Location via proxy:   [ UP ]  
[Report a bug]   [Manage cookies]                
skip to main content
research-article
Open access

GuesSync!: An Online Casual Game To Reduce Affective Polarization

Published: 04 October 2023 Publication History

Abstract

The past decade in the US has been one of the most politically polarizing in recent memory. Ordinary Democrats and Republicans fundamentally dislike and distrust each other, even when they agree on policy issues. This increase in hostility towards opposing party supporters, commonly called affective polarization, has important ramifications that threaten democracy. Political science research suggests that at least part of this polarization stems from Democrats' misperceptions about Republicans' political views and vice-versa. Therefore, in this work, drawing on insights from political science and game studies research, we designed an online casual game that combines the relaxed, playful nonpartisan norms of casual games with corrective information about party supporters' political views that are often misperceived. Through an experiment, we found that playing the game significantly reduces negative feelings toward outparty supporters among Democrats, but not Republicans. It was also effective in improving willingness to talk politics with outparty supporters. Further, we identified psychological reactance as a potential mechanism that affects the effectiveness of depolarization interventions. Finally, our analyses suggest that the game versions with political content were rated to be just as fun to play as a game version without any political content suggesting that, contrary to popular belief, people do like to mix politics and play.

Supplemental Material

PDF File
The Supplementary file contains more details on the question selection process, some ruminations about the participant sample and power analysis. The file also contains more tables and figures providing deeper insights into the analysis for those interested.

References

[1]
Alan I Abramowitz and Steven W Webster. 2018. Negative partisanship: Why Americans dislike parties but behave like rabid partisans. Political Psychology 39 (2018), 119--135.
[2]
Douglas J Ahler and Gaurav Sood. 2018. Measuring Perceptions of Shares of Groups. Misinformation and Mass Audiences (2018), 71--90.
[3]
Douglas J Ahler and Gaurav Sood. 2018. The parties in our heads: Misperceptions about party composition and their consequences. The Journal of Politics 80, 3 (2018), 964--981.
[4]
Chris Bail. 2021. Breaking the Social Media Prism: How to Make Our Platforms Less Polarizing. Princeton University Press.
[5]
Douglas Bates, Martin Mächler, Ben Bolker, and Steve Walker. 2015. Fitting Linear Mixed-Effects Models Using lme4. Journal of Statistical Software, Articles 67, 1 (2015).
[6]
Ian Bogost. 2010. Persuasive games: The expressive power of videogames. MIT Press.
[7]
Jack W Brehm. 1966. A theory of psychological reactance. (1966).
[8]
David E Broockman, Joshua L Kalla, and Sean J Westwood. 2022. Does affective polarization undermine democratic norms or accountability? Maybe not. American Journal of Political Science (2022).
[9]
Rune Haubo Bojesen Christensen. 2015. ordinal-regression models for ordinal data. R package version 28 (2015), 2015.
[10]
Aidan Combs, Graham Tierney, Brian Guay, Friedolin Merhout, Christopher A Bail, D Sunshine Hillygus, and Alexander Volfovsky. 2022. Anonymous Cross-Party Conversations Can Decrease Political Polarization: A Field Experiment on a Mobile Chat Platform. (2022).
[11]
Jean Decety. 2005. Perspective taking as the royal avenue to empathy. Other minds: How humans bridge the divide between self and others 143 (2005), 157.
[12]
Carroll Doherty, Jocelyn Kiley, and Nida Asheer. 2019. Partisan antipathy: More intense, more personal. Pew Research Center (2019).
[13]
James N Druckman, Samara Klar, Yanna Krupnikov, Matthew Levendusky, and John Barry Ryan. 2020. (Mis-) Estimating Affective Polarization. (2020).
[14]
James N. Druckman, Samara Klar, Yanna Krupnikov, Matthew Levendusky, and John Barry Ryan. 2021. How Affective Polarization Shapes Americans' Political Beliefs: A Study of Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic. Journal of Experimental Political Science 8, 3 (2021), 223--234. https://doi.org/10.1017/XPS.2020.28
[15]
James N Druckman and Matthew S Levendusky. 2019. What do we measure when we measure affective polarization? Public Opinion Quarterly 83, 1 (2019), 114--122.
[16]
Adam M Enders and Miles T Armaly. 2019. The differential effects of actual and perceived polarization. Political Behavior 41 (2019), 815--839.
[17]
David M Erceg-Hurn and Lyndall G Steed. 2011. Does exposure to cigarette health warnings elicit psychological reactance in smokers? Journal of applied social psychology (2011).
[18]
Philip M Fernbach and Leaf Van Boven. 2022. False polarization: Cognitive mechanisms and potential solutions. Current Opinion in Psychology 43 (2022), 1--6.
[19]
Eli J Finkel, Christopher A Bail, Mina Cikara, Peter H Ditto, Shanto Iyengar, Samara Klar, Lilliana Mason, Mary C McGrath, Brendan Nyhan, David G Rand, et al. 2020. Political sectarianism in America. Science 370, 6516 (2020), 533--536.
[20]
R Kelly Garrett, Jacob A Long, and Min Seon Jeong. 2019. From partisan media to misperception: Affective polarization as mediator. Journal of Communication 69, 5 (2019), 490--512.
[21]
Homero Gil de Zúñiga, Brian Weeks, and Alberto Ardèvol-Abreu. 2017. Effects of the news-finds-me perception in communication: Social media use implications for news seeking and learning about politics. Journal of computer-mediated communication 22, 3 (2017), 105--123.
[22]
Tabea Hässler, Johannes Ullrich, Michelle Bernardino, Nurit Shnabel, Colette Van Laar, Daniel Valdenegro, Simone Sebben, Linda R Tropp, Emilio Paolo Visintin, Roberto González, et al . 2020. A large-scale test of the link between intergroup contact and support for social change. Nature Human Behaviour 4, 4 (2020), 380--386.
[23]
Andrew F Hayes. 2017. Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis: A regression-based approach. Guilford publications.
[24]
Marc J Hetherington and Thomas J Rudolph. 2015. Why Washington won't work. University of Chicago Press.
[25]
Hyunseo Hwang, Youngju Kim, and Catherine U Huh. 2014. Seeing is believing: Effects of uncivil online debate on political polarization and expectations of deliberation. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media 58, 4 (2014), 621--633.
[26]
Shanto Iyengar, Yphtach Lelkes, Matthew Levendusky, Neil Malhotra, and Sean J Westwood. 2019. The origins and consequences of affective polarization in the United States. Annual Review of Political Science 22 (2019), 129--146.
[27]
Shanto Iyengar and Sean J Westwood. 2015. Fear and loathing across party lines: New evidence on group polarization. American Journal of Political Science 59, 3 (2015), 690--707.
[28]
Nathan P Kalmoe and Lilliana Mason. 2022. Radical American Partisanship: Mapping Violent Hostility, Its Causes, and the Consequences for Democracy. University of Chicago Press.
[29]
Geoff Kaufman and Mary Flanagan. 2015. A psychologically ?embedded" approach to designing games for prosocial causes. Cyberpsychology: Journal of Psychosocial Research on Cyberspace 9, 33 (Oct 2015).
[30]
Geoff Kaufman, Mary Flanagan, and Max Seidman. 2015. Creating stealth game interventions for attitude and behavior change: An ?Embedded Design" model. Persuasive Gaming in Context (2015), 73.
[31]
Bumsoo Kim, Ryan Broussard, and Matthew Barnidge. 2020. Testing political knowledge as a mediator of the relationship between news use and affective polarization. The Social Science Journal (2020), 1--13.
[32]
Samara Klar, Yanna Krupnikov, and John Barry Ryan. 2018. Affective polarization or partisan disdain? Untangling a dislike for the opposing party from a dislike of partisanship. Public Opinion Quarterly 82, 2 (2018), 379--390.
[33]
Daniel Kreiss and Shannon C McGregor. 2023. A review and provocation: On polarization and platforms. New Media & Society (2023), 14614448231161880.
[34]
Yanna Krupnikov and John Barry Ryan. 2022. The Other Divide: Polarization and Disengagement in American Politics. Cambridge University Press.
[35]
Jeffrey Lees and Mina Cikara. 2020. Inaccurate group meta-perceptions drive negative out-group attributions in competitive contexts. Nature Human Behaviour 4, 3 (2020), 279--286.
[36]
Jeffrey Lees and Mina Cikara. 2021. Understanding and combating misperceived polarization. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 376, 1822 (2021), 20200143.
[37]
Russell Lenth, Henrik Singmann, Jonathon Love, Paul Buerkner, and Maxime Herve. 2018. Emmeans: Estimated marginal means, aka least-squares means. R package version 1, 1 (2018), 3.
[38]
Josh A Lerner. 2014. Making democracy fun: How game design can empower citizens and transform politics. MIT Press.
[39]
Matthew Levendusky and Neil Malhotra. 2016. Does media coverage of partisan polarization affect political attitudes? Political Communication 33, 2 (2016), 283--301.
[40]
Matthew S Levendusky. 2018. Americans, not partisans: Can priming American national identity reduce affective polarization? The Journal of Politics 80, 1 (2018), 59--70.
[41]
Matthew S Levendusky. 2018. When efforts to depolarize the electorate fail. Public Opinion Quarterly 82, 3 (2018), 583--592.
[42]
Matthew S Levendusky and Neil Malhotra. 2016. (Mis) perceptions of partisan polarization in the American public. Public Opinion Quarterly 80, S1 (2016), 378--391.
[43]
Matthew S Levendusky and Dominik A Stecula. 2021. We Need to Talk: How Cross-Party Dialogue Reduces Affective Polarization. Cambridge University Press.
[44]
Yanni Ma, Graham Dixon, and Jay D Hmielowski. 2019. Psychological reactance from reading basic facts on climate change: The role of prior views and political identification. Environmental Communication 13, 1 (2019), 71--86.
[45]
Lilliana Mason. 2018. Uncivil agreement: How politics became our identity. University of Chicago Press.
[46]
Christopher McConnell, Yotam Margalit, Neil Malhotra, and Matthew Levendusky. 2018. The economic consequences of partisanship in a polarized era. American Journal of Political Science 62, 1 (2018), 5--18.
[47]
Robert L Morgan, James E Whorton, and Cynthia Gunsalus. 2000. A comparison of short term and long term retention: Lecture combines with discussion versus cooperative learning. Journal of instructional psychology 27, 1 (2000), 53.
[48]
Emily Moyer-Gusé and Robin L Nabi. 2010. Explaining the effects of narrative in an entertainment television program: Overcoming resistance to persuasion. Human communication research 36, 1 (2010), 26--52.
[49]
Sean A Munson, Stephanie Y Lee, and Paul Resnick. 2013. Encouraging reading of diverse political viewpoints with a browser widget. In Seventh international aaai conference on weblogs and social media.
[50]
Matti Nelimarkka, Salla-Maaria Laaksonen, and Bryan Semaan. 2018. Social Media Is Polarized, Social Media Is Polarized: Towards a New Design Agenda for Mitigating Polarization. In Proceedings of the 2018 Designing Interactive Systems Conference. ACM, 957--970.
[51]
Matti Nelimarkka, Jean Philippe Rancy, Jennifer Grygiel, and Bryan Semaan. 2019. (Re) Design to Mitigate Political Polarization: Reflecting Habermas' ideal communication space in the United States of America and Finland. Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction 3, CSCW (2019), 1--25.
[52]
Brendan Nyhan. 2021. Why the backfire effect does not explain the durability of political misperceptions. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 118, 15 (2021).
[53]
Brendan Nyhan and Jason Reifler. 2010. When corrections fail: The persistence of political misperceptions. Political Behavior 32, 2 (2010), 303--330.
[54]
Jeeyun Oh and S Shyam Sundar. 2015. How does interactivity persuade? An experimental test of interactivity on cognitive absorption, elaboration, and attitudes. Journal of Communication 65, 2 (2015), 213--236.
[55]
Daniel M Oppenheimer, Tom Meyvis, and Nicolas Davidenko. 2009. Instructional manipulation checks: Detecting satisficing to increase statistical power. Journal of experimental social psychology 45, 4 (2009), 867--872.
[56]
Lilla V Orr and Gregory A Huber. 2020. The policy basis of measured partisan animosity in the United States. American Journal of Political Science 64, 3 (2020), 569--586.
[57]
Thomas M Ostrom and Constantine Sedikides. 1992. Out-group homogeneity effects in natural and minimal groups. Psychological bulletin 112, 3 (1992), 536.
[58]
Wei Peng, Mira Lee, and Carrie Heeter. 2010. The effects of a serious game on role-taking and willingness to help. Journal of communication 60, 4 (2010), 723--742.
[59]
Ashwin Rajadesingan, Carolyn Duran, Paul Resnick, and Ceren Budak. 2021. 'Walking Into a Fire Hoping You Don't Catch': Strategies and Designs to Facilitate Cross-Partisan Online Discussions. Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction 5, CSCW2 (2021), 1--30.
[60]
Chelsea L Ratcliff. 2021. Characterizing reactance in communication research: A review of conceptual and operational approaches. Communication Research 48, 7 (2021), 1033--1058.
[61]
Gina Roussos and John F Dovidio. 2016. Playing below the poverty line: Investigating an online game as a way to reduce prejudice toward the poor. Cyberpsychology: Journal of Psychosocial Research on Cyberspace 10, 2 (2016).
[62]
Kai Ruggeri, Bojana Veckalov, Lana Bojanic, Thomas L Andersen, Sarah Ashcroft-Jones, Nélida Ayacaxli, Paula Barea-Arroyo, Mari Louise Berge, Ludvig D Bjørndal, Asli Bursalioglu, et al . 2021. The general fault in our fault lines. Nature Human Behaviour 5, 10 (2021), 1369--1380.
[63]
Dana Ruggiero. 2015. The effect of a persuasive social impact game on affective learning and attitude. Computers in Human Behavior 45 (Apr 2015), 213--221. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2014.11.062
[64]
Kathy Sanford, Lisa J Starr, Liz Merkel, and Sarah Bonsor Kurki. 2015. Serious games: video games for good? E-Learning and Digital Media 12, 1 (2015), 90--106.
[65]
Martin Saveski, Nabeel Gillani, Ann Yuan, Prashanth Vijayaraghavan, and Deb Roy. 2022. Perspective-taking to reduce affective polarization on social media. In Proceedings of the International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media, Vol. 16. 885--895.
[66]
Karen B Schloss and Stephen E Palmer. 2014. The politics of color: Preferences for Republican red versus Democratic blue. Psychonomic bulletin & review 21, 6 (2014), 1481--1488.
[67]
Jaime E Settle. 2018. Frenemies: How social media polarizes America. Cambridge University Press.
[68]
Jaime E Settle and Taylor N Carlson. 2019. Opting out of political discussions. Political Communication 36, 3 (2019), 476--496.
[69]
Jiyoun Suk, David Coppini, Carlos Muñiz, and Hernando Rojas. 2021. The more you know, the less you like: A comparative study of how news and political conversation shape political knowledge and affective polarization. Communication and the Public (2021), 20570473211063237.
[70]
Henri Tajfel, John C Turner, William G Austin, and Stephen Worchel. 1979. An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. Organizational identity: A reader 56, 65 (1979), 9780203505984--16.
[71]
Katie Salen Tekinbas and Eric Zimmerman. 2003. Rules of play: Game design fundamentals. MIT press.
[72]
Emily Thorson. 2016. Belief echoes: The persistent effects of corrected misinformation. Political Communication 33, 3 (2016), 460--480.
[73]
Aart van Stekelenburg, Gabi Schaap, Harm Veling, and Moniek Buijzen. 2020. Correcting misperceptions: The causal role of motivation in corrective science communication about vaccine and food safety. Science Communication 42, 1 (2020), 31--60.
[74]
Jan G Voelkel, Michael Stagnaro, James Chu, Sophia Pink, Joseph Mernyk, Chrystal Redekopp, Isaias Ghezae, Matthew Cashman, Dhaval Adjodah, Levi Allen, et al. 2023. Megastudy identifying effective interventions to strengthen Americans' democratic attitudes. (2023).
[75]
Emily A West and Shanto Iyengar. 2022. Partisanship as a social identity: Implications for polarization. Political Behavior 44, 2 (2022), 807--838.
[76]
Magdalena Wojcieszak and Benjamin R Warner. 2020. Can interparty contact reduce affective polarization? A systematic test of different forms of intergroup contact. Political Communication 37, 6 (2020), 789--811.
[77]
Xudong Yu, Magdalena Wojcieszak, Seungsu Lee, Andreu Casas, Rachid Azrout, and Tomasz Gackowski. 2021. The (null) effects of happiness on affective polarization, conspiracy endorsement, and deep fake recognition: Evidence from five survey experiments in three countries. Political behavior 43, 3 (2021), 1265--1287.

Cited By

View all
  • (2023)Interacting as Equals: How Contact Can Promote Tolerance Among Opposing PartisansSSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.4456223Online publication date: 2023

Recommendations

Comments

Information & Contributors

Information

Published In

cover image Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction
Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction  Volume 7, Issue CSCW2
CSCW
October 2023
4055 pages
EISSN:2573-0142
DOI:10.1145/3626953
Issue’s Table of Contents
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution International 4.0 License.

Publisher

Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 04 October 2023
Published in PACMHCI Volume 7, Issue CSCW2

Check for updates

Author Tags

  1. game
  2. hostility
  3. misperceptions
  4. polarization

Qualifiers

  • Research-article

Funding Sources

Contributors

Other Metrics

Bibliometrics & Citations

Bibliometrics

Article Metrics

  • Downloads (Last 12 months)602
  • Downloads (Last 6 weeks)53
Reflects downloads up to 04 Oct 2024

Other Metrics

Citations

Cited By

View all
  • (2023)Interacting as Equals: How Contact Can Promote Tolerance Among Opposing PartisansSSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.4456223Online publication date: 2023

View Options

View options

PDF

View or Download as a PDF file.

PDF

eReader

View online with eReader.

eReader

Get Access

Login options

Full Access

Media

Figures

Other

Tables

Share

Share

Share this Publication link

Share on social media