Article

Unconditionally secure first-price auction protocols using a multicomponent commitment scheme

Authors:

Mehrdad Nojoumian,

Douglas R. StinsonAuthors Info & Claims

ICICS'10: Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information and communications security

Pages 266 - 280

Published: 15 December 2010 Publication History

Abstract

Due to the rapid growth of e-commerce technology, secure auction protocols have attracted much attention among researchers. The main reason for constructing sealed-bid auction protocols is the fact that losing bids can be used in future auctions and negotiations if they are not kept private. Our motivation is to develop a new commitment scheme to construct first-price auction protocols similar to proposed solutions in [18,17,19]. Our constructions are auctioneer-free and unconditionally secure whereas those protocols rely on computational assumptions and use auctioneers. As our contribution, we first propose a multicomponent commitment scheme, that is, a construction with multiple committers and verifiers. Consequently, three secure first-price auction protocols are proposed, each of which has its own properties. We also provide the security proof and the complexity analysis of proposed constructions.

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Cited By

Nishide TIwamoto MIwasaki AOhta K(2014)Secure $$M+1$$ st-Price Auction with Automatic Tie-BreakRevised Selected Papers of the 6th International Conference on Trusted Systems - Volume 947310.1007/978-3-319-27998-5_27(422-437)Online publication date: 16-Dec-2014
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-319-27998-5_27
Nojoumian MStinson D(2014)Efficient Sealed-Bid Auction Protocols Using Verifiable Secret SharingProceedings of the 10th International Conference on Information Security Practice and Experience - Volume 843410.1007/978-3-319-06320-1_23(302-317)Online publication date: 5-May-2014
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-319-06320-1_23
Shi W(2014)A provable secure sealed-bid multi-attribute auction scheme under semi-honest modelInternational Journal of Communication Systems10.1002/dac.257127:12(3738-3747)Online publication date: 1-Dec-2014
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1002/dac.2571

Unconditionally secure first-price auction protocols using a multicomponent commitment scheme
1. Security and privacy

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Published In

cover image Guide Proceedings

ICICS'10: Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information and communications security

December 2010

471 pages

ISBN:3642176496

Editors:
Miguel Soriano
Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, Barcelona, Spain
,
Sihan Qing
Chinese Academy of Sciences, Institute of Software, Beijing, China
,
Javier Lopez
Universidad de Málaga, Computer Science Department, Complejo Tecnológico, Málaga, Spain

Sponsors

Scytl Secure Electronic Voting: Scytl Secure Electronic Voting
Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación, Spain
ARES CONSOLIDER CSD2007-00004: ARES CONSOLIDER CSD2007-00004
ARISPL: Advanced Research on Information Security and Privacy line
Department of Telematics: Department of Telematics

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Springer-Verlag

Berlin, Heidelberg

Publication History

Published: 15 December 2010

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Cited By

Nishide TIwamoto MIwasaki AOhta K(2014)Secure $$M+1$$ st-Price Auction with Automatic Tie-BreakRevised Selected Papers of the 6th International Conference on Trusted Systems - Volume 947310.1007/978-3-319-27998-5_27(422-437)Online publication date: 16-Dec-2014
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-319-27998-5_27
Nojoumian MStinson D(2014)Efficient Sealed-Bid Auction Protocols Using Verifiable Secret SharingProceedings of the 10th International Conference on Information Security Practice and Experience - Volume 843410.1007/978-3-319-06320-1_23(302-317)Online publication date: 5-May-2014
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-319-06320-1_23
Shi W(2014)A provable secure sealed-bid multi-attribute auction scheme under semi-honest modelInternational Journal of Communication Systems10.1002/dac.257127:12(3738-3747)Online publication date: 1-Dec-2014
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1002/dac.2571

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