Deliberation

Democracy is in crisis. As neo-Nazis, right-wing populists, and authoritarians, old and new, stake their claims around the world, democracy faces its greatest challenge yet. The only way to save it is to change it.

Democracy as we know it is flawed. The three branches of power in liberal democracy—the executive, legislative, and judicial—keep citizens from making decisions about policies that affect them most. For a true democracy to flourish, argue Patrizia Nanz and Claus Leggewie, we need a fourth branch: the consultative.

This short and accessible guide to a new kind of political engagement offers a chronicle of the political past and present—including an important analysis of right-wing populism’s recent and historic allure—and a robust analysis of the accomplishments of protest movements and citizens’ groups. With a rare optimism, which values the wisdom of the masses over the narrow-mindedness of today’s tyrants, this guide is a modern call-to-arms for a more democratic future.

This article argues that, given the current pervasive uncertainty about the reliability of jury deliberation, we ought to treat it with epistemic humility. I further argue that epistemic humility should be expressed and enforced by turning jury deliberation from a mandatory rule of the jury trial to a waivable right of the defendant. I consider two main objections to my argument: the first one concerns the putative self-defeatingness of humility attitudes; the second objection points to the burdensomeness of granting an unconditional jury deliberation waiver to the defendant.

What is the role of Jürgen Habermas’s critical theory amidst the prevalence of disinformation, polarization, and distrust in the media? In the book Habermas and the Media, Hartmut Wessler offers a “media lens” to make sense of Habermas’s work. He makes a case for the relevance of Habermas’s thought today, although his work needs to be updated to respond to developments in media studies and empirical political science. The book is an invaluable resource to any reader looking for an introduction on Habermas’s media theory. Its strongest point is its presentation of Habermas’s work in a clear and concise manner. It presents Habermas’s thinking chronologically, which is an effective way of walking readers through how Habermas’s ideas about the media evolved over 40 or so years. The discussion covered Habermas’s best-known books including The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989) and The Theory of Communicative Action (1984) as well as his little-known work such as The Inclusion of the Other (1998), the chapter “Further Reflections on the Public Sphere" in the book Habermas and the Public Sphere (1992) and the essays on Political Communication in Media Society published in Communication Theory (2006) and Europe: The Faltering Project (2009).

Many advocates of deliberative democracy see in the Internet a new opportunity for the development of public spaces, public spheres, and places where deliberation can take place. An important element of the notion of the public sphere in general and of deliberation specifically, is the quality of the debate. In the past decade, many studies have been conducted to evaluate online discussions in light of the ideal notion of the public sphere. However, a wide gap exists between theoretical approaches and the actual operationalization of such theories for empirical research. In an attempt to bridge this gap we develop a method for examining the extent to which Internet forums meet the normative requirements of rational-critical debate, reciprocity, and reflexivity. The methodological approach consists of a textual analysis of the contributions made to an online forum. The coding scheme presented in this article is based on a case study (UK Online) and guided by the theoretical notions of deliberative democracy.

Talking politics online is not exclusively reserved for those spaces dedicated to politics, particularly the everyday political talk crucial to the public sphere. However, past net-based public sphere research has focused mostly on political spaces thereby neglecting an array of other genres. The aim of this article is to move beyond politically oriented communicative spaces by investigating political talk within the British reality TV discussion forum Wife Swap. The purpose is to see whether a forum dedicated to reality TV provides the communicative space, content, and style for politics that extends the public sphere. The central question is whether it fulfils the requirements of rationality and ‘decent’ deliberation. Moreover, the analysis moved beyond a formal notion by investigating how expressives influence the more traditional elements of deliberation. The findings revealed that Wife Swap participants engaged in political talk that was often deliberative. Moreover, it was a space where the use of expressives played a key role in enhancing such talk.

The current definition of demagogy provided by rhetorical theory is neither preventing nor adequately explaining the abuse of rhetoric so prevalent in contemporary political dialogue, and while it might not be the job of rhetoricians to do the former, rhetorical scholarship should certainly engage more thoroughly in the latter. I suggest that we need to reexamine demagogy in the context of the digital age due to the unique rhetorical dynamics of the online political landscape. Demagogues have a new and dangerous power online that has not yet been explored in rhetorical scholarship. I begin exploring this new power by tracing the scholarship on demagogy, proposing a new focus for demagogy studies based on deliberation and Edwin Black's idea of “second persona,” examining the digital exigence for this focus, and finally presenting case studies of both traditional and digital rhetoric to test this view of demagogy.

RÉSUMÉ. — Outre les constats sur la crise du gouvernement représentatif insistant sur la défiance des citoyens, la crise climatique est perçue comme révélant l’impuissance de cette forme politique basé sur l’élection. Des voix s’élèvent dans le champ académique, militant et politique, en faveur de l’utilisation de mini-publics tirés au sort pour résoudre divers enjeux politiques, en particulier le changement climatique. Si les assemblées citoyennes sur le climat se sont récemment multipliées, il convient d’examiner leur précurseur : l’assemblée citoyenne irlandaise (ACI). Ce dispositif délibératif a certes proposé la légalisation de l’avortement en 2017, approuvée par référendum, mais il a également traité du climat. Grâce à une longue étude de terrain, on analyse les délibérations de l’ACI sur le climat, et notamment la tension entre pouvoir des citoyens participants et contrôle par les organisateurs et experts. Puis, on comparera le cas irlandais à la Convention Citoyenne pour le Climat française, qui a également fait l’objet d’une étude de terrain intégrale.

MOTS-CLÉS. — Assemblée citoyenne – climat – délibération – démocratie – innovation démocratique – Irlande.

CITATIONS. — Courant D. (2020), « Des mini-publics délibératifs pour sauver le climat ? Analyses empiriques de l’Assemblée citoyenne irlandaise et de la Convention citoyenne française », Archives de Philosophie du Droit, vol. 62, p. 487-507.

This paper compares two basic concepts of two outstanding players of philosophical world: Plato's moderation and Aristotle's temperance. Comparing occurs in two terms: the positions that both of them place their own concepts in human nature and among other virtues and the meaning of concepts according to them are different.

How might discourse generate political change? So far, democratic theorists have focused largely on how deliberative exchanges might shift political opinion. Responding to empirical research that casts doubt on the generalizability of deliberative mechanisms outside of carefully designed forums, this essay seeks to broaden the scope of discourse theory by considering speech that addresses participants’ identities instead. More specifically, we ask what may be learned about identity-oriented discourse by examining the practice of religious preaching. As we demonstrate, scholars of homiletics—the study of preaching—have identified three core features that support its focus on identity: its unconditionality, its appeal to authoritative texts and traditions, and its diffuse instrumentality. We then ask what each of these features might look like in more straightforwardly political contexts. Finally, we address several normative questions raised by this practice, as a way of exploring the promises and dangers accompanying identity-oriented discourse more generally.

The critical discussion is clearly a major context of dialogue to use as a normative model in evaluating arguments as fallacious or not. However, this paper identifies other types of dialogue that also need to be considered. It is a thesis of this paper that these peripheral models of dialogue are needed to support evaluations of arguments. A second thesis is that dialectical shifts, changes from one type of dialogue to another, also need to be taken into account.

A large body of research has explored the employment of user-generated content (UGC) in journalism websites. While rich and informative, accumulated research offers discrete insights
into an array of research questions but lacks a comprehensive account of the larger picture that emerges. With this in mind, we propose an analytical framework for evaluating UGC’s roles in professional news websites. Based on a synthesis of accumulated research, we differentiate between the realm of journalism as a business and a practice; and the realm of democracy, wherein news media may play a role as a public sphere and a means of political empowerment. By offering a comprehensive examination of key findings and themes arising from UGC research, the article seeks to advance our understanding of the evolving news media landscape. It concludes with directions for further research.

The new approach taken by Hamblin (1970) and since then many others was to refashion the concept of an argument to think of it not just as an arbitrarily designated set of propositions, but as a move one party makes in a dialogue to offer premises that may be acceptable to another party who doubts the conclusion of the argument.

This paper explores the ways in which central principles of open democracy--deliberation and authentic democratic representation--could be facilitated by digital technologies.

Forthcoming in H. Landemore, R. Reich, and L. Bernholz (eds), Digital Technology and Democratic Theory, Chicago: Chicago University Press, forthcoming Fall 2020 (Chapter Two).

Part 1: The Curious Institutionalisation of Deliberative Democracy. The Irish Citizens’ Assemblies and the Future of Democratic Innovation

Abstract
Cases of deliberative democracy are ever-growing, however they remain largely ad hoc and ephemeral. Is institutionalisation a necessary condition for democratic innovations to meet great expectations? As the latest chapter in deliberative innovation, Ireland saw three successive assemblies produce major political outcomes through three successful referendums. Will Ireland lead the way in terms of new democratic institutions? First, I start by presenting the context within which the Irish case arose. It is crucial to perceive the Irish citizens’ assemblies as the latest chapter of a long trend involving deliberative mini-publics and as a product of transfers. Second, I analyse the institutionalisation process of deliberative democracy in Ireland by studying the successive assemblies, their ruptures and continuities, and their articulation. This case study will allow us to identify the relevant dimensions for institutionalisation. Finally, in light of the Irish insights, I establish some comparative typologies of the various institutionalisations displayed by deliberative democratic innovations worldwide and the challenges they raise.
Keywords : democratic innovation, institutionalisation, deliberative democracy, mini-public, participatory democracy


Résumé
Les expérimentations pratiques de démocratie délibérative se multiplient dans le monde, mais elles demeurent largement ad hoc et éphémères. L’institutionalisation est-elle une condition nécessaire pour que les innovations démocratiques répondent aux attentes à leur égard ? En tant que pointe avancée de l’innovation délibérative,
L’Irlande a vu trois assemblées successives produire des changements politiques majeurs, notamment à travers trois référendums victorieux. L’Irlande sera-t-elle un modèle en termes de nouvelles institutions démocratiques ? Premièrement, je commence par présenter le contexte au sein duquel le cas irlandais émerge. Il est crucial de considérer les assemblées citoyennes irlandaises comme le dernier chapitre d’une longue tendance impliquant des mini-publics délibératifs et comme le produit de transferts. Deuxièmement, j’analyse le processus d’institutionalisation de la démocratie délibérative en Irlande en étudiant les trois assemblées successives, leurs ruptures et continuités ainsi que leur articulation. Ce étude de cas nous permettra d’identifier les dimensions pertinentes concernant l’institutionnalisation. Enfin, à la lumière de ces découvertes, j’établis des typologies comparatives des différentes institutionnalisations révélées par les innovations délibératives contemporaines au niveau mondial, ainsi que les enjeux qu’elles soulèvent.
Mots-clefs : innovation démocratique, institutionalisation, démocratie délibérative, mini-public, participation



Part 2: “We have humility.” Perceived legitimacy and representative claims in the Irish Citizens’ Assembly

Abstract
In the study of deliberative democracy, both theorists and empiricists often consider legitimacy as procedural. However, why and how do randomly selected mini-public’s participants think they have the right -or not- to deliberate and to represent? What are their subjective cognitive representations and justifications regarding their own legitimacy? What are the visions of democracy and politics underlining those cognitive representations? To answer these questions, I develop a comprehensive sociology of the perceived legitimacy of the members of the Irish Citizens’ Assembly. I study their discourse, produced during qualitative interviews, through the concept of humility-legitimacy. After looking at this empirical evidence, I propose a theory of a “new spirit of sortition” and its consequences for democracy.
Keywords : citizen assembly, deliberative democracy, legitimacy, mini-public, representation


Résumé
Dans les études portant sur la démocratie délibérative, théoriciens et empiristes considèrent l’essentiel du temps la légitimité comme procédurale. Cependant, pourquoi et comment les participants à un mini-public tiré au sort pensent-ils qu’ils ont ou non le droit de délibérer et de représenter ? Quelles sont les conceptions de la démocratie et du politique qui sous-tendent ces représentations cognitives ? Afin de répondre à ces question, j’ai effectué une sociologie compréhensive des légitimités perçues par les membres de l’Assemblée Citoyenne irlandaise. J’ai étudié leurs discours, produit lors d’entretiens qualitatifs, à travers le concept de « légitimité-humilité ». Après avoir analysé les preuves empiriques, j’élabore une théorie du « nouvel esprit du tirage au sort » et de ses conséquences pour la démocratie.
Mots-clefs : assemblée citoyenne, démocratie délibérative, légitimité, mini-public, représentation


Pour citer ce dossier / To quote this issue :
Courant, Dimitri (2018). ‘Deliberative Democracy, Legitimacy, and Institutionalisation. The Irish Citizens' Assemblies’, IEPHI Working Paper Series, n°72.

Pour citer individuellement les deux articles présentés dans les Parties 1 et 2 de ce cahier / To quote individually the two articles presented in Part 1 and Part 2 of this issue :
Courant, Dimitri (2018a). ‘The Curious Institutionalisation of Deliberative Democracy. The Irish Citizens’ Assemblies and the Future of Democratic Innovation’, in Dimitri Courant, Deliberative Democracy, Legitimacy, and Institutionalisation. The Irish Citizens' Assemblies, IEPHI Working Paper Series, n°72 : 8-23.

Courant, Dimitri (2018b). ‘“We have humility.” Perceived legitimacy and representative claims in the Irish Citizens’ Assembly’, in Dimitri Courant, Deliberative Democracy, Legitimacy, and Institutionalisation. The Irish Citizens' Assemblies, IEPHI Working Paper SeriesI, n°72 : 25-46.

In France, the university buildings have significant challenges to meet the environmental transition requirements for green growth. At the same time, they are key elements for the spread of the sustainable development objectives at the building, the university campus, and the city scale. Universities are institutions capable of promoting changes in society, but also are institutions that need to be changed. In other words, before being a model for society, universities should implement sustainable behavior through the promotion of sustainable practices on campus. It is possible to say that energy consumption, CO2 emissions and lack of integration with the city are the major problems faced by French universities.Nowadays, the sustainable strategies implementation to improve buildings performance faces many challenges, including the lack of experience and information to support decision-making. A participatory tool for support decision-making was developed and tested to measure the performance of the ‘Aile Sud’ building renovation strategies in the Bergerie Nationale. The performance of the ‘Aile Sud’ building renovation strategies was assessed, and some recommendations for performance improvement were suggested in a continuous improvement approach.

La recherche présentée dans ce mémoire porte sur le rôle de la vie, celui des autres, et celui que nous jouons dans notre propre destinée. Elle part du postulat selon lequel chacun souhaite occuper dans ce monde une « place » qui lui convient vraiment, dans laquelle il peut s’épanouir, et non pas une place à laquelle on l’aurait assigné et à laquelle il serait contraint de rester. Dans un monde ultra normé, dans quelle mesure est-il possible d’« inventer » sa place, de créer son propre modèle, différent de celui reçu ? Qu’est-ce qui peut permettre à quelqu’un d’opérer un changement dans sa façon de penser et d’agir ? Qu’est-ce qui peut donner la force, la volonté de décider par soi de ce qui convient pour soi, d’agir et de persévérer malgré les obstacles rencontrés ?
Trois entretiens ont été menés sous l’angle de ce questionnement décliné en trois concepts : la relation, la rencontre, l’autodirection. L’analyse de trois récits de vie singuliers a permis de relier ces trois concepts aux concepts d’hétéroformation(Ce que les autres font de nous), écoformation(Ce que la vie fait de nous) et autoformation (Ce que nous faisons de notre vie.) de Gaston Pineau.
D’abord, l’éducation reçue et la relation à l’école et avec son environnement dès l’enfance est apparue comme une sorte de fondation de la disposition à devenir, à être disponibles aux possibles, à rebondir, à s’autoriser à transgresser les normes pour inventer ses propres normes et réussir à être soi au milieu des autres.
Ensuite, la rencontre a été identifiée comme un élément transformateur, qui met en mouvement. Cette rencontre, souvent imprévue et surprenante, peut être un évènement, une personne, une idée, une prise de conscience. Ainsi, elle peut se transformer en kairos une opportunité à saisir pour agir sur sa vie.
Enfin, la notion d’autodirection, a été explorée en tant qu’aptitude à se fixer un cap et à le maintenir, à s’auto-observer et à s’auto-réguler, à s’autoriser, à modifier la feuille de route en faisant des détours, mais également à changer d’avis sur sa destination. Cette aptitude nécessitée de se connaître soi-même, savoir à quoi l’on tient, tout en étant ouvert à la nouveauté.
Cette recherche est une piste de réflexion à visée émancipatrice pour les accompagnateurs, dans divers champs d’intervention : la formation, l’insertion ou évolution professionnelle, la gestion des ressources humaines.

V0 of my Dissertation for Habilitation à diriger les recherches.  Defended June 2009 - Université Sorbonne Nouvelle -Paris 3. Without Annex 3. Some references to be completed.

V0 de mon mémoire de synthèse pour l'Habilitation à diriger les recherches. Soutenu en juin 2009 à Université Sorbonne Nouvelle -Paris 3. Sans l'annexe 3 (et quelques références manquantes).

The abstract democratic ideal is hegemonic nowadays, but, what is considered to be its concrete institutional forms are facing a growing “crisis of representation” and distrust. As an answer to this crisis and after centuries of absence, sortition (selecting representatives by lots) is making its return on the political stage through various academic research, practical experiments and activist claims. But each thinker, experimentation, or militant group, is giving a different explanation of what sortition is, why and how it could strengthen democracy. How could we be thinking sortition efficiently? Instead of doing a chronology of this return my proposal is to construct a more general theory of sortition in a comparative approach. A broad study seems necessary in order to grasp the theoretical constants, despite the empirical diversity of sortition concrete uses. First, I shall compare sortition to the three other selection modes: election, nomination and certification. Second, I will analyse the deliberative frameworks, that is to say “who decides what how”. Third, I will distinguish four democratic principles of sortition: equality, impartiality, representativeness and legitimacy. My first research hypothesis is that sortition is likely to offer a greater equality, impartiality and representativeness. My second hypothesis is that sortition is the only method of selection producing a specific form, a humility-legitimacy when the three other selection modes are producing a superiority-legitimacy, where the principal is declared superior to the agent through the selection process.

https://www.unil.ch/iephi/home/menuinst/publications/les-cahiers-de-liephi/abstract-4.html

This thesis is a theoretical and empirical inquiry into ‘deliberative peacebuilding’, seeking to explain the ‘failures’ and ‘successes’ of peacebuilding in East Timor and Somaliland. While warfare has increased globally since the end of the Cold War, the UN has made efforts to
build peace (e.g. Boutros-Ghali 1992). While peacebuilding has become an internationally applied set of ideas and practices, one of the theoretical gaps is deliberation. This research thus conceptualises ‘deliberative peacebuilding’, and associates this with peacebuilding in the
non-Western, post-colonial, and (post-)conflict context.

This research identified East Timor and Somaliland as its case studies. Despite similarity in the ‘legitimation problem’ with vertical (state-society) and horizontal (‘modernity’-‘tradition’) inequalities/differences based upon cultural and historical backgrounds, East Timor and Somaliland undertook different approaches in a decade after the end of their civil wars. While
East Timor accepted UN peace operations, Somaliland rejected them. Yet both experienced similar transitions to make political order between ‘failure’ (political de-legitimation/societal dissent) and ‘success’ (political legitimation/societal consent).

Accordingly, this thesis poses two questions: 1) what caused the UN to have ‘failed’ (to prevent the ‘crisis’ from recurring in 2006) in East Timor, and 2) what caused East Timor and Somaliland to have experienced ‘equifinality’ (making similar progress along different paths)
in building peace (in East Timor from 1999 to 2012 and in Somaliland from 1991 to 2005). Findings, among others, include different paths in transition: a ‘hybrid’ path with external intervention in East Timor and an ‘agonistic’ path without it in Somaliland. Asymmetry in power relations urged deliberative agencies to address the ‘legitimation problem’ differently.

This article traces a connection between the Daoist conception of nothingness and democratic deliberation by way of Derrida's deconstructive analysis of decision. Analysis of the aporia(s) at the heart of decision is a recurrent feature of Derrida's later work and, I argue, this highlights the function of nothingness in the act of decision. After identifying convergences between Derridean deconstruction and the Daodejing relating to the constitutive role of nothingness in material and immaterial things, I argue that it is only because of the nothingness between reasons and a decision that there really is "a decision." This nothingness as the heart of any decision is further compounded by the "ordeal" that Derrida describes in relation to decisions that aspire to be just or responsible to the other. Finally, I argue that Derrida's analysis of decision suggests a possible way to spell out the connection between nothingness and the ethics of difference as presented in the Zhuangzi. Awareness of the primary and secondary nothingness involved in decision reminds us that there is no ground for "good conscience" with regard to any decision that has been taken and that there is always more to be done.

Defining what democracy means nowadays seems increasingly problematic as several alternative democratic visions are being developed and contrasted in normative theory and political practice. On the one hand, there are traditional accounts of democracy that are highly formal and minimalistic. Citizens are endowed with political rights, which they use to advance their interests, particularly through regular elections, which delegate power to governing representatives. Representative democracy has been long identified with this conception. On the other hand, alternative perspectives have emphasised the untapped potential of liberal societies. These more radical perspectives belong to two main democratic traditions: participatory democracy and deliberative democracy. On the basis of a common framework of participatory and deliberative norms, this paper envisages an alternative and more robust idea of democracy to offer normative guidance in democratising contemporary societies. We tie our discussion to an analysis of how Italian democracy could be improved.

Qu’est-ce qu’un raisonnement pratique valide ? Je distinguerai pour commencer, de façon quelque peu schématique, deux types de syllogisme pratique que l’on retrouve autant dans l’œuvre d’Aristote qu’au sein de différentes théories contemporaines du jugement pratique: le syllogisme moyens-fins et le syllogisme règle-cas. Je tenterai d’en montrer respectivement les lacunes afin de proposer une théorie adéquate du syllogisme pratique, en argumentant que cette théorie se trouve bien chez Aristote, malgré un émiettement et un certain manque de clarté de sa part. Dans cette démarche, nous serons confrontés à trois difficultés principales : la place de la délibération dans le raisonnement pratique, la nature de la conclusion du raisonnement (décision ou action) et puis le passage des prémisses à la conclusion, ou problème de la motivation. Ces trois problèmes sont des éléments essentiels d’une « logique du commandement interne ».

Demokracja deliberatywna, mimo, iż często podejmowana w naukach społecznych jako model teoretyczny, nie cieszy się równie dużą popularnością w praktyce. Model stworzony przez J. Rawlsa i J. Habermasa ma zarówno swoich przeciwników jak i zwolenników. Jedni, twierdzą, że jest on zbyt idealistyczny i zawiera utopijne wręcz postulaty oraz zasady niemożliwe osiągnięcia w ramach heterogenicznego i pluralistycznego społeczeństwa. Entuzjaści deliberacji natomiast, przekonują, że mimo pewnych niedoskonałości systemu, nie ma przeszkód, by stopniowo wdrażać jego komponenty, które mogą stanowić intratną alternatywę dla demokracji liberalnej, której zarzuca się obecnie nieefektywność. W artykule przedstawiono kilka przykładów skutecznego wdrażania rozwiązań demokracji deliberatywnej, w kontekście szeroko rozumianej debaty społecznej oraz potrzeby modyfikacji demokracji liberalnej.

Summary: Deliberative democracy, although often and willingly developed in the social sciences as a theoretical model, does not have so far equally popular in practice. The model created by J. Rawls and J. Habermas has both his opponents and supporters. Some argue that its idealistic and utopian postulates and principles are impossible to achieve within the heterogeneous and pluralistic society. Enthusiasts of deliberation, however, argue that despite certain imperfections in the system, there are no obstacles to gradually deploy its components, which can be a lucrative alternative to liberal democracy, which is currently criticized by its inefficiency. The article presents several examples of effective deployment of deliberative democracy in the context of the wider public debate and the need for modification of liberal democracy.

Deliberative democracy is at risk of becoming collateral damage of the current crisis of representative democracy. If deliberative democracy is necessarily representative and if representation betrays the true meaning of democracy as rule of, by, and for the people, then how can deliberative democracy retain any validity as a theory of political legitimacy? Any tight connection between deliberative democracy and representative democracy thus risks making deliberative democracy obsolete: a dated paradigm fit for a precrisis order, but maladjusted to the world of Occupy, the Pirate Party, the Zapatistas, and other anti-representative movements. This essay argues that the problem comes from a particular and historically situated understanding of representative democracy as rule by elected elites. I argue that in order to retain its normative appeal and political relevance, deliberative democracy should dissociate itself from representative democracy thus understood and reinvent itself as the core of a more truly democratic paradigm, which I call " open democracy. " In open democracy, popular rule means the mediated but real exercise of power by ordinary citizens. This new paradigm privileges nonelectoral forms of representation and in it, power is meant to remain constantly inclusive of and accessible–in other words open–to ordinary citizens. The motivating concern for this essay is the impact that the crisis of representative democracy, widely diagnosed by political commentators and democratic theorists alike, has or should have on deliberative democracy as a mainstream theory of democratic legitimacy. To the extent that the fate of deliberative democracy has become intimately intertwined with representative democracy as both a normative paradigm and a set of particular historical institutions, and to the extent that representative democracy is under attack precisely for being representative and keeping ordinary citizens at arm's length of the real site of decision and power, deliberative democrats should be worried about the status of their theory. Deliberative democracy risks becoming collateral damage of the problems currently facing representative democracy.

In this paper, I explore some of the connections between Hannah Arendt's two major works in political theory: The Human Condition and On Revolution. I attempt to show that the agonist and deliberative elements in Arendt are complementary, rather than mutually exclusive. I further argue that challenging Arendt's assimilation to the republican tradition is a major component of a more comprehensive understanding of Arendt's political theory.

In order for democratic deliberative interactions in educational settings to fruitfully occur, certain favorable conditions must obtain. In this chapter I chiefly concern myself with one of these putative conditions, namely that of school integration, believed by many liberal scholars to be necessary for consensus-building and legitimate decision-making. I provide a critical assessment of the belief that integration is a necessary facilitative condition for democratic deliberation in the classroom. I demonstrate that liberal versions of democratic deliberation predicated on this condition are puzzlingly inattentive both to the inevitability of segregation, as well as the inequities occasioned by 'school integration'. I then move to probe the possibilities for democratic education in the absence of integration. I argue that neither the possibilities for deliberation nor the cultivation of civic virtue turn on an environment being 'integrated'. Indeed some kinds of segregation may be more conducive to fostering both deliberation and civic virtue.

This chapter delves into debates about time and democratic deliberation. Deliberative democrats have developed sequential models but tend to think of time mainly as a background variable. Critics have drawn attention to the inadequacy of deliberation in accelerated society but, in so doing, have conflated arguments about the pace of democratic deliberation with arguments about its durational time. Democratic deliberation may be slow and inconclusive, but one aspect does not necessarily entail the other. It is against this backdrop that I shed lights on a diachronic reading of fallibilism in order to advance a more favourable reading of inconclusiveness.

El presente artículo se enfrenta al problema de determinar el marco en el que, para Aristóteles, se puede valorar la deliberación y los resultados de esta: la decisión y la acción que se realiza posterior a esta. Este problema surge en gran medida por lo que
Aristóteles denomina “la indeterminación de la deliberación”, pues en situaciones en las que las opciones sobre las que se delibera son borrosas es difícil determinar cuál es el marco sobre el cual se puede valorar si la decisión resultado de la deliberación fue acertada o no. Para ello, en primera instancia distinguimos la deliberación técnica y la deliberación moral, distinción enmarcada principalmente en términos de los fines, pues para la deliberación técnica el fin es extrínseco a la deliberación misma, razón por la cual es posible que para esta se presenten diferentes tipos de valoración. En la deliberación moral los fines son solamente intrínsecos, y son determinados únicamente en función de su conexión con la buena deliberación. Así, solo con  base en un modelo de “buena deliberación” determinado por la prudencia, y extendido además para toda la comunidad del cual el sujeto hace parte, es posible establecer un marco normativo adecuado para evaluar cada deliberación moral particular.