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Cybercrime After the Sunrise: A Statistical Analysis of DNS Abuse in New gTLDs

Published: 29 May 2018 Publication History
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  • Abstract

    To enhance competition and choice in the domain name system, ICANN introduced the new gTLD program, which added hundreds of new gTLDs (e.g. .nyc, .io) to the root DNS zone. While the program arguably increased the range of domain names available to consumers, it might also have created new opportunities for cybercriminals. To investigate that, we present the first comparative study of abuse in the domains registered under the new gTLD program and legacy gTLDs (18 in total, such as .com, .org). We combine historical datasets from various sources, including DNS zone files, WHOIS records, passive and active DNS and HTTP measurements, and 11 reputable abuse feeds to study abuse across gTLDs. We find that the new gTLDs appear to have diverted abuse from the legacy gTLDs: while the total number of domains abused for spam remains stable across gTLDs, we observe a growing number of spam domains in new gTLDs which suggests a shift from legacy gTLDs to new gTLDs. Although legacy gTLDs had a rate of 56.9 spam domains per 10,000 registrations (Q4 2016), new gTLDs experienced a rate of 526.6 in the same period-which is almost one order of magnitude higher. In this study, we also analyze the relationship between DNS abuse, operator security indicators and the structural properties of new gTLDs. The results indicate that there is an inverse correlation between abuse and stricter registration policies. Our findings suggest that cybercriminals increasingly prefer to register, rather than hack, domain names and some new gTLDs have become a magnet for malicious actors. ICANN is currently using these results to review the existing anti-abuse safeguards, evaluate their joint effects and to introduce more effective safeguards before an upcoming new gTLD rollout.

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    1. Cybercrime After the Sunrise: A Statistical Analysis of DNS Abuse in New gTLDs

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      cover image ACM Conferences
      ASIACCS '18: Proceedings of the 2018 on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security
      May 2018
      866 pages
      ISBN:9781450355766
      DOI:10.1145/3196494
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      Published: 29 May 2018

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      Author Tags

      1. cybercrime
      2. domain name system
      3. registrars
      4. security metrics
      5. top-level domains

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      • ICANN
      • French Ministry of Research project PERSYVAL-Lab

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      ASIACCS '18 Paper Acceptance Rate 52 of 310 submissions, 17%;
      Overall Acceptance Rate 418 of 2,322 submissions, 18%

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      • (2024)DeepD2V - Deep Learning and Domain Word Embeddings for DGA based Malware Detection2024 IEEE International Conference on Machine Learning for Communication and Networking (ICMLCN)10.1109/ICMLCN59089.2024.10624693(164-170)Online publication date: 5-May-2024
      • (2024)Longitudinal Measurement Study of the Domain Names Associated With the Olympic GamesIEEE Access10.1109/ACCESS.2024.336010812(19128-19144)Online publication date: 2024
      • (2024)The legacies of long tail and the unfolding of consolidation and concentration in the top-level domain sectorJournal of Cyber Policy10.1080/23738871.2023.22900578:2(218-238)Online publication date: 2-Jan-2024
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