Democracy is frequently thought of as a “universal value”. Donors for the Organisation for Econom... more Democracy is frequently thought of as a “universal value”. Donors for the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) accept this assumption and take measures in recipient countries that aim to promote or uphold values they consider central to democracy, including political competition and individual equality, among others. However, some scholars have questioned whether such values are actually universally applicable, and whether donors need to disavow themselves of the notion that “one size fits all” when it comes to promoting democracy in developing countries. Nevertheless, the role of cultural values in mediating the effectiveness of democracy promotion is relatively under-theorised in existing research. This discussion paper is part of the larger research project “What is democracy’s value?”, which aims at understanding how societal values and attitudes influence the effectiveness of international democracy promotion in African countries. The project looks at how social values and political attitudes mediate democracy promotion in two specific realms: attempts by heads of state to circumvent presidential term limits, and reforms to legislation in the realm of family law and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual (LGBT+) rights. This discussion paper focusses on two cases that took place in Uganda: Yoweri Museveni’s successful 2005 campaign to remove presidential term limits from the Constitution, and the attempt to pass legislation outlawing homosexuality in 2014. In both cases, OECD donors intervened, to varying degrees, in an effort to uphold basic principles of democracy. Despite popular support for maintaining term limits, donor interventions were unsuccessful in the first case. They were, however, successful in thwarting the Anti-Homosexuality Act, even though it had a high level of popular support. The findings of the Ugandan case studies problematise the assumed link between cultural value dimensions – popularised by cross-cultural researchers such as Hofstede, Schwartz, and Inglehart and Welzel – and popular political attitudes. A tendency towards particular value dimensions does not necessarily seem to predispose Ugandans towards particular attitudes, nor does a match or mismatch between the value dimensions of donors and Ugandans result in a corresponding match or mismatch of political attitudes. Likewise, a widespread political attitude does not dictate the outcomes of reform processes, at least in the authoritarian context in which Ugandan politics takes place. More important is the magnitude of material incentives and/or sanctions offered by donors, and the transnational alliances between international and domestic actors. This is not to say that values do not matter. Cultural values are an integral part of the social and political contexts in which democracy promotion takes place and are an important factor in informing the behaviour of executive decision-makers. A greater understanding of cultural values, beliefs and attitudes is integral for both the study of democracy promotion and designing context-sensitive and effective interventions to support democracy in recipient countries.
In 2014, the EU concluded Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with several African, Caribbean ... more In 2014, the EU concluded Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with several African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) regions. These EPAs represent some of the most advanced examples of interregional cooperation. Yet, the outcomes of EPA negotiations are not the same across all regions. This article investigates differences in negotiated outcomes and argues that regional actorness – the ability of regions to become identifiable, to aggregate the interests of member states, to formulate collective goals and to make and implement decisions – influences regions’ ability to navigate interregional trade negotiations. In a comparison of the actorness and negotiated outcomes of West Africa and the SADC EPA Group, the article shows that actorness matters for international negotiations: regions with higher levels of actorness can negotiate better outcomes even under conditions of stark power asymmetry.
Regional powers are not always benevolent leaders when it comes to the building of regional insti... more Regional powers are not always benevolent leaders when it comes to the building of regional institutions. While powerful states – particularly the “new” rising powers – may have a vested interest in regionalism as a means of projecting influence, regional powers may behave as coercive or benevolent leaders, or alternatively display an absence of leadership altogether. The drivers of varying regional power behavior can be attributed to their competing concerns regarding (economic) power, functional efficiency, international legitimacy, and neopatrimonial networks. This paper explores the varying behavior of Nigeria and South Africa in relation to the institutionalization of free trade areas and regional courts within their respective regions. Nigeria has displayed little leadership in ECOWAS trade integration due to domestic opposition; however, a newly-democratic Nigeria’s search for international legitimacy drove the establishment of the ECOWAS Court of Justice. Likewise, South Africa’s search for legitimacy drove its support for the SADC Tribunal, but the competing demands of different audiences led it to abandon this support. South Africa has also displayed leadership in relation to the SADC Free Trade Area; however, its neighbors perceive it as a self-interested, almost coercive actor. The findings suggest that the motivations for regional powers’ behavior vary across time and policy sectors, and that inconsistent behavior is driven by a change in the priority granted to different drivers.
The controversial Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are currently back on the agenda, as sev... more The controversial Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are currently back on the agenda, as several African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states are again faced with a loss of market access if they do not ratify their EPAs by 1 October 2016. To complicate matters, Brexit has introduced an element of uncertainty and is causing some ACP states to reconsider their decision to sign EPAs. EPAs were introduced under the trade pillar of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA), which governs relations between the European Union (EU) and the ACP. EPAs represent a sea change in trade relations between the EU and the ACP: not only do they introduce reciprocity into trade preferences, they are organized on a regional basis, with the aim of promoting regional integration within the ACP. This Briefing Paper presents an update of the various EPA processes, and investigates the extent to which they have actually met the EU's stated aim of promoting regionalism in the ACP, as well as the EPAs alignment with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and the debate on the future of EU-ACP cooperation.
Actorness is no longer the preserve of the European Union. Due to their participation in inter- r... more Actorness is no longer the preserve of the European Union. Due to their participation in inter- regional relations, other regional organizations are developing and institutionalizing the require- ments of international actorness, but insofar as a comparative framework for systematically comparing and contrasting actorness across different organizations is lacking, it is difficult to predict the likely outcomes of such relations. Taking a comparative regionalisms approach, this article develops a comparative and generalizable framework of actorness. Adding to the extremely limited literature on non-EU actorness, the model is tested in an analysis of the actorness of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the field of international trade negotiations. Despite SADC’s stronger identity and presence, it is ECOWAS – having more effective decision-making and better capa- bilities – that possesses greater actorness – a fact likely to impact on inter-regional outcomes.
This article examines gender mainstreaming in European Union (EU) development policy towards sout... more This article examines gender mainstreaming in European Union (EU) development policy towards southern Africa. The aim is to detect how gender (in)equality in southern Africa is framed by the EU, and the extent to which this overlaps with Southern African Development Community (SADC) and civil society framing of gender (in)equality. We also explore potential reasons for the overlap and mismatch of frames. Using the methodology of critical frame analysis, EU policy programming documents are analysed and compared to SADC's Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan, and civil society texts on gender equality. We conclude that the EU approach to gender mainstreaming in its development aid towards southern Africa is to a large extent instrumentalist, predominantly integrationist and only partially participatory. Gender mainstreaming is framed as a way of more effectively achieving existing policy goals, and civil society groups are poorly integrated in the drafting process. Although the EU approach has significant overlap with the frames used by SADC, the latter seem to hold a broader, more holistic conception of gender mainstreaming. A major gap exists between civil society organisations' views on gender (in)equality and those expressed by the EU. This gap might be harmful for the relevance of EU policies and may compromise their effectiveness.
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 48 , Mar 2014
As early as 1992, the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) already include... more As early as 1992, the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) already included a commitment to human rights, democracy, and the rule of law as governance standards in its member states, but it was in 2001 that SADC significantly broadened its efforts at governance transfer. SADC focuses in particular on standards related to gender, (socioeconomic) human rights, and (electoral) democracy, which are promoted and protected through various instruments including military interventions and sanctions in the framework of security cooperation. While the rule of law and good governance have also gained a more prominent place on the agenda since 2001, standards and instruments are less developed. Overall, there is a significant gap between the prescription of standards and policies on the one hand and the implementation of measures on the other. The suspension of the SADC Tribunal in 2010 following its rulings on human rights issues clearly shows the limits of SADC as an active promoter vis-à-vis its member states.
"The Southern African Development Community (SADC), a largely intergovernmental regional organiza... more "The Southern African Development Community (SADC), a largely intergovernmental regional organization, established a regional tribunal with supranational features, only to suspend it after it produced an undesirable ruling. This represents a unique and puzzling case of governance transfer ‘roll-back’. We argue that intrinsic demand for the establishment of the Tribunal at the level of the Summit – SADC’s ultimate authority – was never high to begin with, and that it was adopted mainly as a donor-pleasing accessory. When the Tribunal overstepped its mandate relatively early in its life, not only granting itself jurisdiction in the realm of human rights, but also ruling against the Zimbabwean government in a politically sensitive case, it was dismantled by the Summit. But if donor incentives played a role in establishing the Tribunal, they cannot explain its suspension. Furthermore, institutionalist approaches would claim that a ‘lock-in’ effect should prevent institutionalized commitments at the regional level from being undone. We explain this in terms of ‘reading from the donor script’, which results in poorly embedded institutions lacking real commitment at the executive level. Developing states are only willing to read from the donor script so long as it does not threaten their core interests, which in the case of SADC are strongly informed by the region’s history and political culture. Our findings are informed by in-depth interviews with twelve experts connected to the Tribunal, which took place between May and July 2013 in Botswana, Namibia, Mozambique and South Africa. The case study contributes to a better understanding of the scope conditions for progress and regression in governance transfer by highlighting the existence of a donor script informing governance transfer in recipient regions. First, we offer a brief overview of SADC’s promotion of human rights, democracy, rule of law and good governance before zooming in on the story of the establishment and suspension of the Tribunal."
Democracy is frequently thought of as a “universal value”. Donors for the Organisation for Econom... more Democracy is frequently thought of as a “universal value”. Donors for the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) accept this assumption and take measures in recipient countries that aim to promote or uphold values they consider central to democracy, including political competition and individual equality, among others. However, some scholars have questioned whether such values are actually universally applicable, and whether donors need to disavow themselves of the notion that “one size fits all” when it comes to promoting democracy in developing countries. Nevertheless, the role of cultural values in mediating the effectiveness of democracy promotion is relatively under-theorised in existing research. This discussion paper is part of the larger research project “What is democracy’s value?”, which aims at understanding how societal values and attitudes influence the effectiveness of international democracy promotion in African countries. The project looks at how social values and political attitudes mediate democracy promotion in two specific realms: attempts by heads of state to circumvent presidential term limits, and reforms to legislation in the realm of family law and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual (LGBT+) rights. This discussion paper focusses on two cases that took place in Uganda: Yoweri Museveni’s successful 2005 campaign to remove presidential term limits from the Constitution, and the attempt to pass legislation outlawing homosexuality in 2014. In both cases, OECD donors intervened, to varying degrees, in an effort to uphold basic principles of democracy. Despite popular support for maintaining term limits, donor interventions were unsuccessful in the first case. They were, however, successful in thwarting the Anti-Homosexuality Act, even though it had a high level of popular support. The findings of the Ugandan case studies problematise the assumed link between cultural value dimensions – popularised by cross-cultural researchers such as Hofstede, Schwartz, and Inglehart and Welzel – and popular political attitudes. A tendency towards particular value dimensions does not necessarily seem to predispose Ugandans towards particular attitudes, nor does a match or mismatch between the value dimensions of donors and Ugandans result in a corresponding match or mismatch of political attitudes. Likewise, a widespread political attitude does not dictate the outcomes of reform processes, at least in the authoritarian context in which Ugandan politics takes place. More important is the magnitude of material incentives and/or sanctions offered by donors, and the transnational alliances between international and domestic actors. This is not to say that values do not matter. Cultural values are an integral part of the social and political contexts in which democracy promotion takes place and are an important factor in informing the behaviour of executive decision-makers. A greater understanding of cultural values, beliefs and attitudes is integral for both the study of democracy promotion and designing context-sensitive and effective interventions to support democracy in recipient countries.
In 2014, the EU concluded Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with several African, Caribbean ... more In 2014, the EU concluded Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with several African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) regions. These EPAs represent some of the most advanced examples of interregional cooperation. Yet, the outcomes of EPA negotiations are not the same across all regions. This article investigates differences in negotiated outcomes and argues that regional actorness – the ability of regions to become identifiable, to aggregate the interests of member states, to formulate collective goals and to make and implement decisions – influences regions’ ability to navigate interregional trade negotiations. In a comparison of the actorness and negotiated outcomes of West Africa and the SADC EPA Group, the article shows that actorness matters for international negotiations: regions with higher levels of actorness can negotiate better outcomes even under conditions of stark power asymmetry.
Regional powers are not always benevolent leaders when it comes to the building of regional insti... more Regional powers are not always benevolent leaders when it comes to the building of regional institutions. While powerful states – particularly the “new” rising powers – may have a vested interest in regionalism as a means of projecting influence, regional powers may behave as coercive or benevolent leaders, or alternatively display an absence of leadership altogether. The drivers of varying regional power behavior can be attributed to their competing concerns regarding (economic) power, functional efficiency, international legitimacy, and neopatrimonial networks. This paper explores the varying behavior of Nigeria and South Africa in relation to the institutionalization of free trade areas and regional courts within their respective regions. Nigeria has displayed little leadership in ECOWAS trade integration due to domestic opposition; however, a newly-democratic Nigeria’s search for international legitimacy drove the establishment of the ECOWAS Court of Justice. Likewise, South Africa’s search for legitimacy drove its support for the SADC Tribunal, but the competing demands of different audiences led it to abandon this support. South Africa has also displayed leadership in relation to the SADC Free Trade Area; however, its neighbors perceive it as a self-interested, almost coercive actor. The findings suggest that the motivations for regional powers’ behavior vary across time and policy sectors, and that inconsistent behavior is driven by a change in the priority granted to different drivers.
The controversial Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are currently back on the agenda, as sev... more The controversial Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are currently back on the agenda, as several African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states are again faced with a loss of market access if they do not ratify their EPAs by 1 October 2016. To complicate matters, Brexit has introduced an element of uncertainty and is causing some ACP states to reconsider their decision to sign EPAs. EPAs were introduced under the trade pillar of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA), which governs relations between the European Union (EU) and the ACP. EPAs represent a sea change in trade relations between the EU and the ACP: not only do they introduce reciprocity into trade preferences, they are organized on a regional basis, with the aim of promoting regional integration within the ACP. This Briefing Paper presents an update of the various EPA processes, and investigates the extent to which they have actually met the EU's stated aim of promoting regionalism in the ACP, as well as the EPAs alignment with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and the debate on the future of EU-ACP cooperation.
Actorness is no longer the preserve of the European Union. Due to their participation in inter- r... more Actorness is no longer the preserve of the European Union. Due to their participation in inter- regional relations, other regional organizations are developing and institutionalizing the require- ments of international actorness, but insofar as a comparative framework for systematically comparing and contrasting actorness across different organizations is lacking, it is difficult to predict the likely outcomes of such relations. Taking a comparative regionalisms approach, this article develops a comparative and generalizable framework of actorness. Adding to the extremely limited literature on non-EU actorness, the model is tested in an analysis of the actorness of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the field of international trade negotiations. Despite SADC’s stronger identity and presence, it is ECOWAS – having more effective decision-making and better capa- bilities – that possesses greater actorness – a fact likely to impact on inter-regional outcomes.
This article examines gender mainstreaming in European Union (EU) development policy towards sout... more This article examines gender mainstreaming in European Union (EU) development policy towards southern Africa. The aim is to detect how gender (in)equality in southern Africa is framed by the EU, and the extent to which this overlaps with Southern African Development Community (SADC) and civil society framing of gender (in)equality. We also explore potential reasons for the overlap and mismatch of frames. Using the methodology of critical frame analysis, EU policy programming documents are analysed and compared to SADC's Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan, and civil society texts on gender equality. We conclude that the EU approach to gender mainstreaming in its development aid towards southern Africa is to a large extent instrumentalist, predominantly integrationist and only partially participatory. Gender mainstreaming is framed as a way of more effectively achieving existing policy goals, and civil society groups are poorly integrated in the drafting process. Although the EU approach has significant overlap with the frames used by SADC, the latter seem to hold a broader, more holistic conception of gender mainstreaming. A major gap exists between civil society organisations' views on gender (in)equality and those expressed by the EU. This gap might be harmful for the relevance of EU policies and may compromise their effectiveness.
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 48 , Mar 2014
As early as 1992, the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) already include... more As early as 1992, the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) already included a commitment to human rights, democracy, and the rule of law as governance standards in its member states, but it was in 2001 that SADC significantly broadened its efforts at governance transfer. SADC focuses in particular on standards related to gender, (socioeconomic) human rights, and (electoral) democracy, which are promoted and protected through various instruments including military interventions and sanctions in the framework of security cooperation. While the rule of law and good governance have also gained a more prominent place on the agenda since 2001, standards and instruments are less developed. Overall, there is a significant gap between the prescription of standards and policies on the one hand and the implementation of measures on the other. The suspension of the SADC Tribunal in 2010 following its rulings on human rights issues clearly shows the limits of SADC as an active promoter vis-à-vis its member states.
"The Southern African Development Community (SADC), a largely intergovernmental regional organiza... more "The Southern African Development Community (SADC), a largely intergovernmental regional organization, established a regional tribunal with supranational features, only to suspend it after it produced an undesirable ruling. This represents a unique and puzzling case of governance transfer ‘roll-back’. We argue that intrinsic demand for the establishment of the Tribunal at the level of the Summit – SADC’s ultimate authority – was never high to begin with, and that it was adopted mainly as a donor-pleasing accessory. When the Tribunal overstepped its mandate relatively early in its life, not only granting itself jurisdiction in the realm of human rights, but also ruling against the Zimbabwean government in a politically sensitive case, it was dismantled by the Summit. But if donor incentives played a role in establishing the Tribunal, they cannot explain its suspension. Furthermore, institutionalist approaches would claim that a ‘lock-in’ effect should prevent institutionalized commitments at the regional level from being undone. We explain this in terms of ‘reading from the donor script’, which results in poorly embedded institutions lacking real commitment at the executive level. Developing states are only willing to read from the donor script so long as it does not threaten their core interests, which in the case of SADC are strongly informed by the region’s history and political culture. Our findings are informed by in-depth interviews with twelve experts connected to the Tribunal, which took place between May and July 2013 in Botswana, Namibia, Mozambique and South Africa. The case study contributes to a better understanding of the scope conditions for progress and regression in governance transfer by highlighting the existence of a donor script informing governance transfer in recipient regions. First, we offer a brief overview of SADC’s promotion of human rights, democracy, rule of law and good governance before zooming in on the story of the establishment and suspension of the Tribunal."
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This discussion paper is part of the larger research project “What is democracy’s value?”, which aims at understanding how societal values and attitudes influence the effectiveness of international democracy promotion in African countries. The project looks at how social values and political attitudes mediate democracy promotion in two specific realms: attempts by heads of state to circumvent presidential term limits, and reforms to legislation in the realm of family law and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual (LGBT+) rights. This discussion paper focusses on two cases that took place in Uganda: Yoweri Museveni’s successful 2005 campaign to remove presidential term limits from the Constitution, and the attempt to pass legislation outlawing homosexuality in 2014. In both cases, OECD donors intervened, to varying degrees, in an effort to uphold basic principles of democracy. Despite popular support for maintaining term limits, donor interventions were unsuccessful in the first case. They were, however, successful in thwarting the Anti-Homosexuality Act, even though it had a high level of popular support.
The findings of the Ugandan case studies problematise the assumed link between cultural value dimensions – popularised by cross-cultural researchers such as Hofstede, Schwartz, and Inglehart and Welzel – and popular political attitudes. A tendency towards particular value dimensions does not necessarily seem to predispose Ugandans towards particular attitudes, nor does a match or mismatch between the value dimensions of donors and Ugandans result in a corresponding match or mismatch of political attitudes. Likewise, a widespread political attitude does not dictate the outcomes of reform processes, at least in the authoritarian context in which Ugandan politics takes place. More important is the magnitude of material incentives and/or sanctions offered by donors, and the transnational alliances between international and domestic actors. This is not to say that values do not matter. Cultural values are an integral part of the social and political contexts in which democracy promotion takes place and are an important factor in informing the behaviour of executive decision-makers. A greater understanding of cultural values, beliefs and attitudes is integral for both the study of democracy promotion and designing context-sensitive and effective interventions to support democracy in recipient countries.
a means of projecting influence, regional powers may behave as coercive or benevolent leaders, or alternatively display an absence of leadership altogether. The drivers of varying regional power behavior can be attributed to their competing concerns regarding (economic) power, functional efficiency, international legitimacy, and neopatrimonial networks. This paper explores the varying behavior of Nigeria and South Africa in relation to the institutionalization of free trade areas and regional courts within their respective regions. Nigeria has displayed little leadership in ECOWAS trade integration due to domestic opposition; however, a newly-democratic Nigeria’s search for international legitimacy drove the establishment of the ECOWAS Court of Justice. Likewise, South Africa’s search for legitimacy drove its support for the SADC Tribunal, but the competing demands of different audiences led it to abandon this support. South Africa has also displayed leadership in relation to the SADC Free Trade Area; however, its neighbors perceive it as a self-interested, almost coercive actor. The findings suggest that the motivations for regional powers’ behavior vary across time and policy sectors, and that inconsistent behavior is driven by a change in the priority granted to different drivers.
This discussion paper is part of the larger research project “What is democracy’s value?”, which aims at understanding how societal values and attitudes influence the effectiveness of international democracy promotion in African countries. The project looks at how social values and political attitudes mediate democracy promotion in two specific realms: attempts by heads of state to circumvent presidential term limits, and reforms to legislation in the realm of family law and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual (LGBT+) rights. This discussion paper focusses on two cases that took place in Uganda: Yoweri Museveni’s successful 2005 campaign to remove presidential term limits from the Constitution, and the attempt to pass legislation outlawing homosexuality in 2014. In both cases, OECD donors intervened, to varying degrees, in an effort to uphold basic principles of democracy. Despite popular support for maintaining term limits, donor interventions were unsuccessful in the first case. They were, however, successful in thwarting the Anti-Homosexuality Act, even though it had a high level of popular support.
The findings of the Ugandan case studies problematise the assumed link between cultural value dimensions – popularised by cross-cultural researchers such as Hofstede, Schwartz, and Inglehart and Welzel – and popular political attitudes. A tendency towards particular value dimensions does not necessarily seem to predispose Ugandans towards particular attitudes, nor does a match or mismatch between the value dimensions of donors and Ugandans result in a corresponding match or mismatch of political attitudes. Likewise, a widespread political attitude does not dictate the outcomes of reform processes, at least in the authoritarian context in which Ugandan politics takes place. More important is the magnitude of material incentives and/or sanctions offered by donors, and the transnational alliances between international and domestic actors. This is not to say that values do not matter. Cultural values are an integral part of the social and political contexts in which democracy promotion takes place and are an important factor in informing the behaviour of executive decision-makers. A greater understanding of cultural values, beliefs and attitudes is integral for both the study of democracy promotion and designing context-sensitive and effective interventions to support democracy in recipient countries.
a means of projecting influence, regional powers may behave as coercive or benevolent leaders, or alternatively display an absence of leadership altogether. The drivers of varying regional power behavior can be attributed to their competing concerns regarding (economic) power, functional efficiency, international legitimacy, and neopatrimonial networks. This paper explores the varying behavior of Nigeria and South Africa in relation to the institutionalization of free trade areas and regional courts within their respective regions. Nigeria has displayed little leadership in ECOWAS trade integration due to domestic opposition; however, a newly-democratic Nigeria’s search for international legitimacy drove the establishment of the ECOWAS Court of Justice. Likewise, South Africa’s search for legitimacy drove its support for the SADC Tribunal, but the competing demands of different audiences led it to abandon this support. South Africa has also displayed leadership in relation to the SADC Free Trade Area; however, its neighbors perceive it as a self-interested, almost coercive actor. The findings suggest that the motivations for regional powers’ behavior vary across time and policy sectors, and that inconsistent behavior is driven by a change in the priority granted to different drivers.