Article

Electronic auctions with private bids

Authors:

Michael Harkavy,

J. D. Tygar,

Hiroaki KikuchiAuthors Info & Claims

WOEC'98: Proceedings of the 3rd conference on USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 3

Page 6

Published: 31 August 1998 Publication History

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Abstract

Auctions are a fundamental electronic commerce technology. We describe a set of protocols for performing sealed-bid electronic auctions which preserve the privacy of the submitted bids using a form of secure distributed computation. Bids are never revealed to any party, even after the auction is completed. Both first-price and second-price (Vickrey) auctions are supported, and the computational costs of the methods are low enough to allow their use in many real-world auction situations.

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Cited By

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Howlader JMal A(2015)Sealed-bid auctionSecurity and Communication Networks10.1002/sec.12688:18(3415-3440)Online publication date: 1-Dec-2015
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1002/sec.1268
Nojoumian MStinson D(2014)Efficient Sealed-Bid Auction Protocols Using Verifiable Secret SharingProceedings of the 10th International Conference on Information Security Practice and Experience - Volume 843410.1007/978-3-319-06320-1_23(302-317)Online publication date: 5-May-2014
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-319-06320-1_23
Angel SWalfish M(2013)Verifiable auctions for online ad exchangesACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review10.1145/2534169.248603843:4(195-206)Online publication date: 27-Aug-2013
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2534169.2486038
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Electronic auctions with private bids

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Published In

WOEC'98: Proceedings of the 3rd conference on USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 3

August 1998

244 pages

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USENIX Association

United States

Publication History

Published: 31 August 1998

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Howlader JMal A(2015)Sealed-bid auctionSecurity and Communication Networks10.1002/sec.12688:18(3415-3440)Online publication date: 1-Dec-2015
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1002/sec.1268
Nojoumian MStinson D(2014)Efficient Sealed-Bid Auction Protocols Using Verifiable Secret SharingProceedings of the 10th International Conference on Information Security Practice and Experience - Volume 843410.1007/978-3-319-06320-1_23(302-317)Online publication date: 5-May-2014
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-319-06320-1_23
Angel SWalfish M(2013)Verifiable auctions for online ad exchangesACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review10.1145/2534169.248603843:4(195-206)Online publication date: 27-Aug-2013
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2534169.2486038
Angel SWalfish MChiu DWang JBarford PSeshan S(2013)Verifiable auctions for online ad exchangesProceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2013 conference on SIGCOMM10.1145/2486001.2486038(195-206)Online publication date: 12-Aug-2013
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2486001.2486038
Dreier JJonker HLafourcade PChen KXie QQiu WLi NTzeng W(2013)Defining verifiability in e-auction protocolsProceedings of the 8th ACM SIGSAC symposium on Information, computer and communications security10.1145/2484313.2484387(547-552)Online publication date: 8-May-2013
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Dreier JLafourcade PLakhnech Y(2013)Formal verification of e-auction protocolsProceedings of the Second international conference on Principles of Security and Trust10.1007/978-3-642-36830-1_13(247-266)Online publication date: 16-Mar-2013
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Palmer BBubendorfer KWelch I(2011)Development and evaluation of a secure, privacy preserving combinatorial auctionProceedings of the Ninth Australasian Information Security Conference - Volume 11610.5555/2460416.2460426(67-76)Online publication date: 17-Jan-2011
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Dong NJonker HPang J(2010)Analysis of a receipt-free auction protocol in the applied pi calculusProceedings of the 7th International conference on Formal aspects of security and trust10.5555/1964555.1964570(223-238)Online publication date: 16-Sep-2010
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Nojoumian MStinson D(2010)Unconditionally secure first-price auction protocols using a multicomponent commitment schemeProceedings of the 12th international conference on Information and communications security10.5555/1948352.1948377(266-280)Online publication date: 15-Dec-2010
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Liu Y(2009)A new secure and efficient M+1st price auction scheme based on ECC systemProceedings of the 3rd international conference on Anti-Counterfeiting, security, and identification in communication10.5555/1719110.1719226(489-492)Online publication date: 20-Aug-2009
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On Auctions with Withdrawable Winning Bids

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