research-article

Privacy-Preserving OpenID Connect

Authors:

David BasinAuthors Info & Claims

ASIA CCS '20: Proceedings of the 15th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security

Pages 277 - 289

https://doi.org/10.1145/3320269.3384724

Published: 05 October 2020 Publication History

Abstract

OpenID Connect is the most widely used Internet protocol for delegated authentication today. It provides single sign-on functionality for users who use their account with an identity provider to authenticate to different services, called relying parties. Unfortunately OpenID Connect is not privacy-friendly: the identity provider learns with each use which relying party the user logs in to. This necessitates a high degree of trust in the identity provider, and is especially problematic when the relying parties' identity reveals sensitive information. We present two extensions to OpenID Connect that address this privacy concern. We first present a simple extension that prevents the identity provider from learning to which relying parties its users log in, and we further extend this solution to also prevent colluding relying parties from tracking users. We give formal security proofs for both standard OpenID Connect and our extensions using the Tamarin security protocol verification tool.

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Cited By

Linker FBasin DBalzarotti DXu W(2024)SOAPProceedings of the 33rd USENIX Conference on Security Symposium10.5555/3698900.3699081(3223-3240)Online publication date: 14-Aug-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3698900.3699081
Al Rahat TFeng YTian YLuo BLiao XXu JKirda ELie D(2024)AuthSaber: Automated Safety Verification of OpenID Connect ProgramsProceedings of the 2024 on ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3658644.3670318(2949-2962)Online publication date: 2-Dec-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3658644.3670318
He JLei LWang YWang PJing J(2024)ARPSSO: An OIDC-Compatible Privacy-Preserving SSO Scheme Based on RP AnonymizationComputer Security – ESORICS 202410.1007/978-3-031-70890-9_14(268-288)Online publication date: 6-Sep-2024
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-70890-9_14
Show More Cited By

Index Terms

Privacy-Preserving OpenID Connect
1. Networks
  1. Network properties
    1. Network security
      1. Security protocols
      2. Web protocol security
2. Security and privacy
  1. Network security
    1. Web protocol security
  2. Security services
    1. Privacy-preserving protocols

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cover image ACM Conferences

ASIA CCS '20: Proceedings of the 15th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security

October 2020

957 pages

ISBN:9781450367509

DOI:10.1145/3320269

General Chairs:
Hung-Min Sun
National Tsing Hua University, Taiwan
,
Shiuhpyng Shieh
National Chiao Tung University, Taiwan
,
Program Chairs:
Guofei Gu
Texas A&M University, USA
,
Giuseppe Ateniese
Stevens Institute of Technology, USA

Copyright © 2020 ACM.

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SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control

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New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 05 October 2020

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ASIA CCS '20

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SIGSAC

ASIA CCS '20: The 15th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security

October 5 - 9, 2020

Taipei, Taiwan

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Overall Acceptance Rate 418 of 2,322 submissions, 18%

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Cited By

Linker FBasin DBalzarotti DXu W(2024)SOAPProceedings of the 33rd USENIX Conference on Security Symposium10.5555/3698900.3699081(3223-3240)Online publication date: 14-Aug-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3698900.3699081
Al Rahat TFeng YTian YLuo BLiao XXu JKirda ELie D(2024)AuthSaber: Automated Safety Verification of OpenID Connect ProgramsProceedings of the 2024 on ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3658644.3670318(2949-2962)Online publication date: 2-Dec-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3658644.3670318
He JLei LWang YWang PJing J(2024)ARPSSO: An OIDC-Compatible Privacy-Preserving SSO Scheme Based on RP AnonymizationComputer Security – ESORICS 202410.1007/978-3-031-70890-9_14(268-288)Online publication date: 6-Sep-2024
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-70890-9_14
Xu RYang SZhang FFang Z(2023)MISO: Legacy-compatible Privacy-preserving Single Sign-on using Trusted Execution Environments2023 IEEE 8th European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)10.1109/EuroSP57164.2023.00029(352-372)Online publication date: Jul-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/EuroSP57164.2023.00029
Yousra BYassine SYassine MSaid SLo’ai TSalah K(2023)A Novel Secure and Privacy-Preserving Model for OpenID Connect Based on BlockchainIEEE Access10.1109/ACCESS.2023.329214311(67660-67678)Online publication date: 2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2023.3292143
Fuhr DRöcher D(2023)0 Trust, 100 % Trust AnchorDatenschutz und Datensicherheit - DuD10.1007/s11623-023-1834-547:10(633-637)Online publication date: 20-Sep-2023
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11623-023-1834-5
Sadi MYu E(2023)WEBAPIK: a body of structured knowledge on designing web APIsRequirements Engineering10.1007/s00766-023-00401-228:3(441-479)Online publication date: 14-Mar-2023
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00766-023-00401-2
Kalantari SPhilippaerts PDimova YHughes DJoosen WDe Decker B(2023)A User-Centric Approach to API DelegationsComputer Security – ESORICS 202310.1007/978-3-031-51476-0_16(318-337)Online publication date: 25-Sep-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-031-51476-0_16
Sassetti GSharif ASciarretta GCarbone RRanise S(2023)Assurance, Consent and Access Control for Privacy-Aware OIDC DeploymentsData and Applications Security and Privacy XXXVII10.1007/978-3-031-37586-6_13(203-222)Online publication date: 12-Jul-2023
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37586-6_13
Jannett LMladenov VMainka CSchwenk JYin HStavrou ACremers CShi E(2022)DISTINCTProceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3548606.3560692(1553-1567)Online publication date: 7-Nov-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3548606.3560692
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