Colton Carlson

The theological doctrine of Molinism is the conjunction of libertarian freedom and middle knowledge (i.e., God's knowledge of what libertarian free creatures would do in any circumstance). Tim Stratton has dubbed this doctrine as "Mere Molinism". This volume is part of a larger collection of rebuttals. Volume 1 was dedicated to theological definitions and philosophical preliminaries. Volume 2, in contrast, is aimed at specifically addressing the philosophical errors in the doctrine of Mere Molinism. I begin by examining the exchange between Bignon and Stratton throughout the years. I then turn to considering Stratton's defense of the Consequence Argument and his rejoinders against John Martin Fischer's semicompatibilist model, also known as guidance control. I argue that Stratton fails to defend his Freethinking Argument (FTA) in the light of these rebuttals for a variety of reasons. Next, I consider whether Stratton's Deliberation Argument works in defense of the FTA, in addition to other support claims often lobbied against compatibilist-determinists. I argue that each support claim fails to properly secure an independent defense for the FTA, and thus each fail to support the doctrine of Mere Molinism.

Molinism is the conjunction that humans have libertarian free will and that God has middle knowledge. Tim Stratton has recently published a book on the topic of human freedom and Molinism, and has described his view as "mere Molinism." In this reply, I discuss a wide range of philosophical issues that plague his view of Molinism. I begin and end Volume 1 with detailing (at a considerable length) the problems with how Stratton defines his terms, as well as how he approaches philosophical preliminaries involving the philosophy of freedom debate in contemporary literature.

The following essay is a small segment of a much larger three-volume set in response to Tim Stratton’s recently published book Mere Molinism. In this article, I critically examine Stratton’s 1 Corinthians 10:13 argument for libertarian free will. I begin by addressing some basic terminological disputes in the free will debate (e.g., the ability to do otherwise, indeterminism, libertarian and compatibilist sufficient conditions). I then turn to addressing Paul Himes’ 1 Corinthians 10:13 argument for libertarian free will. With the help of Steven Cowan, I find that Himes’ argument has both theological and philosophical misgivings, though not entirely inchoate. Next, I consider Paul Manata’s objection. Though I think Manata’s reply is promising, I ultimately find it unsatisfactory. Finally, I end the article with a few remarks for libertarians moving forward with the argument.