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Secure Autonomous Cyber-Physical Systems Through Verifiable Information Flow Control

Published: 15 January 2018 Publication History

Abstract

Modern cyber-physical systems are complex networked computing systems that electronically control physical systems. Autonomous road vehicles are an important and increasingly ubiquitous instance. Unfortunately, their increasing complexity often leads to security vulnerabilities. Network connectivity exposes these vulnerable systems to remote software attacks that can result in real-world physical damage, including vehicle crashes and loss of control authority. We introduce an integrated architecture to provide provable security and safety assurance for cyber-physical systems by ensuring that safety-critical operations and control cannot be unintentionally affected by potentially malicious parts of the system. Fine-grained information flow control is used to design both hardware and software, determining how low-integrity information can affect high-integrity control decisions. This security assurance is used to improve end-to-end security across the entire cyber-physical system. We demonstrate this integrated approach by developing a mobile robotic testbed modeling a self-driving system and testing it with a malicious attack.

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cover image ACM Conferences
CPS-SPC '18: Proceedings of the 2018 Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and PrivaCy
October 2018
114 pages
ISBN:9781450359924
DOI:10.1145/3264888
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

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Published: 15 January 2018

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  • (2022)Fast 3D Point Cloud Target Tracking based on Polar-Voxel Encoding2022 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics (SMC)10.1109/SMC53654.2022.9945125(2439-2445)Online publication date: 9-Oct-2022
  • (2021)A Semantic Framework for Direct Information Flows in Hybrid-Dynamic SystemsProceedings of the 7th ACM on Cyber-Physical System Security Workshop10.1145/3457339.3457981(5-15)Online publication date: 24-May-2021
  • (2021)Hardware Information Flow TrackingACM Computing Surveys10.1145/344786754:4(1-39)Online publication date: 3-May-2021
  • (2021)Relational Analysis of Sensor Attacks on Cyber-Physical Systems2021 IEEE 34th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)10.1109/CSF51468.2021.00035(1-16)Online publication date: Jun-2021
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