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Automated market-making in the large: the gates hillman prediction market

Published: 07 June 2010 Publication History
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    We designed and built the Gates Hillman Prediction Market (GHPM) to predict the opening day of the Gates and Hillman Centers, the new computer science buildings at Carnegie Mellon University. The market ran for almost a year and attracted 169 active traders who placed almost 40,000 bets with an automated market maker. Ranging over 365 possible opening days, the market's event partition size is the largest ever elicited in any prediction market by an order of magnitude. A market of this size required new advances, including a novel span-based elicitation interface. The results of the GHPM are important for two reasons. First, we uncovered two flaws of current automated market makers: spikiness and liquidity-insensitivity, and we develop the mathematical underpinnings of these flaws. Second, the market provides a valuable corpus of identity-linked trades. We use this data set to explore whether the market reacted to or anticipated official communications, how self-reported trader confidence had little relation to actual performance, and how trade frequencies suggest a power law distribution. Most significantly, the data enabled us to evaluate two competing hypotheses about how markets aggregate information, the Marginal Trader Hypothesis and the Hayek Hypothesis; the data strongly support the former.

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    cover image ACM Conferences
    EC '10: Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
    June 2010
    400 pages
    ISBN:9781605588223
    DOI:10.1145/1807342
    Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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    Publication History

    Published: 07 June 2010

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    Author Tags

    1. automated market making
    2. data analysis
    3. elicitation
    4. experimental studies
    5. prediction markets

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    EC '10
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    EC '10: ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
    June 7 - 11, 2010
    Massachusetts, Cambridge, USA

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    Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%

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