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A decision-analytic approach for P2P cooperation policy setting

Published: 03 October 2010 Publication History

Abstract

While overall performance of peer-to-peer systems depends strongly on the amount of resource contributions made by individual peers, autonomous and rational peers make decisions on their cooperation policies (resource contributions) according to their individual utilities. To deal with the inherent conflict among individual utilities of the rational peers to improve overall performance of the system, we propose a decision-analytic approach that determines the appropriate cooperation policies of the individual peers in a distributed manner and coordinates their rational decisions in compliance with the social welfare improvement.

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cover image ACM Other conferences
NetEcon '10: Proceedings of the 2010 Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems, and Computation
October 2010
67 pages
ISBN:9781450373043
DOI:10.1145/1879082
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Association for Computing Machinery

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Published: 03 October 2010

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Author Tags

  1. Pareto efficiency
  2. distributed decision making
  3. game theory
  4. rational peers

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NetEcon '10
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