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Towards a framework for evaluating BGP security

Published: 06 August 2012 Publication History

Abstract

Security and performance evaluation of Internet protocols can be greatly aided by emulation in realistic deployment scenarios. We describe our implementation of such methods which uses high-level abstractions to bring simplicity into a virtualized test-lab.
We argue that current test-labs have not adequately captured those challenges, partly because their design is too static. To achieve more flexibility and to allow the experimenter to easily deploy many alternative scenarios we need abstractions that allow autoconfiguration and auto-deployment of real router and server code in a multi-AS infrastructure. We need to be able to generate scenarios for multi-party players in a fully isolated emulated test-lab and deploy the network using virtualized routers, switches, and servers.
In this paper, our abstractions are specifically designed to evaluate the BGP security framework currently being documented by the IETF SIDR working group. We capture the relevant aspects of the SIDR security proposals, and allow experimenters to evaluate the technology in topologies of real router and server code. We believe such methods are also useful for teaching newcomers and operators, as it allows them to gain experience in a sand-box before deployment. It allows security experts to set up controlled experiments at various levels of complexity, and concentrate on discovering weaknesses, instead of having to spend time on tedious configuration tasks. Finally, it allows router vendors and implementers to test their code and to perform scalability evaluation.

References

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Y. Rekhter, T. Li, and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)," 2006, RFC 4271.
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K. Butler, T. R. Farley, P. McDaniel, and J. Rexford, "A Survey of BGP Security Issues and Solutions," Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 98, no. 1, pp. 100-122, January 2010.
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G. Huston, M. Rossi, and G. Armitage, "Securing BGP - A Literature Survey," Communications Surveys Tutorials, IEEE, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 199-222, 2011.
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M. Lepinski and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing," 2012, RFC 6480.
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T. Griffin and G. Huston, "BGP Wedgies," 2005, rFC 4264.
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D. McPerson, V. Gill, D. Walton, and A. Retana, "Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) Persistent Route Oscillation Condition," 2002, RFC 3345.
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R. Bush and R. Austein, "The RPKI/Router Protocol," 2012, draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-26.
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G. Huston and G. Michaelson, "Validation of Route Origination Using the Resource Certificate Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)," 2012, RFC 6483.
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M. Lepinski and S. Turner, "An Overview of BGPSEC," 2011, draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview-01.
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Cited By

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  • (2018)Towards a Rigorous Methodology for Measuring Adoption of RPKI Route Validation and FilteringACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review10.1145/3211852.321185648:1(19-27)Online publication date: 27-Apr-2018

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cover image Guide Proceedings
CSET'12: Proceedings of the 5th USENIX conference on Cyber Security Experimentation and Test
August 2012
12 pages
  • Program Chairs:
  • Sean Peisert,
  • Stephen Schwab

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USENIX Association

United States

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Published: 06 August 2012

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  • (2018)Towards a Rigorous Methodology for Measuring Adoption of RPKI Route Validation and FilteringACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review10.1145/3211852.321185648:1(19-27)Online publication date: 27-Apr-2018

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