TARK

This paper presents a formal epistemic framework for dynamic games in which players, during the course of the game, may revise their beliefs about the opponents' utility functions. We impose two key conditions upon the players' beliefs: (a) throughout ...

An important approach to game theory is to examine the consequences of beliefs that agents may have about each other. This paper investigates respect for public preferences. Consider an agent A who believes that B strictly prefers an option a to an ...

We introduce an axiomatic approach to the problem of inferring a complete and transitive weak ordering representing the agent's preferences given a set of observed constraints. The axioms characterize a unique inference rule, which amounts to the ...

In this paper I argue for a broad game theoretical perspective on language use. Polite linguistic behavior, in particular, should be taken as rational interaction of conversational partners that each come with their own beliefs and preferences. I argue ...

We generalize the framework of non-cooperative computation (NCC), recently introduced by Shoham and Tennenholtz, to apply to cryptographic situations. We consider functions whose inputs are held by separate, self-interested agents. We consider four ...

This paper deals with multi-unit combinatorial auctions where there are n types of goods for sale, and for each good there is some fixed number of units. We focus on the case where each bidder desires a relatively small number of units of each good. In ...

Over the last several years, a number of authors have developed graphtheoretic or network models for large-population game theory. In such models, each player or organization is represented by a vertex in a graph, and payoffs are determined by the ...

This paper applies to quantum systems a modelling for the logic of knowledge, originally developed for reasoning about distributed systems, but since then applied to game theory, computer security and artificial intelligence. A formal model of quantum ...

The framework of algorithmic knowledge assumes that agents use deterministic knowledge algorithms to compute the facts they explicitly know. We extend the framework to allow for randomized knowledge algorithms. We then characterize the information ...

The paper explains enumerative induction, the confirmation of a law by its positive instances, in ranking theoretic terms. It gives a ranking theoretic explication of a possible law or a nomological hypothesis. And it shows, finally, that such schemes ...

Standard state-space models, which are widely used in economics, preclude non-trivial forms of unawareness as shown by Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (1998). We define a generalized state-space model that allows for unawareness. In order to facilitate ...

We provide a formal study of belief retraction operators that do not necessarily satisfy the (Inclusion) postulate. Our intuition is that a rational description of belief change must do justice to cases in which dropping a belief can lead to the ...

The paper offers a complete probabilistic characterization of the abductive operator axiomatized by Maurice Pagnuco in [11]. The model assumes the axiomatic characterization of Conditional Coherence presented by Lester Dubins in section 3 of [8]. It ...

Players are assumed to rank each other as coalition partners. Two processes of coalition formation are defined and illustrated:•Fallback (FB): Players seek coalition partners by descending lower and lower in their preference rankings until some majority ...

In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue. Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but seminal results have shown that all general voting protocols are manipulable. One ...

In this paper we investigate complexity issues related to pure Nash equilibria of strategic games. We show that, even in very restrictive settings, determining whether a game has a pure Nash Equilibrium is NP-hard, while deciding whether a game has a ...

In many real-world situations, "cooperation" in the simple sense of the Prisoner's Dilemma is not sufficient for success: instead, cooperators must precisely coordinate more complex behaviors in a noisy environment. We investigate one such model, the ...