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Empirical Analysis of EIP-1559: Transaction Fees, Waiting Times, and Consensus Security

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Yinhong ZhaoAuthors Info & Claims

CCS '22: Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

Pages 2099 - 2113

https://doi.org/10.1145/3548606.3559341

Published: 07 November 2022 Publication History

Abstract

A transaction fee mechanism (TFM) is an essential component of a blockchain protocol. However, a systematic evaluation of the real-world impact of TFMs is still absent. Using rich data from the Ethereum blockchain, the mempool, and exchanges, we study the effect of EIP-1559, one of the earliest-deployed TFMs that depart from the traditional first-price auction paradigm. We conduct a rigorous and comprehensive empirical study to examine its causal effect on blockchain transaction fee dynamics, transaction waiting times, and consensus security. Our results show that EIP-1559 improves the user experience by mitigating intrablock differences in the gas price paid and reducing users' waiting times. However, EIP-1559 has only a small effect on gas fee levels and consensus security. In addition, we find that when Ether's price is more volatile, the waiting time is significantly higher. We also verify that a larger block size increases the presence of siblings. These findings suggest new directions for improving TFMs.

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Empirical Analysis of EIP-1559: Transaction Fees, Waiting Times, and Consensus Security

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cover image ACM Conferences

CCS '22: Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

November 2022

3598 pages

ISBN:9781450394505

DOI:10.1145/3548606

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University of California, Riverside
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Virginia Tech
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CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
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Elaine Shi
Carnegie Mellon University

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https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm17010019
Kim HKim D(2024)Equilibrium and Efficiency in Decentralized Finance: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of DeFi PoolsThe Journal of Korean Institute of Information Technology10.14801/jkiit.2024.22.7.17922:7(179-184)Online publication date: 31-Jul-2024
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