Stefan Telle

How does the public form preferences about differentiated integration (DI)? The literature on mass-elite linkages offers two perspectives: top-down, political elites cue the public, or bottomup, political elites react to public preferences. This paper develops expectations based on both perspectives, and presents novel empirical data on citizens, political parties, and governments to test them. We distinguish preferences over differentiated policy integration, like 'Opt-Outs', from preferences over polity differentiation, such as 'Two-Speed Europe'. Although our evidence is observational and therefore cannot establish causal relationships between elites and the mass public, our results are most compatible with the notion of a top-down linkage. This is because DI preferences are generally of low salience, and first revealed at the European level in the context of negotiations. Subsequently, this revelation of DI preferences shapes domestic discussions about DI, especially at the level of political parties. Yet, this mostly pertains to situations when governments do not yet have clear DI preferences of their own, meaning government preferences are not yet formed and revealed in the context of the supranational negotiations. Overall, this study suggests that mass-elite linkage in the preference formation on DI might be more tenuous than either the top-down or bottom-up perspective might assume.

Differentiated integration (DI) in the European Union (EU) has mainly been understood as variation in participation in common policies. But DI also has implications for the nature and functioning of the EU as a polity. While temporary DI may facilitate deeper integration, permanent DI is liable to increase transaction costs and fragmentation. However, little is known about how such alternatives are assessed by decision-makers in the member states. This article uses novel quantitative and qualitative data to shed light on this question. It looks at the explanatory role of various types of opt-outs and at member states' dependence, capacity, and identity. We find that temporary and permanent differentiation are assessed differently in the member states but neither alternative is clearly preferred. Long-term involuntary opt-outs are related to negative assessments of both forms of DI. Surprisingly, voluntary opt-outs do not seem to lead to more positive assessments of DI. We also find that the temporary DI is preferred in smaller member states, while support for permanent DI is higher in larger member states. Finally, we find differences in the effects of dependency, capacity, and identity between older and newer member states.

Differentiated integration (DI) in the European Union (EU) has mainly been understood as variation in participation in common policies. But DI also has implications for the nature and functioning of the EU as a polity. While temporary DI may facilitate deeper integration, permanent DI is liable to increase transaction costs and fragmentation. However, little is known about how such alternatives are assessed by decision-makers in the member states. This article uses novel quantitative and qualitative data to shed light on this question. It looks at the explanatory role of various types of opt-outs and at member states’ dependence, capacity, and identity. We find that temporary and permanent differentiation are assessed differently in the member states but neither alternative is clearly preferred. Long-term involuntary opt-outs are related to negative assessments of both forms of DI. Surprisingly, voluntary opt-outs do not seem to lead to more positive assessments of DI. We also find that the temporary DI is preferred in smaller member states, while support for permanent DI is higher in larger member states. Finally, we find differences in the effects of dependency, capacity, and identity between older and newer member states.

A growing literature is studying the phenomenon of differentiated integration (DI) in the European Union (EU). Empirical studies have focused on charting the degree of existing differentiation, often understood as exemptions from common EU rules. The present report seeks to complement this literature in two ways: first, the report develops a holistic conceptualization of DI by distinguishing between polity and policy differentiation. Similarly, we distinguish two mechanisms through which differentiation can be realized, one satisfying demand for the status quo (‘opt-outs’) and the other satisfying demand for more integration (‘enhanced cooperation’). Second, the existing literature has paid relatively little attention to what the EU member states actually ‘think’ about DI. We contend that member states’ preferences about DI cannot be read off of differentiated EU rules, given that institutional rules and international bargaining processes intervene. Therefore, the report poses two empirical questions: What positions do EU member states take on DI? And why? To answer these questions, the report uses new data from 27 member states on expressed governmental preferences about differentiated integration between 2008-2020. With regard to the first question (WHAT), our findings are threefold: First, polity differentiation is seen slightly negatively on average by the member states. Second, there is significant cross-country variation in member state preferences toward polity differentiation. Third, the mechanism of ‘enhanced cooperation’ is viewed much more favourably than the ‘opt-out’ mechanism. With regard to the second question (WHY), our findings are twofold: First, member states’ positions are not only or predominantly determined by their structural characteristics (e.g. size, wealth, identity), but rather by the expected impact of DI on polity legitimacy and effectiveness. The second key finding is rooted in the inductive identification of factors that have not yet been prominently discussed in the literature. We find that ‘integration experience’, different ‘visions of the EU’, and the ‘shadow of polity DI’ play a role in how EU member states assess differentiated integration. Overall, these factors point to the conclusion that the formation of member state preferences does not happen in a vacuum but is strongly influenced by existing or expected European interdependences.

The report investigates two questions regarding the Irish governmental discourse on differentiated integration (DI). First, how much did Irish governments talk about differentiated integration. Second, what positions did Irish governments take on differentiated integration. The report covers the time period 1990-2019. It distinguishes three conceptual levels: DI models (“multi-speed EU” and “multi-end EU”), DI mechanisms (enhanced co-operation and “opt-outs”), and DI instances (twenty-one differentiated EU policies). It finds that DI is a low salience issue, expect in the context of certain key events (i.e. EU treaty change). Moreover, the positions of Irish governments are highly policy- and context dependent. Over time, a principled negative assessment of “enhanced co-operation” has developed towards a more pragmatic approach, allowing other MS to cooperate in policy-fields where Ireland does not seek closer cooperation.

The paper argues that existing supply-and demand-explanations of populism neglect the political process as a source of popular dissatisfaction. Alternatively , the paper develops the argument that historical transformations of statehood may lead to misalignment between citizens' expectations and lived experience regarding their rights, duties, and compliance obligations toward authority. Republican citizenship is presented as the outcome of historical processes of nation-building, while liberal citizenship is underlying the process of European integration. The paper illustrates the transformation of civic, political, and social rights by economic and political liberalization in the European Union. It introduces the concept of "cityzen" to stress the increasing importance of urbanity for exercising citizenship rights. Based on the re-framed understanding of populism developed in the paper, some speculative arguments on how to address the populist challenge in the EU are presented and a promising avenue for future research is highlighted.

Citation: Stefan Telle: Populism and Citizenship in the European Union: Beyond Supply- and Demand-Explanations, in: Connections. A Journal for Historians and Area Specialists, 07.09.2019, <www.connections.clio-online.net/article/id/artikel-4795>.

National borders constitute barriers to social, economic and political processes and, thus, tend to contribute to the peripheralisation of border regions. The paper compares the evolution of two euroregions in peripheral central European border regions, whose objective is to overcome such negative border effects by promoting cross-border cooperation at the regional level. On a theoretical level, the paper argues for an understanding of euroregions as soft spaces. Rather than viewing them primarily as instances of state rescaling, the paper emphasizes their role as adaptive service providers for local constituencies. It is suggested that their long-term stability depends on their relation to, and the internal dynamics of, politico-administrative hard spaces at the regional, national, and supranational level. While hard spaces are associated with the notion of the Weberian bureaucratic state, soft spaces combine many of the ideas of the New Public Management literature. Building on an organizational ecology perspective, the paper forwards the argument that stable, resourceful, and accessible hard spaces constitute a predictable and engaging environment within which softer arrangements may compete for the delivery of services. However, the interplay between soft and hard spaces tends to have an impact on the euroregions’ agendas. While EU cohesion policy provides incentives to strengthen horizontal cross-border coordination, the organizational integration of the two euroregions remained rather loose, testifying to the continued importance of domestic prerogatives.

The paper has the dual objective of contributing to theory development as well as to the debate about the added value of EU Cohesion Policy. Experimentalist governance theory suggests that a virtuous feedback loop between policy design and implementation can the input-and output-legitimacy of policy making. EU Cohesion Policy formally resembles this experimentalist setting, but persistent debates about its added value suggest that the virtuous loop is blocked. The paper uses new institutionalism theory to systematically identify theoretical explanations for this blockage. It argues that the experimentalist link between organizational structure, pooling of experiences, greater participation, and policy learning is highly precarious. First, the rational-choice perspective suggests that the link rests on the optimistic assumption of a common utility function among the participating actors. Moreover, the structural funds provide strong incentives for grant-seeking. Second, the discursive perspective shows that the identification of shared interests depends on highly demanding speech conditions. Third, the sociological perspective highlights that the evaluation of information is socially conditioned. Therefore, learning may be based on fallacious assumptions and lead to undesired results. The paper substantiates these insights with empirical evidence from one case of institutionalized cross-border cooperation in East Central Europe.

The paper discusses the co-evolution of the EU mode of governance and the objectives of European Union cohesion policy. As EU integration proceeds, collective decision-making in an increasingly diverse political arena has become a central concern for research on EU governance. The literature on experimentalist governance suggests consensus-seeking deliberation and policy-experimentation as two key mechanisms to reduce the trade-off between overall policy responsiveness and democratic legitimacy. However, this paper argues that the inconsistencies which result from making cohesion policy deliver the Lisbon Agenda and EU 2020 objectives growth are a characteristic of meta-governance rather than of reflexive adaptation. These findings emerge from an analysis of the cohesion policy programming periods since 1988 and the parallel developments in European Union governance.

According to the "sleeping giant" hypothesis, the recent electoral success of populist parties in Europe is explained by changes on the supply-side which have "unlocked" pre-existing demand. The first part of this paper argues, instead, that changes on the supply-side are "creating" rather than "unlocking" demand in the European Union. It is suggested that representation deficits of the political system rather than pre-political dispositions of the voter explain demand for populism. The paper then shows how a combination of liberalization and supranational commitments has limited the responsiveness of national democratic institutions to the demands of the integration losers in the European Union. Moreover, the recent financial and migration crises have shown that in times of urgency and uncertainty, supranational coordination among member states can quickly disintegrate into power politics and technocratic crisis-management. The result of these developments is domination of citizens as well as domination of among member states. Finally, the paper argues that the convergence of demand for populism and Euroscepticism in recent crises may be a blessing in disguise in that is signals the emergence of a European collective political identity. The implication is that Eurosceptic populism may be best addressed by strengthening overarching institutions of democratic representation.

The paper revisits of Francis Fukuyama’s (1992) “end of history” thesis in light of the current wave of populism in the European Union (EU) and beyond. It asks whether the re-emergence of non-liberal political agendas refutes Fukuyama’s argument of a secular trend toward liberal democracy. To this end, the paper problematizes Fukuyama’s conceptualization of liberal democracy. While Fukuyama, in his 1992 book, viewed liberalism and democracy as inherently complementary in the sense of realizing equal recognition among humans, contemporary republican thought (Bellamy 2007, 2019) has pointed to the problematic relationship between the two concepts. With regard to the European Union, the paper argues that liberalization outpaced regional political integration after 1989 (Rodrik 2000), leading to the dilemma of “supranational policies without politics” and “national politics without policies” (Schmidt 2006).

European Groupings of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) are a legal instrument intended to facilitate institutional cross-border cooperation. Launched in 2006, EGTC creation was particularly swift in East Central Europe, albeit with significant variation between different border regions. The article adopts an organizational ecology perspective to explain this variation and argues that the level of organizational density inside a cross-border ecological niche is crucial for EGTC creation. The analysis draws on policy documents and semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders from four border areas in East Central Europe. It finds that lower levels of organizational density in unitary states constitute a favourable organizational environment for EGTC creation. However, rather than enhancing autonomous decision-making in the border region, we find evidence that unitary state support for EGTC creation reflects a political strategy to centralize control over cross-border cooperation.