Article

Near-optimal network design with selfish agents

Authors:

Elliot Anshelevich,

Anirban Dasgupta,

Tom WexlerAuthors Info & Claims

STOC '03: Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing

Pages 511 - 520

https://doi.org/10.1145/780542.780617

Published: 09 June 2003 Publication History

Abstract

We introduce a simple network design game that models how independent selfish agents can build or maintain a large network. In our game every agent has a specific connectivity requirement, i.e. each agent has a set of terminals and wants to build a network in which his terminals are connected. Possible edges in the network have costs and each agent's goal is to pay as little as possible. Determining whether or not a Nash equilibrium exists in this game is NP-complete. However, when the goal of each player is to connect a terminal to a common source, we prove that there is a Nash equilibrium as cheap as the optimal network, and give a polynomial time algorithm to find a (1+ε)-approximate Nash equilibrium that does not cost much more. For the general connection game we prove that there is a 3-approximate Nash equilibrium that is as cheap as the optimal network, and give an algorithm to find a (4.65+ε)-approximate Nash equilibrium that does not cost much more.

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Cited By

Jacobs-Crisioni CDijkstra LKučas A(2024)Does Density Foster Shorter Public Transport Networks? A Network Expansion Simulation ApproachLand10.3390/land1301007713:1(77)Online publication date: 10-Jan-2024
https://doi.org/10.3390/land13010077
Nickerl JMödinger DLorenz J(2021)From Local Network Formation Game to Peer-to-Peer Protocol2021 International Symposium on Electrical, Electronics and Information Engineering10.1145/3459104.3459184(483-492)Online publication date: 19-Feb-2021
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3459104.3459184
Abam MQafari M(2019)Geometric spanner gamesTheoretical Computer Science10.1016/j.tcs.2019.07.020Online publication date: Jul-2019
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2019.07.020
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Index Terms

Near-optimal network design with selfish agents
1. Theory of computation
  1. Design and analysis of algorithms

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cover image ACM Conferences

STOC '03: Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing

June 2003

740 pages

ISBN:1581136749

DOI:10.1145/780542

Conference Chair:
Lawrence L. Larmore
University of Nevada Las Vegas, Las Vegas, NV
,
Program Chair:
Michel X. Goemans
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA

Copyright © 2003 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Published: 09 June 2003

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STOC03: The 35th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing

June 9 - 11, 2003

CA, San Diego, USA

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STOC '03 Paper Acceptance Rate 80 of 270 submissions, 30%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 1,469 of 4,586 submissions, 32%

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Cited By

Jacobs-Crisioni CDijkstra LKučas A(2024)Does Density Foster Shorter Public Transport Networks? A Network Expansion Simulation ApproachLand10.3390/land1301007713:1(77)Online publication date: 10-Jan-2024
https://doi.org/10.3390/land13010077
Nickerl JMödinger DLorenz J(2021)From Local Network Formation Game to Peer-to-Peer Protocol2021 International Symposium on Electrical, Electronics and Information Engineering10.1145/3459104.3459184(483-492)Online publication date: 19-Feb-2021
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3459104.3459184
Abam MQafari M(2019)Geometric spanner gamesTheoretical Computer Science10.1016/j.tcs.2019.07.020Online publication date: Jul-2019
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2019.07.020
Belloni ADeng CPekeč S(2017)Mechanism and Network Design with Private Negative ExternalitiesOperations Research10.1287/opre.2016.158565:3(577-594)Online publication date: 1-Jun-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1287/opre.2016.1585
Graham RHamilton LLevavi ALoh P(2016)Anarchy Is Free in Network CreationACM Transactions on Algorithms10.1145/272997812:2(1-10)Online publication date: 12-Feb-2016
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2729978
Battiston P(2016)Constrained Network FormationItalian Economic Journal10.1007/s40797-016-0040-02:3(347-362)Online publication date: 23-Aug-2016
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40797-016-0040-0
Jacobs-Crisioni CKoopmans C(2016)Transport link scanner: simulating geographic transport network expansion through individual investmentsJournal of Geographical Systems10.1007/s10109-016-0233-y18:3(265-301)Online publication date: 10-Jun-2016
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10109-016-0233-y
Demaine EHajiaghayi MMahini HZadimoghaddam M(2016)Network Creation GamesEncyclopedia of Algorithms10.1007/978-1-4939-2864-4_752(1408-1412)Online publication date: 22-Apr-2016
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4939-2864-4_752
Angelucci ABilò VFlammini MMoscardelli L(2015)On the sequential price of anarchy of isolation gamesJournal of Combinatorial Optimization10.1007/s10878-013-9694-929:1(165-181)Online publication date: 1-Jan-2015
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s10878-013-9694-9
Feldman MRon T(2015)Capacitated Network Design GamesTheory of Computing Systems10.1007/s00224-014-9540-157:3(576-597)Online publication date: 1-Oct-2015
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s00224-014-9540-1
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