Fair and Efficient Division of a Discrete Cake with Switching Utility Loss
Authors: 
Zheng Chen, Bo Li, 
Minming Li, Guochuan ZhangAuthors Info & Claims
Zheng Chen, Bo Li, Minming Li, Guochuan ZhangAuthors Info & ClaimsPages 2641 - 2649
Abstract
Cake cutting is a widely studied model for allocating resources with temporal or spatial structures among agents. Recently, a new line of research has emerged that focuses on the discrete variant, where the resources are indivisible and connected by a path. In some real-world applications, the resources are interdependent, and dividing the cake may reduce their effectiveness. In this paper, we introduce a model that captures the effect of division as switching utility loss and investigate the tradeoff between fairness and efficiency for various settings. Specifically, we measure fairness and efficiency using the popular notions of envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) and social welfare, respectively. The goal of our study is to understand how much social welfare must be sacrificed to ensure EF1 allocations and design polynomial-time algorithms that can compute EF1 allocations with the best possible social welfare guarantee.
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Index Terms
- Fair and Efficient Division of a Discrete Cake with Switching Utility Loss
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Published In
May 2024
2898 pages
ISBN:9798400704864
- General Chairs:
- Mehdi Dastani,
- Jaime Simão Sichman,
- Program Chairs:
- Natasha Alechina,
- Virginia Dignum
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International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Richland, SC
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Published: 06 May 2024
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- Hong Kong SAR Research Grants Council
- Science and Technology Innovation 2030 - "The Next Generation of Artificial Intelligence" Major Project
- the National Natural Science Foundation of China
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AAMAS '23
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AAMAS '23: International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
May 6 - 10, 2024
Auckland, New Zealand
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