Paper 2013/613
Recomputing with Permuted Operands: A Concurrent Error Detection Approach
Xiaofei Guo and Ramesh Karri
Abstract
Naturally occurring and maliciously injected faults reduce the reliability of cryptographic hardware and may leak confidential information. We develop a concurrent error detection (CED) technique called Recomputing with Permuted Operands (REPO). We show that it is cost effective in Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and a secure hash function Grøstl. We provide experimental results and formal proofs to show that REPO detects all single-bit and single-byte faults. Experimental results show that REPO achieves close to 100% fault coverage for multiple byte faults. The hardware and throughput overheads are compared with those of previously reported CED techinques on two Xilinx Virtex FPGAs. The hardware overhead is 12.4-27.3%, and the throughput is 1.2-23Gbps, depending on the AES architecture, FPGA family, and detection latency. The performance overhead ranges from 10% to 100% depending on the security level. Moreover, the proposed technique can be integrated into various block cipher modes of operation. We also discuss the limitation of REPO and its potential vulnerabilities.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design, vol.32, no.10, pp.1595--1608, Oct. 2013
- DOI
- 10.1109/TCAD.2013.2263037
- Keywords
- Concurrent error detectionDifferential fault analysisFault attack
- Contact author(s)
- xg243 @ nyu edu
- History
- 2014-02-27: last of 3 revisions
- 2013-09-24: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2013/613
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2013/613, author = {Xiaofei Guo and Ramesh Karri}, title = {Recomputing with Permuted Operands: A Concurrent Error Detection Approach}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2013/613}, year = {2013}, doi = {10.1109/TCAD.2013.2263037}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/613} }