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Truthful opinions from the crowds

Authors:

Radu Jurca,

Boi FaltingsAuthors Info & Claims

ACM SIGecom Exchanges, Volume 7, Issue 2

Article No.: 3, Pages 1 - 4

https://doi.org/10.1145/1399589.1399592

Published: 01 June 2008 Publication History

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References

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Cai QTang PZeng YAndre EKoenig SDastani MSukthankar G(2018)Ranking Mechanism Design for Price-setting Agents in E-commerceProceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3237383.3237925(1504-1512)Online publication date: 9-Jul-2018
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Liu CCai QZhang YLarson KWinikoff MDas SDurfee E(2017)Multi-armed Bandit Mechanism with Private HistoriesProceedings of the 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3091125.3091378(1607-1609)Online publication date: 8-May-2017
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Cai QFilos-Ratsikas ALiu CTang PSen SGeyer WFreyne JCastells P(2016)Mechanism Design for Personalized Recommender SystemsProceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Recommender Systems10.1145/2959100.2959135(159-166)Online publication date: 7-Sep-2016
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Published In

ACM SIGecom Exchanges Volume 7, Issue 2

June 2008

60 pages

EISSN:1551-9031

DOI:10.1145/1399589

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

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Published: 01 June 2008

Published in SIGECOM Volume 7, Issue 2

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Cai QTang PZeng YAndre EKoenig SDastani MSukthankar G(2018)Ranking Mechanism Design for Price-setting Agents in E-commerceProceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3237383.3237925(1504-1512)Online publication date: 9-Jul-2018
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3237383.3237925
Liu CCai QZhang YLarson KWinikoff MDas SDurfee E(2017)Multi-armed Bandit Mechanism with Private HistoriesProceedings of the 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3091125.3091378(1607-1609)Online publication date: 8-May-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3091125.3091378
Cai QFilos-Ratsikas ALiu CTang PSen SGeyer WFreyne JCastells P(2016)Mechanism Design for Personalized Recommender SystemsProceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Recommender Systems10.1145/2959100.2959135(159-166)Online publication date: 7-Sep-2016
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2959100.2959135
Bentahar JKhosravifar BClacens KGoffart CThiran PGini MShehory OIto TJonker C(2013)On the analysis of joining communities of agent-basedweb servicesProceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems10.5555/2484920.2485213(1339-1340)Online publication date: 6-May-2013
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Ray RVallam RNarahari YGini MShehory OIto TJonker C(2013)Eliciting high quality feedback from crowdsourced tree networks using continuous scoring rulesProceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems10.5555/2484920.2484967(279-286)Online publication date: 6-May-2013
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/2484920.2484967
Kannan RBielikova MAndres FBalasundaram SShyamasundar RShastri L(2011)Understanding honest feedbacks and opinions in academic environmentsProceedings of the Fourth Annual ACM Bangalore Conference10.1145/1980422.1980443(1-4)Online publication date: 25-Mar-2011
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/1980422.1980443

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