James P Moreland
Biola University, Philosophy, Faculty Member
This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY
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I examine how a naturalist worldview informs work in philosophy of mind with a special focus on the appropriateness of a naturalist adopting emergent properties in his or her ontology. First, I examine two versions of naturalism construed... more
I examine how a naturalist worldview informs work in philosophy of mind with a special focus on the appropriateness of a naturalist adopting emergent properties in his or her ontology. First, I examine two versions of naturalism construed as worldviews and clarify their differences. I argue that one of these versions is what naturalists ought to embrace. Happily, most but not all naturalists recognize this. To defend this claim, I will lay out certain epistemic criteria that are helpful in adjudicating between rival scientific and philosophical paradigms. These criteria will contribute to supporting my preference for which version of naturalism is preferable. Next, I present a general depiction of the components and inner logic of a naturalistic worldview and follow this by providing a precise notion of an emergent property. Finally, I offer several criticisms of emergent properties and conclude that a naturalist ought to avoid them.
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I focus on the ethical non-naturalism of Russ Shafer-Landau. First, I spend a good bit of time specifying the nature of two versions of naturalism and arguing that one is embraced ubiquitously—more importantly, should be embraced—by... more
I focus on the ethical non-naturalism of Russ Shafer-Landau. First, I spend a good bit of time specifying the nature of two versions of naturalism and arguing that one is embraced ubiquitously—more importantly, should be embraced—by contemporary naturalists. I do so because if I am right about this, before we investigate the details of Shafer-Landau’s ethical non-naturalism, there will be a significant burden of proof for him to meet. In my view, that burden is strong enough to justify the claim that a critic’s epistemic task is merely to provide undercutting defeaters for Shafer-Landau’s position, and not to proffer rebutting defeaters, though I will attempt to supply both. After presenting a crucial characterization of contemporary naturalism followed by a critique of naturalist emergent properties, I state and critique Shafer-Landau’s ontology followed by the same for his epistemology. Both will be evaluated with a particular focus on their plausibility to support his ethical non...
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This paper is a defense of the big ideas behind the free-thinking argument. This argument aims to demonstrate that determinism is incompatible with epistemic responsibility in a desert sense (being praised or blamed for any thought, idea,... more
This paper is a defense of the big ideas behind the free-thinking argument. This argument aims to demonstrate that determinism is incompatible with epistemic responsibility in a desert sense (being praised or blamed for any thought, idea, judgment, or belief). This lack of epistemic responsibility is problematic for the naturalist. It seems to be an even worse problem, however, for the exhaustive divine determinist because not only would humanity not stand in a position to be blamed for any of our thoughts and beliefs, but it also surfaces a “problem of epistemic evil”, which can be raised against the knowledge of God, the rationality of humans, and the trustworthiness of Scripture.
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Research Interests: Philosophy and Wiley
... Page 4. To Everyone.book Page 3 Friday, July 30, 2004 10:36 AM To Everyone an Answer A CASE FOR THE CHRISTIAN WORLDVIEW ESSAYS IN HONOR OF Norman L. Geisler EDITED BY FrancisJ. ... paper) 1. Apologetics. I. Geisler, Norman L. II.... more
... Page 4. To Everyone.book Page 3 Friday, July 30, 2004 10:36 AM To Everyone an Answer A CASE FOR THE CHRISTIAN WORLDVIEW ESSAYS IN HONOR OF Norman L. Geisler EDITED BY FrancisJ. ... paper) 1. Apologetics. I. Geisler, Norman L. II. Beckwith, Francis III. ...
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Research Interests: Philosophy and Dualism
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Critique de l'interpretation de la philosophie de la matiere de Locke soutenue par C. Williams dans le sens d'une these de la parite de la matiere pensante. Examinant le dualisme de la substance, ainsi que la conception... more
Critique de l'interpretation de la philosophie de la matiere de Locke soutenue par C. Williams dans le sens d'une these de la parite de la matiere pensante. Examinant le dualisme de la substance, ainsi que la conception metaphysique de la personne, l'A. montre que l'argument de la parite n'est pas pertinent au regard du physicalisme chretien.
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L'A. etudie la contribution de Saint Thomas d'Aquin au debat contemporain sur les notions d'humanite, de personnalite et d'identite personnelle qui fondent l'ethique de la finalite de l'existence. L'A. montre... more
L'A. etudie la contribution de Saint Thomas d'Aquin au debat contemporain sur les notions d'humanite, de personnalite et d'identite personnelle qui fondent l'ethique de la finalite de l'existence. L'A. montre que l'approche de Saint Thomas d'Aquin offre une reponse digne d'interet aux probemes du dialogue ethique contemporain domine par la reference a Locke et Descartes
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Hud Hudson has written a technical yet innovative book. And while I disagree with most of Hudson’s theses – I believe that most physicalists will refrain from choking down his central contention – this book places Hudson at the forefront... more
Hud Hudson has written a technical yet innovative book. And while I disagree with most of Hudson’s theses – I believe that most physicalists will refrain from choking down his central contention – this book places Hudson at the forefront of work in material composition; it is a ‘must’ read. Hudson argues for a conditional, though he also defends the antecedent: if we accept six theses, then we must accept his view of human persons: (1) materialism regarding human persons; (2) human persons persist over time by either enduring or perduring (the latter is Hudson’s position); (3) ontological vagueness is false; (4) classic logic is true, identity is absolute and is not sortal-relative; (5) necessitarianism is false; and (6) we ought to minimize bruteness in doing ontology. In light of these theses, Hudson develops his partist view to answer this question: ‘To which space-time worms does ‘‘human person’’ refer?’ In chapter 1, Hudson poses the Problem of the Many and rejects ten solution...
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It is difficult to think of a topic of greater concern than the nature of truth. Indeed, truth and the knowledge thereof are the very rails upon which people ought to live their lives. And over the centuries, the classic correspondence... more
It is difficult to think of a topic of greater concern than the nature of truth. Indeed, truth and the knowledge thereof are the very rails upon which people ought to live their lives. And over the centuries, the classic correspondence theory of truth has outlived most of its critics. But these are postmodern times, or so we are often told, and the classic model, once ensconced deeply in the Western psyche, must now be replaced by a neopragmatist or some other anti-realist model of truth, at least for those concerned with the rampant victimization raging all around us. Thus, “we hold these truths to be self evident” now reads “our socially constructed selves arbitrarily agree that certain chunks of language are to be esteemed in our linguistic community.” Something has gone wrong here, and paraphrasing the words of Mad magazine’s Alfred E. Newman, “We came, we saw, and we conked out!” The astute listener will have already picked up that I am an unrepentant correspondence advocate wh...
It must be confessed, moreover, that perception, and that which depends on it are inexplicable by mechanical cause, that is by fi gures and motions. And supposing there were a machine so constructed as to think, feel and have perception,... more
It must be confessed, moreover, that perception, and that which depends on it are inexplicable by mechanical cause, that is by fi gures and motions. And supposing there were a machine so constructed as to think, feel and have perception, we could conceive of it as enlarged and yet preserving the same proportions, so that we might enter it as a mill. And this granted, we should only fi nd on visiting it, pieces which push one against another, but never anything by which to explain a perception. This must be sought for, therefore, in the simple substance and not in the composite or in the machine. (Leibniz 1979, p. 536)
The libertarian view, advocated by philosopher James Rachels, states that there is no morally relevant difference between active and passive euthanasia. Moreover, Rachels says, it is biographical life (which includes a person's... more
The libertarian view, advocated by philosopher James Rachels, states that there is no morally relevant difference between active and passive euthanasia. Moreover, Rachels says, it is biographical life (which includes a person's aspirations, human relationships, and interests), not biological life (being a human being), that is important from a moral point of view (see Part One, p. 13). And if passive euthanasia is morally justifiable in a given case, then so is active euthanasia, since there is no relevant distinction between them.
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I address an epistemic and related ontological dificulty with the doctrine of biblical inerrancy. The ontological problem: If biblical inerrancy applies to the original autographs, why would God allow these to disappear from the scene?... more
I address an epistemic and related ontological dificulty with the doctrine of biblical inerrancy. The ontological problem: If biblical inerrancy applies to the original autographs, why would God allow these to disappear from the scene? The epistemological problem: Given that the original autographs are gone, we lack a way to know exactly what the original writings were. The first problem is solved by distinguishing text types and tokens, and claiming that semantic meaning and inerrancy are underivative features types. The second is resolved by claiming that in the actual world, we are epistemically better off with the original tokens gone.
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Research Interests: Philosophy and Universals
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Currently, the self has replaced the soul as the major focus of much psychological theorizing. I argue that this shift is due to a number of confusions regarding the nature and justification of substance dualism. I also claim that this... more
Currently, the self has replaced the soul as the major focus of much psychological theorizing. I argue that this shift is due to a number of confusions regarding the nature and justification of substance dualism. I also claim that this focus on the self, without a framework that treats it as a substantial soul, leads to a number of conceptual problems and terminological equivocations. Moreover, I show that certain features of widely accepted views of the self actually seem to require a substantial soul to make sense. To substantiate these claims, Section I contains a discussion of a set of current misunderstandings about the nature of a substance (e.g., that a substance is a static thing unrelated to other things), and a treatment of key problems with current models of the self (e.g., that the self is a construct of language). Section II compares two very different views of wholes with parts-substances vs. property-things. Section III clarifies the essence of substance dualism by describing five states of the soul and the nature of a faculty of the soul. The section closes with a sketch of the main types of considerations that justify belief in substance dualism. In the final section, I argue that the self is the soul by showing how key features of certain psychological models of the self seem to require substance dualism to make sense and by clarifying a set of psychological terms/concepts in light of what has been argued earlier.