Fairness in Multiagent Resource Allocation with Dynamic and Partial Observations
Pages 1868 - 1870
Abstract
We investigate fairness issues in distributed resource allocation of indivisible goods. More specifically, we study envy-freeness in a setting where the observations of agents only result from encounters with other agents. Agents thus have a partial and uncertain view of the entire allocation, that they maintain throughout the process, and which allows them to have different estimates of their envy. We provide a fully distributed protocol allowing to guarantee termination despite the limited knowledge of agents.
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Published In
July 2018
2312 pages
- General Chairs:
- Elisabeth Andre,
- Sven Koenig,
- Program Chairs:
- Mehdi Dastani,
- Gita Sukthankar
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In-Cooperation
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International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Richland, SC
Publication History
Published: 09 July 2018
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AAMAS '18 Paper Acceptance Rate 149 of 607 submissions, 25%;
Overall Acceptance Rate 1,155 of 5,036 submissions, 23%
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