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Dynamic models of coalition formation: fallback vs. build-up

Published: 20 June 2003 Publication History

Abstract

Players are assumed to rank each other as coalition partners. Two processes of coalition formation are defined and illustrated:•Fallback (FB): Players seek coalition partners by descending lower and lower in their preference rankings until some majority coalition, all of whose members consider each other mutually acceptable, forms.•Build-up (BU): Same descent as FB, except only majorities whose members rank each other highest form coalitions.BU coalitions are stable in the sense that no member would prefer to be in another coalition, whereas FB coalitions, whose members need not rank each other highest, may not be stable. BU coalitions are bimodally distributed in a random society, with peaks around simple majority and unanimity; the distributions of majorities in the US Supreme Court and in the US House of Representatives follow this pattern. Other examples of real-life coalition processes are discussed.

References

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Brams, Steven J. (1978). The Presidential Election Game. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
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Brams, Steven J., Michael A. Jones, and D. Marc Kilgour (2003). "Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process Matters." Preprint, Department of Politics, New York University.
[3]
Brams, Steven J., Michael A. Jones, and D. Marc Kilgour (2002). "Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions." Journal of Theoretical Politics 14, no. 3 (July): 359--383.
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Brams, Steven J., and D. Marc Kilgour (2001). "Fallback Bargaining." Group Decision and Negotiation 10, no. 4 (July): 287--316.
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Cechlárová, Katarina, and Antonio Romero-Medina (2000). "Stability in Coalition Formation Games." International Journal of Game Theory 29, no. 4 (December): 487--494.
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Edelman, Paul H., and Suzanna Sherry (2000). "All or Nothing: Explaining the Size of Supreme Court Majorities." North Carolina Law Review 78, no. 5 (June): 1225--52.
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Greenberg, Joseph, and Shlomo Weber (1993). "Stable Coalition Structures with a Unidimensional Set of Alternatives." Journal of Economic Theory 60, no. 1: 62--82.
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Iizuka, Hiroyuki, Masahito Yamamoto, Keji Suzuki, and Azuma Ohuchi (2002). "Bottom-up Consensus Formation in Voting Games." Nonlinear Dynamics, Psychology, and Life Sciences 6, no. 2 (April): 185--195.
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Müller, Wolfgang C., and Kaare Strom (eds.) (2001). Coalition Government in Western Europe. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
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Cited By

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  • (2016)Communities in Preference Networks: Refined Axioms and Beyond2016 IEEE 16th International Conference on Data Mining (ICDM)10.1109/ICDM.2016.0071(599-608)Online publication date: Dec-2016
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cover image ACM Other conferences
TARK '03: Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
June 2003
245 pages
ISBN:1581137311
DOI:10.1145/846241
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

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Published: 20 June 2003

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SenSys03
SenSys03: The First ACM Conference on Embedded Networked
June 20 - 22, 2003
Indiana, Univerity of Indiana

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Overall Acceptance Rate 61 of 177 submissions, 34%

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Cited By

View all
  • (2018)Scalable Algorithms for Data and Network AnalysisFoundations and Trends® in Theoretical Computer Science10.1561/040000005112:1–2(1-274)Online publication date: 13-Dec-2018
  • (2016)An Axiomatic Approach to Community DetectionProceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science10.1145/2840728.2840748(135-146)Online publication date: 14-Jan-2016
  • (2016)Communities in Preference Networks: Refined Axioms and Beyond2016 IEEE 16th International Conference on Data Mining (ICDM)10.1109/ICDM.2016.0071(599-608)Online publication date: Dec-2016
  • (2011)Dynamic coalition adaptation for efficient agent-based virtual power plantsProceedings of the 9th German conference on Multiagent system technologies10.5555/2050592.2050603(101-112)Online publication date: 6-Oct-2011
  • (2011)Dynamic Coalition Adaptation for Efficient Agent-Based Virtual Power PlantsMultiagent System Technologies10.1007/978-3-642-24603-6_11(101-112)Online publication date: 2011

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