article

On the sequential price of anarchy of isolation games

Authors:

Anna Angelucci,

Vittorio Bilò,

Michele Flammini,

Luca MoscardelliAuthors Info & Claims

Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Volume 29, Issue 1

Pages 165 - 181

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-013-9694-9

Published: 01 January 2015 Publication History

Abstract

We study the performance of subgame perfect equilibria, a solution concept which better captures the players' rationality in sequential games with respect to the classical myopic dynamics based on the notions of improving deviations and Nash equilibria, in the context of sequential isolation games. In particular, for two important classes of sequential isolation games, we show upper and lower bounds on the sequential price of anarchy, that is the worst-case ratio between the social performance of an optimal solution and that of a subgame perfect equilibrium, under the two classical social functions mostly investigated in the scientific literature, namely, the minimum utility per player and the sum of the players' utilities.

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Cited By

Chen CGiessler PMamageishvili AMihalák MPenna P(2024)Sequential solutions in machine scheduling gamesJournal of Scheduling10.1007/s10951-024-00810-327:4(363-373)Online publication date: 1-Aug-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s10951-024-00810-3
Chen CGiessler PMamageishvili AMihalák MPenna P(2020)Sequential Solutions in Machine Scheduling GamesWeb and Internet Economics10.1007/978-3-030-64946-3_22(309-322)Online publication date: 7-Dec-2020
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-030-64946-3_22
Correa Jde Jong Jde Keijzer BUetz M(2019)The Inefficiency of Nash and Subgame Perfect Equilibria for Network RoutingMathematics of Operations Research10.1287/moor.2018.096844:4(1286-1303)Online publication date: 1-Nov-2019
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1287/moor.2018.0968
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On the sequential price of anarchy of isolation games
1. Mathematics of computing
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cover image Journal of Combinatorial Optimization

Journal of Combinatorial Optimization Volume 29, Issue 1

January 2015

329 pages

ISSN:1382-6905

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Copyright © Copyright © 2015 Springer Science+Business Media New York.

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Springer-Verlag

Berlin, Heidelberg

Publication History

Published: 01 January 2015

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Cited By

Chen CGiessler PMamageishvili AMihalák MPenna P(2024)Sequential solutions in machine scheduling gamesJournal of Scheduling10.1007/s10951-024-00810-327:4(363-373)Online publication date: 1-Aug-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s10951-024-00810-3
Chen CGiessler PMamageishvili AMihalák MPenna P(2020)Sequential Solutions in Machine Scheduling GamesWeb and Internet Economics10.1007/978-3-030-64946-3_22(309-322)Online publication date: 7-Dec-2020
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-030-64946-3_22
Correa Jde Jong Jde Keijzer BUetz M(2019)The Inefficiency of Nash and Subgame Perfect Equilibria for Network RoutingMathematics of Operations Research10.1287/moor.2018.096844:4(1286-1303)Online publication date: 1-Nov-2019
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1287/moor.2018.0968
de Jong JUetz M(2019)The quality of equilibria for set packing and throughput scheduling gamesInternational Journal of Game Theory10.1007/s00182-019-00693-149:1(321-344)Online publication date: 19-Aug-2019
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s00182-019-00693-1
Mamageishvili AMihalák MMontemezzani S(2018)Improved bounds on equilibria solutions in the network design gameInternational Journal of Game Theory10.1007/s00182-017-0600-z47:4(1113-1135)Online publication date: 1-Nov-2018
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s00182-017-0600-z
Mamageishvili AMihalák M(2015)Multicast Network Design Game on a RingProceedings of the 9th International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications - Volume 948610.1007/978-3-319-26626-8_32(439-451)Online publication date: 18-Dec-2015
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-319-26626-8_32

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