Location via proxy:   [ UP ]  
[Report a bug]   [Manage cookies]                
skip to main content
10.5555/2283396.2283412guideproceedingsArticle/Chapter ViewAbstractPublication PagesConference Proceedingsacm-pubtype
Article

On the fixed-parameter tractability of composition-consistent tournament solutions

Published: 16 July 2011 Publication History

Abstract

Tournament solutions, i.e., functions that associate with each complete and asymmetric relation on a set of alternatives a non-empty subset of the alternatives, play an important role within social choice theory and the mathematical social sciences at large. Laffond et al. have shown that various tournament solutions satisfy composition-consistency, a structural invariance property based on the similarity of alternatives. We define the decomposition degree of a tournament as a parameter that reflects its decomposability and show that computing any composition-consistent tournament solution is fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the decomposition degree. Furthermore, we experimentally investigate the decomposition degree of two natural distributions of tournaments and its impact on the running time of computing the tournament equilibrium set.

References

[1]
N. Alon. Ranking tournaments. SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics, 20(1):137-142, 2006.
[2]
K. J. Arrow and H. Raynaud. Social Choice and Multicriterion Decision-Making. MIT Press, 1986.
[3]
D. Austen-Smith and J. S. Banks. Positive Political Theory I: Collective Preference. University of Michigan Press, 2000.
[4]
N. Betzler, R. Bredereck, and R. Niedermeier. Partial kernelization for rank aggregation: Theory and experiments. In Proc. of 5th International Symposium on Parameterized and Exact Computation (IPEC), volume 6478 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), pages 26-37. Springer-Verlag, 2010.
[5]
F. Brandt and F. Fischer. Computing the minimal covering set. Mathematical Social Sciences, 56(2):254-268, 2008.
[6]
F. Brandt and P. Harrenstein. Characterization of dominance relations in finite coalitional games. Theory and Decision, 69(2):233-256, 2010.
[7]
F. Brandt, F. Fischer, P. Harrenstein, and M. Mair. A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set. Social Choice and Welfare, 34(4):597-609, 2010.
[8]
F. Brandt. Minimal stable sets in tournaments. Journal of Economic Theory, 2011. Forthcoming.
[9]
C. Capelle, M. Habib, and F. de Montgolfier. Graph decompositions and factorizing permutations. Discrete Mathematics and Theoretical Computer Science, 5:55-70, 2002.
[10]
V. Conitzer. Computing Slater rankings using similarities among candidates. In Proc. of 21st AAAI Conference, pages 613-619. AAAI Press, 2006.
[11]
P. E. Dunne. Computational properties of argumentation systems satisfying graph-theoretic constraints. Artificial Intelligence, 171(10-15):701-729, 2007.
[12]
S. L. Feld and B. Grofman. Who's afraid of the big bad cycle? Evidence from 36 elections. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 4:231-237, 1992.
[13]
D. C. Fisher and J. Ryan. Tournament games and positive tournaments. Journal of Graph Theory, 19(2):217-236, 1995.
[14]
G. Laffond, J. Lainé, and J.-F. Laslier. Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions. Social Choice and Welfare, 13:75-93, 1996.
[15]
J.-F. Laslier. Tournament Solutions and Majority Voting. Springer, 1997.
[16]
R. M. McConnell and F. de Montgolfier. Linear-time modular decomposition of directed graphs. Discrete Applied Mathematics, 145(2):198-209, 2005.
[17]
H. Moulin. Choosing from a tournament. Social Choice and Welfare, 3:271-291, 1986.
[18]
R. Niedermeier. Invitation to Fixed-Parameter Algorithms. Oxford University Press, 2006.
[19]
T. N. Tideman. Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules. Social Choice and Welfare, 4(3):185-206, 1987.
[20]
I. Tsetlin, M. Regenwetter, and B. Grofman. The impartial culture maximizes the probability of majority cycles. Social Choice and Welfare, 21(3):387-398, 2003.
[21]
G. J. Woeginger. Banks winners in tournaments are difficult to recognize. Social Choice and Welfare, 20:523-528, 2003.
[22]
H. P. Young. Condorcet's theory of voting. The American Political Science Review, 82(4):1231-1244, 1988.

Cited By

View all
  1. On the fixed-parameter tractability of composition-consistent tournament solutions

    Recommendations

    Comments

    Information & Contributors

    Information

    Published In

    cover image Guide Proceedings
    IJCAI'11: Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
    July 2011
    704 pages
    ISBN:9781577355137

    Sponsors

    • The International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence, Inc. (IJCAI)

    Publisher

    AAAI Press

    Publication History

    Published: 16 July 2011

    Qualifiers

    • Article

    Contributors

    Other Metrics

    Bibliometrics & Citations

    Bibliometrics

    Article Metrics

    • Downloads (Last 12 months)0
    • Downloads (Last 6 weeks)0
    Reflects downloads up to 04 Feb 2025

    Other Metrics

    Citations

    Cited By

    View all
    • (2018)Interactive DemocracyProceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3237383.3237873(1183-1187)Online publication date: 9-Jul-2018
    • (2015)When does Schwartz conjecture hold?Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/2832249.2832333(603-609)Online publication date: 25-Jul-2015
    • (2015)Bounds on the disparity and separation of tournament solutionsDiscrete Applied Mathematics10.1016/j.dam.2015.01.041187:C(41-49)Online publication date: 31-May-2015
    • (2012)Studies in computational aspects of votingThe Multivariate Algorithmic Revolution and Beyond10.5555/2344236.2344254(318-363)Online publication date: 1-Jan-2012

    View Options

    View options

    Figures

    Tables

    Media

    Share

    Share

    Share this Publication link

    Share on social media