research-article

Mining competition in a multi-cryptocurrency ecosystem at the network edge: a congestion game approach

Authors:

Alexandre Reiffers,

Daniel S. Menasche,

Swapnil Dhamal,

Corinne TouatiAuthors Info & Claims

ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review, Volume 46, Issue 3

Pages 114 - 117

https://doi.org/10.1145/3308897.3308950

Published: 25 January 2019 Publication History

Abstract

We model the competition over several blockchains characterizing multiple cryptocurrencies as a non-cooperative game. Then, we specialize our results to two instances of the general game, showing properties of the Nash equilibrium. In particular, leveraging results about congestion games, we establish the existence of pure Nash equilibria and provide efficient algorithms for finding such equilibria.

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Cited By

Li QZhao GFeng M(2022)Prisoner’s Dilemma Game with Cooperation-Defection Dominance Strategies on Correlational Multilayer NetworksEntropy10.3390/e2406082224:6(822)Online publication date: 13-Jun-2022
https://doi.org/10.3390/e24060822
Rana RKannan STse DViswanath P(2022)Free2ShardProceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems10.1145/35080316:1(1-38)Online publication date: 28-Feb-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3508031
Le Cadre HMou YHöschle H(2022)Parametrized Inexact-ADMM based coordination games: A normalized Nash equilibrium approachEuropean Journal of Operational Research10.1016/j.ejor.2021.04.047296:2(696-716)Online publication date: Jan-2022
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2021.04.047
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Published In

cover image ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review

ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review Volume 46, Issue 3

December 2018

174 pages

ISSN:0163-5999

DOI:10.1145/3308897

Editor:
Nidhi Hegde
Borealis AI

Issue’s Table of Contents

Copyright © 2019 Copyright is held by the owner/author(s).

Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the Owner/Author.

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Association for Computing Machinery

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Publication History

Published: 25 January 2019

Published in SIGMETRICS Volume 46, Issue 3

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Cited By

Li QZhao GFeng M(2022)Prisoner’s Dilemma Game with Cooperation-Defection Dominance Strategies on Correlational Multilayer NetworksEntropy10.3390/e2406082224:6(822)Online publication date: 13-Jun-2022
https://doi.org/10.3390/e24060822
Rana RKannan STse DViswanath P(2022)Free2ShardProceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems10.1145/35080316:1(1-38)Online publication date: 28-Feb-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3508031
Le Cadre HMou YHöschle H(2022)Parametrized Inexact-ADMM based coordination games: A normalized Nash equilibrium approachEuropean Journal of Operational Research10.1016/j.ejor.2021.04.047296:2(696-716)Online publication date: Jan-2022
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2021.04.047
Wang XQiu CRen XXiong ZLeung VNiyato DWang XQiu CRen XXiong ZLeung VNiyato D(2022)Overview of Edge Intelligence and BlockchainIntegrating Edge Intelligence and Blockchain10.1007/978-3-031-10186-1_2(9-31)Online publication date: 30-Jun-2022
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10186-1_2
Spiegelman AKeidat ITennenholtz M(2021)Game of Coins2021 IEEE 41st International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS)10.1109/ICDCS51616.2021.00095(954-964)Online publication date: Jul-2021
https://doi.org/10.1109/ICDCS51616.2021.00095
Jay MMollard ASun YZheng RAmigo IReiffers-Masson ARuano Rincón S(2021)Utility Maximisation in the Coordinator-Less IOTA TangleUbiquitous Networking10.1007/978-3-030-86356-2_8(93-104)Online publication date: 19-May-2021
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-030-86356-2_8
Negy KRizun PSirer E(2020)Selfish Mining Re-ExaminedFinancial Cryptography and Data Security10.1007/978-3-030-51280-4_5(61-78)Online publication date: 10-Feb-2020
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-030-51280-4_5
Aggarwal VTan Y(undefined)A Structural Analysis of Bitcoin Cash's Emergency Difficulty Adjustment AlgorithmSSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.3383739
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3383739

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