research-article

k-Coalitional Cooperative Games

Authors:

Szymon Matejczyk,

Tomasz P. Michalak,

Michael Wooldridge,

Makoto YokooAuthors Info & Claims

AAMAS '16: Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems

Pages 177 - 185

Published: 09 May 2016 Publication History

Abstract

In most previous models of coalition structure generation, it is assumed that agents may partition themselves into any coalition structure. In practice, however, there may be physical and organizational constraints that limit the number of co-existing coalitions. In this paper, we introduce k-coalitional games: a type of partition function game especially designed to model such situations. We propose an extension of the Shapley value for these games, and study its axiomatic and computational properties. In particular, we show that, under some conditions, it can be computed in polynomial time given two existing representations of coalitional games with externalities. Finally, we use k-coalitional games to analyse the relative importance of geographical locations in the game of Diplomacy.

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Cited By

Liu CZhu E(2019)A New Modeling of Cooperative Agents from Game-theoretic PerspectiveProceedings of the 2019 4th International Conference on Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence10.1145/3325730.3325745(133-136)Online publication date: 12-Apr-2019
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3325730.3325745

Index Terms

k-Coalitional Cooperative Games
1. Applied computing
  1. Law, social and behavioral sciences
    1. Economics

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Published In

cover image ACM Other conferences

AAMAS '16: Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems

May 2016

1580 pages

ISBN:9781450342391

General Chairs:
Catholijn M. Jonker
TU Delft, Netherlands
,
Stacy Marsella
University of Southern California, USA
,
Program Chairs:
John Thangarajah
RMIT University. Australia
,
Karl Tuyls
University of Liverpool, UK

Sponsors

IFAAMAS

In-Cooperation

SIGAI: ACM Special Interest Group on Artificial Intelligence

Publisher

International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

Richland, SC

Publication History

Published: 09 May 2016

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Funding Sources

European Research Council
JSPS
Polish National Science Center

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AAMAS '16

Sponsor:

AAMAS '16: International Conference on Agents and Multiagent Systems

May 9 - 13, 2016

Singapore, Singapore

Acceptance Rates

AAMAS '16 Paper Acceptance Rate 137 of 550 submissions, 25%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 1,155 of 5,036 submissions, 23%

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Cited By

Liu CZhu E(2019)A New Modeling of Cooperative Agents from Game-theoretic PerspectiveProceedings of the 2019 4th International Conference on Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence10.1145/3325730.3325745(133-136)Online publication date: 12-Apr-2019
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3325730.3325745

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