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NetWarden: mitigating network covert channels while preserving performance

Published: 12 August 2020 Publication History

Abstract

Network covert channels are an advanced threat to the security of distributed systems. Existing defenses all come at the cost of performance, so they present significant barriers to a practical deployment in high-speed networks. We propose NetWarden, a novel defense whose key design goal is to preserve TCP performance while mitigating covert channels. The use of programmable data planes makes it possible for NetWarden to adapt defenses that were only demonstrated before as proof of concept, and apply them at linespeed. Moreover, NetWarden uses a set of performance boosting techniques to temporarily increase the performance of connections that have been affected by covert channel mitigation, with the ultimate goal of neutralizing the overall performance impact. NetWarden also uses a fastpath/slowpath architecture to combine the generality of software and the efficiency of hardware for effective defense. Our evaluation shows that NetWarden works smoothly with complex applications and workloads, and that it can mitigate covert timing and storage channels with little performance disturbance.

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Cited By

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  • (2021)A Vision for Runtime Programmable NetworksProceedings of the Twentieth ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks10.1145/3484266.3487377(91-98)Online publication date: 10-Nov-2021

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cover image Guide Proceedings
SEC'20: Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Conference on Security Symposium
August 2020
2809 pages
ISBN:978-1-939133-17-5

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Published: 12 August 2020

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  • (2021)A Vision for Runtime Programmable NetworksProceedings of the Twentieth ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks10.1145/3484266.3487377(91-98)Online publication date: 10-Nov-2021

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