eric barnes

The problem of dirty hands concerns the apparently inevitable need for effective politicians to do what is ethically wrong. This essay discusses a related problem in democratic elections of politicians being unwilling to commit themselves to precise positions on controversial policy issues. Given certain plausible assumptions, I demonstrate using a simple game theoretic model that there is an incentive structure for political candidates that is damaging to the public good. I contrast this problem with the classic prisoner’s dilemma and then go on to discuss some possible strategies for overcoming this problem by an improved system of political debates.

Books about Adam Smith appear every year, but most are about Smith the political economist. This recent book is somewhat different from its cohort in that it treats Smith first and foremost as a moral philosopher, with an emphasis on his indebtedness to Plato, Aristotle ...

ABSTRACT Having a child with autism in China raises challenges for families. Some are similar to those of families in western countries, but others are unique. This study sought to understand one aspect—the dilemmas of having a second child in a country where having only one child is the norm, and where social welfare services are not developed. This study examined the experiences of one family from the time when the family were considering having a second child through to the time when the younger child was a teenager. The most salient issues were the changing perspectives on the sibling’s role, and the responsibility and future burden of the sibling due to this responsibility. We use three ethical theories as a framework for analysis. The data suggested several benefits of having a second child and the possibilities for promoting opportunities and well-being, and not just responsibility and worry, in the second child. Areas of future research to expand this study are considered.

Moral theorists and game theorists are both interested in situations where rational agents are ‘called upon’ to constrain their future actions and co-operate with others instead of being free riders. These theorists have constructed a variety of hypothetical games which illuminate this problem of constraint. In this paper, I draw a distinction between ‘behaviour games’ like the Newcomb paradox and ‘disposition games’ like Kavka's toxin puzzle, a prisoner's dilemma and Parfit's hitchhiker example. I then employ this distinction to argue that agents who subscribe to the orthodox theory of rationality do significantly better in disposition games than those who subscribe to revisionist theories like David Gauthier's, while revisionist agents do marginally better in behaviour games. I argue that because of agents' ability to manipulate their own weakness of will, orthodox agents do better at all of these games than has previously been thought. And, by elucidating the ...