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Automated Software Protection for the Masses Against Side-Channel Attacks

Authors:

Nicolas Belleville,

Damien Couroussé,

Karine Heydemann,

Henri-Pierre CharlesAuthors Info & Claims

ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization (TACO), Volume 15, Issue 4

Article No.: 47, Pages 1 - 27

https://doi.org/10.1145/3281662

Published: 16 November 2018 Publication History

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Abstract

We present an approach and a tool to answer the need for effective, generic, and easily applicable protections against side-channel attacks. The protection mechanism is based on code polymorphism, so that the observable behaviour of the protected component is variable and unpredictable to the attacker. Our approach combines lightweight specialized runtime code generation with the optimization capabilities of static compilation. It is extensively configurable. Experimental results show that programs secured by our approach present strong security levels and meet the performance requirements of constrained systems.

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Iavich MKuchukhidze T(2024)Investigating CRYSTALS-Kyber Vulnerabilities: Attack Analysis and MitigationCryptography10.3390/cryptography80200158:2(15)Online publication date: 19-Apr-2024
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Belleville NMasure L(2024)Combining Loop Shuffling and Code PolyMorphism for Enhanced AES Side-Channel SecurityConstructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design10.1007/978-3-031-57543-3_14(260-280)Online publication date: 3-Apr-2024
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Index Terms

Automated Software Protection for the Masses Against Side-Channel Attacks
1. Security and privacy
  1. Security in hardware
    1. Hardware attacks and countermeasures
      1. Side-channel analysis and countermeasures
  2. Software and application security
    1. Software security engineering
2. Software and its engineering
  1. Software notations and tools
    1. Compilers

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Published In

cover image ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization

ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization Volume 15, Issue 4

December 2018

706 pages

ISSN:1544-3566

EISSN:1544-3973

DOI:10.1145/3284745

Editor:
Koen De Bosschere
Ghent University

Issue’s Table of Contents

Copyright © 2018 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 16 November 2018

Accepted: 01 September 2018

Revised: 01 July 2018

Received: 01 December 2017

Published in TACO Volume 15, Issue 4

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French National Research Agency (ANR) as part of the projects COGITO and PROSECCO
INS-2013

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Lungu NAl Rababah ADash BSyed ABarik LRout STembo SLubobya CPatra S(2024)NIST CSF-2.0 Compliant GPU Shader ExecutionEngineering, Technology & Applied Science Research10.48084/etasr.735114:4(15187-15193)Online publication date: 2-Aug-2024
https://doi.org/10.48084/etasr.7351
Iavich MKuchukhidze T(2024)Investigating CRYSTALS-Kyber Vulnerabilities: Attack Analysis and MitigationCryptography10.3390/cryptography80200158:2(15)Online publication date: 19-Apr-2024
https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography8020015
Belleville NMasure L(2024)Combining Loop Shuffling and Code PolyMorphism for Enhanced AES Side-Channel SecurityConstructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design10.1007/978-3-031-57543-3_14(260-280)Online publication date: 3-Apr-2024
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-57543-3_14
Xu CErata FSzefer JMeng WJensen CCremers CKirda E(2023)Exploration of Power Side-Channel Vulnerabilities in Quantum Computer ControllersProceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3576915.3623118(579-593)Online publication date: 15-Nov-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3576915.3623118
Javeed AYilmaz CSavas E(2023)Microarchitectural Side-Channel Threats, Weaknesses and Mitigations: A Systematic Mapping StudyIEEE Access10.1109/ACCESS.2023.327575711(48945-48976)Online publication date: 2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2023.3275757
Ngo KDubrova EJohansson T(2023)A side-channel attack on a masked and shuffled software implementation of SaberJournal of Cryptographic Engineering10.1007/s13389-023-00315-313:4(443-460)Online publication date: 25-Apr-2023
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Noseda MKünzli S(2023)Attacking Secure-Element-Hardened MCUboot Using a Low-Cost Fault Injection ToolkitInnovative Security Solutions for Information Technology and Communications10.1007/978-3-031-52947-4_10(126-143)Online publication date: 23-Nov-2023
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Cabrera Arteaga JLaperdrix PMonperrus MBaudry BOkhravi HWang C(2022)Multi-variant Execution at the EdgeProceedings of the 9th ACM Workshop on Moving Target Defense10.1145/3560828.3564007(11-22)Online publication date: 11-Nov-2022
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Morel LCouroussé DHiscock T(2022)Code Polymorphism Meets Code Encryption: Confidentiality and Side-channel Protection of Software ComponentsDigital Threats: Research and Practice10.1145/34870584:2(1-27)Online publication date: 10-Mar-2022
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Hataba MSherif AElkhouly R(2022)Enhanced Obfuscation for Software Protection in Autonomous Vehicular Cloud Computing PlatformsIEEE Access10.1109/ACCESS.2022.315924910(33943-33953)Online publication date: 2022
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