Sharing is Caring: Dynamic Mechanism for Shared Resource Ownership

Shared ownership of computing resources has long been in the practice; here, multiple agents pool their resources together to achieve high utility and low wastefulness. Sharing incentive, non-wastefulness and strategyproofness are three of the most desirable properties for a feasible system. However, Freeman et al. [2018] showed the fact that these three properties are incompatible in a dynamic setting and thus, a trade off must be maintained. In this work, we propose a dynamic allocation mechanism which fairly allocates the shared resources among the agents, and partially satisfies the above desiderata. Our mechanism outperforms the mechanisms proposed by Freeman et al. [2018] in the single resource case in terms of social welfare both in synthetic and real-life data. We also show that in the single resource case, our mechanism allocates the resources in a way that creates a market equilibrium and thus naturally satisfies several additional properties.