research-article

Interactive Democracy

Author:

Markus BrillAuthors Info & Claims

AAMAS '18: Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems

Pages 1183 - 1187

Published: 09 July 2018 Publication History

Abstract

Interactive Democracy is an umbrella term that encompasses a variety of approaches to make collective decision making processes more engaging and responsive. A common goal of these approaches is to utilize modern information technology---in particular, the Internet---in order to enable more interactive decision making processes. An integral part of many interactive democracy proposals are online decision platforms that provide much more flexibility and interaction possibilities than traditional democratic systems. This is achieved by embracing the novel paradigm of delegative voting, often referred to as liquid democracy, which aims to reconcile the idealistic appeal of direct democracy with the practicality of representative democracy. The successful design of interactive democracy systems presents a multidisciplinary research challenge; one important aspect concerns the elicitation and aggregation of preferences. However, existing proposals are mostly disconnected from the vast body of scientific literature on preference aggregation and related topics. In this article, I argue that tools and techniques developed in the multiagent systems literature should be employed to aid the design of online decision platforms and other interactive democracy systems. Insights from computational social choice, an emerging research area at the intersection of computer science and economics, will be particularly relevant for this endeavor.

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Cited By

Liu AHan QXia LYu NEvans RShpitser I(2023)Accelerating voting by quantum computationProceedings of the Thirty-Ninth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3625834.3625954(1274-1283)Online publication date: 31-Jul-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3625834.3625954
GÖlz PKahng AMackenzie SProcaccia A(2021)The Fluid Mechanics of Liquid DemocracyACM Transactions on Economics and Computation10.1145/34850129:4(1-39)Online publication date: 16-Oct-2021
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3485012
Caragiannis IMicha E(2019)A contribution to the critique of liquid democracyProceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3367032.3367050(116-122)Online publication date: 10-Aug-2019
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3367032.3367050
Show More Cited By

Index Terms

Interactive Democracy
1. Applied computing
  1. Computers in other domains
    1. Computing in government
      1. E-government
      2. Voting / election technologies
2. Theory of computation
  1. Theory and algorithms for application domains
    1. Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
      1. Algorithmic game theory
      2. Network formation

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Information

Published In

cover image ACM Conferences

AAMAS '18: Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems

July 2018

2312 pages

General Chairs:
Elisabeth Andre
Augsburg University, Germany
,
Sven Koenig
University of Southern California, USA
,
Program Chairs:
Mehdi Dastani
Utrecht University, Netherlands
,
Gita Sukthankar
University of Central Florida, USA

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ACM: Association for Computing Machinery

Publisher

International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

Richland, SC

Publication History

Published: 09 July 2018

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Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
Alexander von Humboldt Foundation

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AAMAS '18

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SIGAI

AAMAS '18: Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems

July 10 - 15, 2018

Stockholm, Sweden

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AAMAS '18 Paper Acceptance Rate 149 of 607 submissions, 25%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 1,155 of 5,036 submissions, 23%

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Cited By

Liu AHan QXia LYu NEvans RShpitser I(2023)Accelerating voting by quantum computationProceedings of the Thirty-Ninth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3625834.3625954(1274-1283)Online publication date: 31-Jul-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3625834.3625954
GÖlz PKahng AMackenzie SProcaccia A(2021)The Fluid Mechanics of Liquid DemocracyACM Transactions on Economics and Computation10.1145/34850129:4(1-39)Online publication date: 16-Oct-2021
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3485012
Caragiannis IMicha E(2019)A contribution to the critique of liquid democracyProceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3367032.3367050(116-122)Online publication date: 10-Aug-2019
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3367032.3367050
Abramowitz BMattei N(2019)Flexible representative democracyProceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3367032.3367034(3-10)Online publication date: 10-Aug-2019
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3367032.3367034

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