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Incentives in the Ether: Practical Cryptocurrency Economics & Security

Published: 13 May 2024 Publication History

Abstract

Cryptocurrencies are becoming increasingly important for the modern economy. Prior literature focuses on aligning actor incentives to ensure the secure and efficient operation of cryptocurrencies against adversarial threats that are unobserved in the wild. In this work, we address the gap between the theory and practice of cryptocurrencies by advancing realistic approaches to analyze the economics and security of key cryptocurrency components: consensus mechanisms, transaction fee mechanisms (TFMs), and the application layer. We present novel models of these components that we evaluate both theoretically and using cryptocurrency clients. We augment our evaluation with the first evidence of an in-the-wild attack on a major cryptocurrency, highlighting our approach's practicality. Results contained in our work were adopted by cryptocurrency platforms that hold user assets worth over 300 billion.

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cover image ACM Conferences
WWW '24: Companion Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2024
May 2024
1928 pages
ISBN:9798400701726
DOI:10.1145/3589335
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution International 4.0 License.

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Publication History

Published: 13 May 2024

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Author Tags

  1. cryptocurrency
  2. economics
  3. mechanism design
  4. security

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WWW '24
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WWW '24: The ACM Web Conference 2024
May 13 - 17, 2024
Singapore, Singapore

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Overall Acceptance Rate 1,899 of 8,196 submissions, 23%

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