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GyrosFinger: Fingerprinting Drones for Location Tracking Based on the Outputs of MEMS Gyroscopes

Published: 05 February 2018 Publication History

Abstract

Drones are widely used for various purposes such as delivery, aerial photography, and surveillance. Considering the increasing drone-related services, tracking the locations of drones can cause security threats such as escaping from drone surveillance, disturbing drone-related services, and capturing drones. For wirelessly monitoring the status of drones, telemetry is used, and this status information contains various data such as latitude and longitude, calibrated sensor outputs, and sensor offsets. Because most of the telemetry implementation supports neither authentication nor encryption, an attacker can obtain the status information of the drones by using an appropriate wireless communication device such as software-defined radio. While the attacker knows the locations of the drones from the status information, this information is not sufficient for tracking drones because the status information does not include any identity information that can bind the identity of the drone with its location.
<?tight?>In this article, we propose a fingerprinting method for drones in motion for the binding of the identity of the drone with its location. Our fingerprinting method is based on the sensor outputs included in the status information, i.e., the offsets of micro-electro mechanical systems (MEMS) gyroscope, an essential sensor for maintaining the attitude of drones. We found that the offsets of MEMS gyroscopes are different from each other because of manufacturing mismatches, and the offsets of five drones obtained through their telemetry are distinguishable and constant during their flights. To evaluate the performance of our fingerprinting method on a larger scale, we collected the offsets from 70 stand-alone MEMS gyroscopes to generate fingerprints. Our experimental results show that, when using the offsets of three and two axes calculated from 128 samples of the raw outputs per axis as fingerprints, the F-scores of the proposed method reach 98.78% and 94.47%, respectively. The offsets collected after a month are also fingerprinted with F-scores of 96.58% and 78.45% under the same condition, respectively. The proposed fingerprinting method is effective, robust, and persistent. Additionally, unless the MEMS gyroscope is not replaced, our fingerprinting method can be used for drone tracking even when the target drones are flying.

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Published In

cover image ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security
ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security  Volume 21, Issue 2
May 2018
159 pages
ISSN:2471-2566
EISSN:2471-2574
DOI:10.1145/3175499
Issue’s Table of Contents
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

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Publication History

Published: 05 February 2018
Accepted: 01 December 2017
Revised: 01 December 2017
Received: 01 March 2017
Published in TOPS Volume 21, Issue 2

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Author Tags

  1. Device fingerprinting
  2. MEMS gyroscope
  3. security
  4. sensor

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  • Research-article
  • Research
  • Refereed

Funding Sources

  • Institute for Information 8 Communications Technology Promotion (IITP)
  • Development of Information Leakage Prevention and ID Management for Secure Drone Services
  • Korean government (MSIT)

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  • (2023)Device-Independent Smartphone Eavesdropping Jointly Using Accelerometer and GyroscopeIEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing10.1109/TDSC.2022.319313020:4(3144-3157)Online publication date: 1-Jul-2023
  • (2023)From Attack to Identification: MEMS Sensor Fingerprinting Using Acoustic SignalsIEEE Internet of Things Journal10.1109/JIOT.2022.322193010:6(5447-5460)Online publication date: 15-Mar-2023
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