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(sp)iPhone: decoding vibrations from nearby keyboards using mobile phone accelerometers

Published: 17 October 2011 Publication History

Abstract

Mobile phones are increasingly equipped with a range of highly responsive sensors. From cameras and GPS receivers to three-axis accelerometers, applications running on these devices are able to experience rich interactions with their environment. Unfortunately, some applications may be able to use such sensors to monitor their surroundings in unintended ways. In this paper, we demonstrate that an application with access to accelerometer readings on a modern mobile phone can use such information to recover text entered on a nearby keyboard. Note that unlike previous emanation recovery papers, the accelerometers on such devices sample at near the Nyquist rate, making previous techniques unworkable. Our application instead detects and decodes keystrokes by measuring the relative physical position and distance between each vibration. We then match abstracted words against candidate dictionaries and record word recovery rates as high as 80%. In so doing, we demonstrate the potential to recover significant information from the vicinity of a mobile device without gaining access to resources generally considered to be the most likely sources of leakage (e.g., microphone, camera).

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      cover image ACM Conferences
      CCS '11: Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
      October 2011
      742 pages
      ISBN:9781450309486
      DOI:10.1145/2046707
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      Published: 17 October 2011

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      Author Tags

      1. accelerometer
      2. information leakage
      3. mobile phones

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      • (2024)Gait Characterization in Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy (DMD) Using a Single-Sensor Accelerometer: Classical Machine Learning and Deep Learning ApproachesSensors10.3390/s2404112324:4(1123)Online publication date: 8-Feb-2024
      • (2024)Raising Awareness for Inertial Sensors-based Keylogging on SmartphonesProceedings of the 2024 International Conference on Information Technology for Social Good10.1145/3677525.3678634(14-21)Online publication date: 4-Sep-2024
      • (2024)Watch the Rhythm: Breaking Privacy with Accelerometer at the Extremely-Low Sampling Rate of 5HzProceedings of the 2024 on ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3658644.3690370(1776-1790)Online publication date: 2-Dec-2024
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