Article

Unawareness, beliefs and games

Authors:

Burkhard C. SchipperAuthors Info & Claims

TARK '07: Proceedings of the 11th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge

Pages 183 - 192

https://doi.org/10.1145/1324249.1324275

Published: 25 June 2007 Publication History

Abstract

We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for many potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower awareness levels. We use our unawareness belief structure to show that the common prior assumption is too weak to rule out speculative trade in all states. Yet, we prove a generalized "No-trade" theorem according to which there can not be common certainty of strict preference to trade. Moreover, we show a generalization of the "No-agreeing-to-disagree" theorem.

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Cited By

Halpern JRêgo L(2014)Extensive games with possibly unaware playersMathematical Social Sciences10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.11.00270(42-58)Online publication date: Jul-2014
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.11.002
Halpern JPass R(2011)Algorithmic rationalityACM SIGecom Exchanges10.1145/1998549.199855110:2(9-15)Online publication date: 1-Jun-2011
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/1998549.1998551
Chen YEly JLuo X(2011)Note on unawareness: Negative Introspection versus AU Introspection (and KU Introspection)International Journal of Game Theory10.1007/s00182-011-0287-541:2(325-329)Online publication date: 21-Jun-2011
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0287-5
Show More Cited By

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TARK '07: Proceedings of the 11th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge

June 2007

296 pages

ISBN:9781450378413

DOI:10.1145/1324249

Program Chair:
Dov Samet

Copyright © 2007 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Publication History

Published: 25 June 2007

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TARK '07 Paper Acceptance Rate 32 of 100 submissions, 32%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 61 of 177 submissions, 34%

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Cited By

Halpern JRêgo L(2014)Extensive games with possibly unaware playersMathematical Social Sciences10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.11.00270(42-58)Online publication date: Jul-2014
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.11.002
Halpern JPass R(2011)Algorithmic rationalityACM SIGecom Exchanges10.1145/1998549.199855110:2(9-15)Online publication date: 1-Jun-2011
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/1998549.1998551
Chen YEly JLuo X(2011)Note on unawareness: Negative Introspection versus AU Introspection (and KU Introspection)International Journal of Game Theory10.1007/s00182-011-0287-541:2(325-329)Online publication date: 21-Jun-2011
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0287-5
Galanis S(2010)Syntactic foundations for unawareness of theoremsTheory and Decision10.1007/s11238-010-9218-371:4(593-614)Online publication date: 29-May-2010
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-010-9218-3
Galanis SHeifetz A(2009)Syntactic foundations for unawareness of theoremsProceedings of the 12th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge10.1145/1562814.1562835(136-145)Online publication date: 6-Jul-2009
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/1562814.1562835
Halpern JBazzi RPatt-Shamir B(2008)Beyond nash equilibriumProceedings of the twenty-seventh ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing10.1145/1400751.1400752(1-10)Online publication date: 18-Aug-2008
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/1400751.1400752
Hill B(2008)Towards a “Sophisticated” Model of Belief Dynamics. Part II: Belief Revision.Studia Logica10.1007/s11225-008-9130-989:3(291-323)Online publication date: 2-Aug-2008
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-008-9130-9
Hill B(2008)Towards a "Sophisticated" Model of Belief Dynamics. Part IStudia Logica10.1007/s11225-008-9119-489:1(81-109)Online publication date: 1-Jun-2008
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s11225-008-9119-4
Modica S(2008)Unawareness, priors and posteriorsDecisions in Economics and Finance10.1007/s10203-007-0078-431:2(81-94)Online publication date: 5-Jan-2008
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10203-007-0078-4
Heinsalu S(undefined)Universal Type Spaces with UnawarenessSSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.1971850
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1971850

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