ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation

Mechanism design for distributed systems is fundamentally concerned with aligning individual incentives with social welfare to avoid socially inefficient outcomes that can arise from agents acting autonomously. One simple and natural approach is to ...

We characterize the Price of Anarchy (POA) in weighted congestion games, as a function of the allowable resource cost functions. Our results provide as thorough an understanding of this quantity as is already known for nonatomic and unweighted ...

We consider K-Facility Location games, where n strategic agents report their locations in a metric space and a mechanism maps them to K facilities. The agents seek to minimize their connection cost, namely the distance of their true location to the ...

Generalized characteristic function games are a variation of characteristic function games, in which the value of a coalition depends not only on the identities of its members, but also on the order in which the coalition is formed. This class of games ...

We study the inefficiency of equilibria for congestion games when players are (partially) altruistic. We model altruistic behavior by assuming that player i's perceived cost is a convex combination of α_i times his direct cost and α_i times the social ...