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Distributed double auctions for large-scale device-to-device resource trading

Published: 11 October 2020 Publication History
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  • Abstract

    Mobile users in future wireless networks face limited wireless resources such as data plan, computation capacity and energy storage. Given that some of these users may not be utilizing fully their wireless resources, device-to-device (D2D) resource sharing is a promising approach to exploit users' diversity in resource use and for pooling their resources locally. In this paper, we propose a novel two-sided D2D trading market model that enables a large number of locally connected users to trade resources. Traditional resource allocation solutions are mostly centralized without considering users' local D2D connectivity constraints, becoming unscalable for large-scale trading. In addition, there may be market failure since selfish users will not truthfully report their actual valuations and quantities for buying or selling resources. To address these two key challenges, we first investigate the distributed resource allocation problem with D2D assignment constraints. Based on the greedy idea of maximum weighted matching, we propose a fast algorithm to achieve near-optimal average allocative efficiency. Then, we combine it with a new pricing mechanism that adjusts the final trading prices for buying and selling resources in a way that buyers and sellers are incentivized to truthfully report their valuations and available resource quantities. Unlike traditional double auctions with a central controller, this pricing mechanism is fully distributed in the sense that the final trading prices between each matched pair of users only depend on their own declarations and hence can be calculated locally. Finally, we analyze the repeated execution of the proposed D2D trading mechanism in multiple rounds and determine the best trading frequency.

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    Cited By

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    • (2023)Distributed Double Auction Mechanisms for Large-Scale Device-to-Device Resource TradingIEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking10.1109/TNET.2022.321855231:3(1308-1323)Online publication date: Jun-2023
    • (2023)EA-Market: Empowering Real-Time Big Data Applications with Short-Term Edge SLA Leases2023 32nd International Conference on Computer Communications and Networks (ICCCN)10.1109/ICCCN58024.2023.10230160(1-10)Online publication date: Jul-2023
    • (2022)Budget-Feasible Mechanisms in Two-Sided Crowdsensing Markets: Truthfulness, Fairness, and EfficiencyIEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing10.1109/TMC.2022.3201260(1-18)Online publication date: 2022
    • Show More Cited By

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      cover image ACM Conferences
      Mobihoc '20: Proceedings of the Twenty-First International Symposium on Theory, Algorithmic Foundations, and Protocol Design for Mobile Networks and Mobile Computing
      October 2020
      384 pages
      ISBN:9781450380157
      DOI:10.1145/3397166
      Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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      Published: 11 October 2020

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      Author Tags

      1. distributed systems
      2. double auctions
      3. resource allocation
      4. truthful mechanism design

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      View all
      • (2023)Distributed Double Auction Mechanisms for Large-Scale Device-to-Device Resource TradingIEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking10.1109/TNET.2022.321855231:3(1308-1323)Online publication date: Jun-2023
      • (2023)EA-Market: Empowering Real-Time Big Data Applications with Short-Term Edge SLA Leases2023 32nd International Conference on Computer Communications and Networks (ICCCN)10.1109/ICCCN58024.2023.10230160(1-10)Online publication date: Jul-2023
      • (2022)Budget-Feasible Mechanisms in Two-Sided Crowdsensing Markets: Truthfulness, Fairness, and EfficiencyIEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing10.1109/TMC.2022.3201260(1-18)Online publication date: 2022
      • (2022)Online Market Mechanism for Mobile Data Rate Trading With Temporal ConstraintsIEEE Internet of Things Journal10.1109/JIOT.2022.31680619:20(19682-19693)Online publication date: 15-Oct-2022
      • (2020)Online Cooperative Resource Allocation at the Edge: A Privacy-Preserving Approach2020 IEEE 28th International Conference on Network Protocols (ICNP)10.1109/ICNP49622.2020.9259382(1-11)Online publication date: 13-Oct-2020

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