Location via proxy:   [ UP ]  
[Report a bug]   [Manage cookies]                
skip to main content
10.1145/2076732.2076762acmotherconferencesArticle/Chapter ViewAbstractPublication PagesacsacConference Proceedingsconference-collections
research-article

Exploring the potential benefits of expanded rate limiting in Tor: slow and steady wins the race with Tortoise

Published: 05 December 2011 Publication History
  • Get Citation Alerts
  • Abstract

    Tor is a volunteer-operated network of application-layer relays that enables users to communicate privately and anonymously. Unfortunately, Tor often exhibits poor performance due to congestion caused by the unbalanced ratio of clients to available relays, as well as a disproportionately high consumption of network capacity by a small fraction of filesharing users.
    This paper argues the very counterintuitive notion that slowing down traffic on Tor will increase the bandwidth capacity of the network and consequently improve the experience of interactive web users. We introduce Tortoise, a system for rate limiting Tor at its ingress points. We demonstrate that Tortoise incurs little penalty for interactive web users, while significantly decreasing the throughput for filesharers. Our techniques provide incentives to filesharers to configure their Tor clients to also relay traffic, which in turn improves the network's overall performance. We present large-scale emulation results that indicate that interactive users will achieve a significant speedup if even a small fraction of clients opt to run relays.

    References

    [1]
    Alexa: The Web Information Company. Top Sites. http://www.alexa.com/topsites. Retrieved May 13, 2011.
    [2]
    E. Androulaki, M. Raykova, S. Srivatsan, A. Stavrou, and S. Bellovin. PAR: Payment for Anonymous Routing. In Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium (PETS), 2008.
    [3]
    K. Bauer, M. Sherr, D. McCoy, and D. Grunwald. ExperimenTor: A Testbed for Safe and Realistic Tor Experimentation. In USENIX Workshop on Cyber Security Experimentation and Test (CSET), 2011.
    [4]
    S. L. Blond, P. Manils, A. Chaabane, M. A. Kaafar, A. Legout, C. Castellucia, and W. Dabbous. De-anonymizing BitTorrent Users on Tor (poster). In USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI), 2010.
    [5]
    Y. Chen, R. Sion, and B. Carbunar. XPay: Practical Anonymous Payments for Tor Routing and Other Networked Services. In ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (WPES), 2009.
    [6]
    R. Dingledine. Research Problem: Adaptive Throttling of Tor Clients by Entry Guards. http://preview.tinyurl.com/3tcyaem. Retrieved May 24, 2011.
    [7]
    R. Dingledine. Bittorrent Over Tor Isn't a Good Idea. https://blog.torproject.org/blog/bittorrent-over-tor-isnt-good-idea, April 2010.
    [8]
    R. Dingledine and N. Mathewson. Tor Path Specification. http://www.torproject.org/svn/trunk/doc/spec/path-spec.txt, January 2008.
    [9]
    R. Dingledine, N. Mathewson, and P. Syverson. Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router. In USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX), 2004.
    [10]
    R. Dingledine and S. Murdoch. Performance Improvements on Tor, or, Why Tor is Slow and What We're Going to Do About It. https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/roadmaps/2009-03-11-performance.pdf, March 2009.
    [11]
    J. R. Douceur. The Sybil Attack. In International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems (IPTPS), 2002.
    [12]
    F. Hernández-Campos, K. Jeffay, and F. Smith. Tracking the Evolution of Web Traffic: 1995--2003. In Modeling, Analysis and Simulation of Computer Telecommunications Systems (MASCOTS), 2003.
    [13]
    A. Hintz. Fingerprinting Websites Using Traffic Analysis. In Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium (PETS), 2003.
    [14]
    R. Jansen, N. Hopper, and Y. Kim. Recruiting New Tor Relays with BRAIDS. In ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), 2010.
    [15]
    K. Loesing. Measuring the Tor Network: Evaluation of Client Requests to the Directories. Technical report, Tor Project, June 2009.
    [16]
    N. Mathewson. Evaluating SCTP for Tor. http://archives.seul.org/or/dev/Sep-2004/msg00002.html, September 2004. Listserv posting.
    [17]
    D. McCoy, K. Bauer, D. Grunwald, T. Kohno, and D. Sicker. Shining Light in Dark Places: Understanding the Tor Network. In Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium (PETS), 2008.
    [18]
    R. C. Merkle. Secure Communications over Insecure Channels. Communications of the ACM, 21:294--299, April 1978.
    [19]
    S. J. Murdoch. Hot or Not: Revealing Hidden Services by Their Clock Skew. In ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), 2006.
    [20]
    S. J. Murdoch and R. N. M. Watson. Metrics for Security and Performance in Low-Latency Anonymity Systems. In Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium (PETS), 2008.
    [21]
    NetIndex Source Data. http://netindex.com/source-data/. Retrieved May 26, 2011.
    [22]
    T.-W. J. Ngan, R. Dingledine, and D. Wallach. Building Incentives into Tor. In Financial Cryptography and Data Security, 2010.
    [23]
    M. Perry. Tips for running an exit node with minimal harassment. https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tips-running-exit-node-minimal-harassment. Retrieved May 16, 2011.
    [24]
    M. Perry. Computing Bandwidth Adjustments. Proposal 161, Tor Project, 2009.
    [25]
    J. Reardon and I. Goldberg. Improving Tor using a TCP-over-DTLS Tunnel. In USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX), 2009.
    [26]
    M. Sherr, M. Blaze, and B. T. Loo. Scalable Link-Based Relay Selection for Anonymous Routing. In Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium (PETS), August 2009.
    [27]
    M. Sherr, A. Mao, W. R. Marczak, W. Zhou, B. T. Loo, and M. Blaze. A3: An Extensible Platform for Application-Aware Anonymity. In Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS), 2010.
    [28]
    R. Snader and N. Borisov. A Tune-up for Tor: Improving Security and Performance in the Tor Network. In Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS), 2008.
    [29]
    C. Tang and I. Goldberg. An Improved Algorithm for Tor Circuit Scheduling. In ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), 2010.
    [30]
    Tor Project, Inc. Tor Directory Protocol, Version 3, 2010. https://git.torproject.org/checkout/tor/master/doc/spec/dir-spec.txt.
    [31]
    A. Vahdat, K. Yocum, K. Walsh, P. Mahadevan, D. Kostić, J. Chase, and D. Becker. Scalability and Accuracy in a Large-scale Network Emulator. SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev., 36:271--284, December 2002.
    [32]
    S. Zander and S. J. Murdoch. An Improved Clock-Skew Measurement Technique for Revealing Hidden Services. In USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX), 2008.
    [33]
    Zona Publishing. The Need for Speed II. Zona Market Bulletin, 5, April 2001.

    Cited By

    View all
    • (2022)QDRL: QoS-Aware Deep Reinforcement Learning Approach for Tor's Circuit SchedulingIEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering10.1109/TNSE.2022.31795699:5(3396-3410)Online publication date: 1-Sep-2022
    • (2021)On the Accuracy of Tor Bandwidth EstimationPassive and Active Measurement10.1007/978-3-030-72582-2_28(481-498)Online publication date: 30-Mar-2021
    • (2020)Bypassing Tor Exit Blocking with Exit Bridge Onion ServicesProceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3372297.3417245(3-16)Online publication date: 30-Oct-2020
    • Show More Cited By

    Recommendations

    Comments

    Information & Contributors

    Information

    Published In

    cover image ACM Other conferences
    ACSAC '11: Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
    December 2011
    432 pages
    ISBN:9781450306720
    DOI:10.1145/2076732
    Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

    Sponsors

    • ACSA: Applied Computing Security Assoc

    Publisher

    Association for Computing Machinery

    New York, NY, United States

    Publication History

    Published: 05 December 2011

    Permissions

    Request permissions for this article.

    Check for updates

    Author Tags

    1. Tor
    2. anonymity
    3. performance

    Qualifiers

    • Research-article

    Funding Sources

    Conference

    ACSAC '11
    Sponsor:
    • ACSA
    ACSAC '11: Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
    December 5 - 9, 2011
    Florida, Orlando, USA

    Acceptance Rates

    Overall Acceptance Rate 104 of 497 submissions, 21%

    Contributors

    Other Metrics

    Bibliometrics & Citations

    Bibliometrics

    Article Metrics

    • Downloads (Last 12 months)8
    • Downloads (Last 6 weeks)0
    Reflects downloads up to 10 Aug 2024

    Other Metrics

    Citations

    Cited By

    View all
    • (2022)QDRL: QoS-Aware Deep Reinforcement Learning Approach for Tor's Circuit SchedulingIEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering10.1109/TNSE.2022.31795699:5(3396-3410)Online publication date: 1-Sep-2022
    • (2021)On the Accuracy of Tor Bandwidth EstimationPassive and Active Measurement10.1007/978-3-030-72582-2_28(481-498)Online publication date: 30-Mar-2021
    • (2020)Bypassing Tor Exit Blocking with Exit Bridge Onion ServicesProceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3372297.3417245(3-16)Online publication date: 30-Oct-2020
    • (2018)Path selection algorithm with minimal delay in wireless sensor networksInternational Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks10.1177/155014771879385614:8(155014771879385)Online publication date: 21-Aug-2018
    • (2018)KISTACM Transactions on Privacy and Security10.1145/327812122:1(1-37)Online publication date: 10-Dec-2018
    • (2018)Privacy-Preserving Dynamic Learning of Tor Network TrafficProceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3243734.3243815(1944-1961)Online publication date: 15-Oct-2018
    • (2017)Client requirement based path selection algorithm for Tor network2017 8th International Conference on Computing, Communication and Networking Technologies (ICCCNT)10.1109/ICCCNT.2017.8204018(1-6)Online publication date: Jul-2017
    • (2016)Performance and Security Improvements for TorACM Computing Surveys10.1145/294680249:2(1-36)Online publication date: 21-Sep-2016
    • (2016)Evaluating tor modified switching algorithm in the emulation environment2016 22nd Asia-Pacific Conference on Communications (APCC)10.1109/APCC.2016.7581478(510-516)Online publication date: Aug-2016
    • (2015)Reducing Congestion in the Tor Network with Circuit SwitchingJournal of Information Processing10.2197/ipsjjip.23.58923:5(589-602)Online publication date: 2015
    • Show More Cited By

    View Options

    Get Access

    Login options

    View options

    PDF

    View or Download as a PDF file.

    PDF

    eReader

    View online with eReader.

    eReader

    Media

    Figures

    Other

    Tables

    Share

    Share

    Share this Publication link

    Share on social media