1-Jun-2021
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.14778/3467861.3467870
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Index Terms

Dynamic Proportional Sharing: A Game-Theoretic Approach

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cover image Proceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems

Proceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems Volume 2, Issue 1

March 2018

603 pages

EISSN:2476-1249

DOI:10.1145/3203302

Editors:
Augustin Chaintreau
Columbia University
,
Aditya Akella
University of Wisconsin-Madison
,
Adam Wierman
California Institute of Technology

Issue’s Table of Contents

Copyright © 2018 ACM.

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Association for Computing Machinery

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Publication History

Published: 03 April 2018

Published in POMACS Volume 2, Issue 1

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Cited By

Lackner MMaly JWilliams BChen YNeville J(2023)Proportional decisions in perpetual votingProceedings of the Thirty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Thirty-Fifth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence and Thirteenth Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence10.1609/aaai.v37i5.25710(5722-5729)Online publication date: 7-Feb-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1609/aaai.v37i5.25710
Elkind EKraiczy STeh N(2022)Fairness in Temporal Slot AssignmentAlgorithmic Game Theory10.1007/978-3-031-15714-1_28(490-507)Online publication date: 12-Sep-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-031-15714-1_28
Pujol DWu YFain BMachanavajjhala A(2021)Budget sharing for multi-analyst differential privacyProceedings of the VLDB Endowment10.14778/3467861.346787014:10(1805-1817)Online publication date: 1-Jun-2021
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.14778/3467861.3467870
Jindal AGerndt MChadha MPodolskiy VChen P(2021)Function delivery network: Extending serverless computing for heterogeneous platformsSoftware: Practice and Experience10.1002/spe.296651:9(1936-1963)Online publication date: 10-Mar-2021
https://doi.org/10.1002/spe.2966
Hossain RElkind EVeloso MAgmon NTaylor M(2019)Sharing is CaringProceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3306127.3332132(2417-2419)Online publication date: 8-May-2019
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3306127.3332132
Aleksandrov MWalsh T(2019)Monotone and Online Fair DivisionKI 2019: Advances in Artificial Intelligence10.1007/978-3-030-30179-8_5(60-75)Online publication date: 23-Sep-2019
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-030-30179-8_5
Aleksandrov MWalsh T(2019)Strategy-Proofness, Envy-Freeness and Pareto Efficiency in Online Fair Division with Additive UtilitiesPRICAI 2019: Trends in Artificial Intelligence10.1007/978-3-030-29908-8_42(527-541)Online publication date: 23-Aug-2019
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29908-8_42

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