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iSpy: automatic reconstruction of typed input from compromising reflections

Published: 17 October 2011 Publication History

Abstract

We investigate the implications of the ubiquity of personal mobile devices and reveal new techniques for compromising the privacy of users typing on virtual keyboards. Specifi- cally, we show that so-called compromising reflections (in, for example, a victim's sunglasses) of a device's screen are sufficient to enable automated reconstruction, from video, of text typed on a virtual keyboard. Despite our deliberate use of low cost commodity video cameras, we are able to compensate for variables such as arbitrary camera and device positioning and motion through the application of advanced computer vision and machine learning techniques. Using footage captured in realistic environments (e.g., on a bus), we show that we are able to reconstruct fluent translations of recorded data in almost all of the test cases, correcting users' typing mistakes at the same time. We believe these results highlight the importance of adjusting privacy expectations in response to emerging technologies.

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cover image ACM Conferences
CCS '11: Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
October 2011
742 pages
ISBN:9781450309486
DOI:10.1145/2046707
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Publication History

Published: 17 October 2011

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Author Tags

  1. compromising emanations
  2. computer vision
  3. language modeling
  4. mobile devices
  5. privacy

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CCS '11 Paper Acceptance Rate 60 of 429 submissions, 14%;
Overall Acceptance Rate 1,261 of 6,999 submissions, 18%

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  • (2024)Video-Based Cryptanalysis: Extracting Cryptographic Keys from Video Footage of a Device’s Power LED Captured by Standard Video Cameras2024 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)10.1109/SP54263.2024.00163(2422-2440)Online publication date: 19-May-2024
  • (2024)A TEMPEST Attack Implementation based on Hidden Markov model in Smart GridJournal of Physics: Conference Series10.1088/1742-6596/2774/1/0120092774:1(012009)Online publication date: 1-Jul-2024
  • (2024)A Systematic Deconstruction of Human-Centric Privacy & Security Threats on Mobile PhonesInternational Journal of Human–Computer Interaction10.1080/10447318.2024.2361519(1-24)Online publication date: 12-Jun-2024
  • (2022)Leveraging Disentangled Representations to Improve Vision-Based Keystroke Inference Attacks Under Low Data ConstraintsProceedings of the Twelfth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy10.1145/3508398.3511498(242-251)Online publication date: 14-Apr-2022
  • (2022)Eye-based keystroke prediction for natural texts – a feasibility analysis2022 IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom)10.1109/TrustCom56396.2022.00059(375-382)Online publication date: Dec-2022
  • (2022)SchrodinText: Strong Protection of Sensitive Textual Content of Mobile ApplicationsIEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing10.1109/TMC.2020.302511921:4(1402-1419)Online publication date: 1-Apr-2022
  • (2022)Background Buster: Peeking through Virtual Backgrounds in Online Video Calls2022 52nd Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)10.1109/DSN53405.2022.00058(522-533)Online publication date: Jun-2022
  • (2021)This Sneaky Piggy Went to the Android Ad Market: Misusing Mobile Sensors for Stealthy Data ExfiltrationProceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3460120.3485366(1065-1081)Online publication date: 12-Nov-2021
  • (2021)Glowworm Attack: Optical TEMPEST Sound Recovery via a Device's Power Indicator LEDProceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3460120.3484775(1900-1914)Online publication date: 12-Nov-2021
  • (2021)Periscope: A Keystroke Inference Attack Using Human Coupled Electromagnetic EmanationsProceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3460120.3484549(700-714)Online publication date: 12-Nov-2021
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