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When individuals read science news articles, they usually gain new yet shallow knowledge. Previous scientific work points to feelings of overconfidence, which may be moderated by a failure to provide a detailed explanation of a... more
When individuals read science news articles, they usually gain new yet shallow knowledge. Previous scientific work points to feelings of overconfidence, which may be moderated by a failure to provide a detailed explanation of a phenomenon. We investigated how participants (N = 155) perceived their own and scientists' knowledge about a scientific topic before and after they either read or read and explained an online science article. Regardless the kind of engagement, ratings of participants' own knowledge before and after engagement were significantly lower than the ratings of scientists' knowledge, meanwhile ratings of own and scientists' knowledge significantly increased in both groups. The group which provided (simplified) explanations reported a significantly higher reliance on themselves in comparison to the group only reading. Even though additional communicative act of explaining may not contribute to more productive strategies for dealing with science, the distinction between individuals and experts' knowledge seem to prevail.
Research Interests: Psychology and Perception
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Dateset for: Tkotz, Kienhues, Jucks and Bromme (2020). Keep Calm in Heated Debates: How People Perceive Different Styles of Discourse in a Scientific Debate. Front. Educ. doi: 10.3389/feduc.2020.572503
Research Interests: Sociology and Perception
When people stumble across inconsistent or conflicting scientific information, for example, on the Internet, they have to find an adequate explanation for the inconsistency or conflict. We focus on two types of explanations people could... more
When people stumble across inconsistent or conflicting scientific information, for example, on the Internet, they have to find an adequate explanation for the inconsistency or conflict. We focus on two types of explanations people could consider: the lack of one’s ability to understand the information or to explain away the inconsistency, and the actually given inconsistency that is inherent to
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In modern societies, one main goal for educated citizens and educators is to pursue scientific literacy. However, given the high complexity of scientific information and the fact that no single person can rely solely on their own... more
In modern societies, one main goal for educated citizens and educators is to pursue scientific literacy. However, given the high complexity of scientific information and the fact that no single person can rely solely on their own knowledge when making science-related decisions, achieving scientific literacy is not straightforward: This chapter focuses on how people cope with these hurdles using epistemic trust as a central cognitive prerequisite. Particularly, to be able to learn and make decisions about everyday life, laypersons (trustors) must depend on the knowledge of others who know better (experts/trustees). Firstly, we describe the concept of epistemic trust, whereby we argue that epistemic trust should be considered as a learning goal for science education. Secondly, we describe trustworthiness cues that could guide laypersons through a decision on whom to trust (source judgments, language style) and which claims to believe (evidence, consensus, replication). Thirdly, we discuss the role of discursive practices (explanation, argumentation) that could enhance laypersons’ understanding of science and insights into their own limits of knowledge. Lastly, based on how epistemic trust can be enhanced through understanding trustworthiness cues and being open to active engagement in discussions about science, we offer implications for fostering epistemic trust in (higher) education.
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ABSTRACT Objective We investigated how individuals deal with the limits of their own knowledge and productively cope with their dependence on experts as they engage with the socio-scientific topic of nuclear energy. We scrutinized the... more
ABSTRACT Objective We investigated how individuals deal with the limits of their own knowledge and productively cope with their dependence on experts as they engage with the socio-scientific topic of nuclear energy. We scrutinized the effects of content features of an interview text and of individuals’ communicative engagement with the information read. Method In a 2 × 2 factorial design study (N = 273), adult participants opposing nuclear energy read an online interview with a geophysicist. The same factual information was presented, but the geophysicist either took a stance for decommissioning nuclear energy plants or took no stance. After reading, participants were instructed to communicate their own position in an informative or persuasive manner. Dependent measures evaluated participants’ intellectual humility, strategies, perceived easiness of a simple solution, willingness to act and written arguments. Results Expert taking a stance led to lower intellectual humility, higher perceived easiness of a solution and stronger willingness to act against nuclear energy. Having the goal of persuading resulted in participants offering more one-sided arguments. Strategies were not significantly influenced by the independent factors. Conclusions The contrasting effect on individuals’ intellectual humility and willingness to act is discussed from the perspective of climate-oriented action and science education.
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... Stathopoulou and Vosniadou (in press) explored the relationship between phys-ics-related epistemological beliefs and physics understanding of Greek secondary school students. ... Redish et al. (1998) also focused on students'... more
... Stathopoulou and Vosniadou (in press) explored the relationship between phys-ics-related epistemological beliefs and physics understanding of Greek secondary school students. ... Redish et al. (1998) also focused on students' beliefs about physics. ...
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When risky technologies are debated in the media or when cases of scientific misconduct are made public, inevitable discussions arise about public loss of trust in science. However, trust in science reaches far beyond such incidents:... more
When risky technologies are debated in the media or when cases of scientific misconduct are made public, inevitable discussions arise about public loss of trust in science. However, trust in science reaches far beyond such incidents: trust is of much more fundamental importance for science. Clearly, trust is pivotal in doing science, since researchers in their everyday practice rely on the knowledge produced by other experts with different specialization and expertise. In the same way, trust is fundamental for the public understanding of science. Laypeople depend on the knowledge of scientific experts when developing a personal stance on science-based issues and arriving at decisions about them. Laypeople only possess a bounded understanding of science, but nowadays they are able to rapidly access all kinds of scientific knowledge online. To deal with scientific information, laypeople have to trust in scientists and their findings. We will at first describe the role of trust in doing and understanding science. Then a summary of international survey results on the general public’s trust in science are presented. Starting from these results and questions that arise from them, we extend and revise past conceptualizations of trust, arriving at a conceptualization of epistemic trust. Epistemic trust rests not only on the assumption that one is dependent on the knowledge of others who are more knowledgeable; it also entails a vigilance toward the risk to be misinformed. Drawing on empirical findings, we argue that the critical characteristics that determine the epistemic trustworthiness of a source of science-based information (for example, a scientist or a scientific institution) are the source’s expertise, integrity and benevolence. These characteristics have already been described in the model of trust provided by Mayer et al. (1995), but when it comes to trust in context of science, they must be redefined. Furthermore, trust judgments are not based solely on these characteristics, but depend on further constrains, which will be discussed in this chapter.
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In diesem Cutachten stellen wir zunachst eine Verortung der Herausforderung Wissenschaftsrezeption an, indem wir verschiedene Kontextfaktoren von Wissenschaftsrezeption ausfuhren (Abschnitt 2). Im folgenden Abschnitt (3) fokussieren wir... more
In diesem Cutachten stellen wir zunachst eine Verortung der Herausforderung Wissenschaftsrezeption an, indem wir verschiedene Kontextfaktoren von Wissenschaftsrezeption ausfuhren (Abschnitt 2). Im folgenden Abschnitt (3) fokussieren wir auf die Analyseebene des Rezipienten. Hierbei betrachten wir zentrale Personenvariablen, die aus kognitionspsychologischer Sicht die Rezeption von Information beeinflussen sowie auch, sofern moglich, Modelle, wie diese Variablen positiv beeinflusst werden konnen (Modelle zur Einstellungsanderung und zum Conceptual Change). Soweit in der Literatur verfugbar, werden die verschiedenen Variablen anhand von Studien zur Bio- und Gentechnologie exemplarisch weiter ausgefuhrt. Im Abschnitt 4 stellen wir verschiedene Aspekte des zu rezipierenden Inhalts heraus. Bei diesen beziehen wir uns insbesondere auf solche Aspekte, die bei kontrovers diskutierten, konflikthaften Themen von besonderer Bedeutung sind, wiederum mit besonderem Fokus auf Studien zur Bio- und Centechnologie. Im letzten Abschnitt des Cutachtens (5) leiten wir aus unseren Forschungsschwerpunkten einige Empfehlungen zur Verbesserung der Wissenschaftsrezeption ab und skizzieren mogliche weitere Forschungsfragen.
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ABSTRACT When individuals in our knowledge society assess the extent of their own knowledge, they may overestimate what they actually know. But, this knowledge illusion can be reduced when people are prompted to explain the content. To... more
ABSTRACT When individuals in our knowledge society assess the extent of their own knowledge, they may overestimate what they actually know. But, this knowledge illusion can be reduced when people are prompted to explain the content. To investigate whether this holds true for written self-explanations about science phenomena this study transfers the Illusion of explanatory depth (IOED) paradigm to learning from a written science-related text. In an experimental group design, individuals (N = 155) first read information on artificial intelligence supported weather forecasting and then either did or did not produce a written explanation on the topic. Afterwards they rated their own knowledge on the topic, rated experts’ knowledge on the topic, answered questions on their strategies for handling scientific information and rated their own topic specific intellectual humility. Results show that participants in all experimental conditions rated their own knowledge significantly lower than that of experts; however, providing the written explanation about predicting severe weather events did not significantly affect the dependent measures. Implications address how giving explanations may influence judgements of one’s own and scientists’ knowledge in the context of reading science-related texts.
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Research Interests: Psychology, Information Technology, Epistemology, Electronic publishing, Beliefs, and 12 moreMedicine, Information seeking, Intervention, Web-based Learning and Instruction, Reliability, Context Effect, Learning and Instruction, Control Management, Information Seeking, Guidance and Counseling Intervention Programs, Internet, and Control Group
The experimental studies presented here investigated whether discussing ethical implications of preliminary scientific results in a science blog would impact blog readers' perception of the responsible scientist blogger's... more
The experimental studies presented here investigated whether discussing ethical implications of preliminary scientific results in a science blog would impact blog readers' perception of the responsible scientist blogger's epistemic trustworthiness (on the dimensions expertise, integrity, and benevolence). They also investigated whether it made a difference in who had brought forward the ethics aspects: the responsible scientist blogger or another expert. Results indicate that by the mere introduction of ethics, people infer something about the blogger's communicative intentions: Introducing ethical aspects seems to raise vigilance about an expert's benevolence and integrity. Moreover, ratings of epistemic trustworthiness differed depending on who added ethical arguments: If ethics were introduced by the scientist blogger himself, his benevolence and integrity were rated higher than when ethics were introduced by another expert. These results are relevant for science bloggers, science communicators, and researchers who study laypeople's understanding of epistemic uncertainty within science.
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Given their lack of background knowledge, laypeople require expert help when dealing with scientific information. To decide whose help is dependable, laypeople must judge an expert's epistemic trustworthiness in terms of competence,... more
Given their lack of background knowledge, laypeople require expert help when dealing with scientific information. To decide whose help is dependable, laypeople must judge an expert's epistemic trustworthiness in terms of competence, adherence to scientific standards, and good intentions. Online, this may be difficult due to the often limited and sometimes unreliable source information available. To measure laypeople's evaluations of experts (encountered online), we constructed an inventory to assess epistemic trustworthiness on the dimensions expertise, integrity, and benevolence. Exploratory (n = 237) and confirmatory factor analyses (n = 345) showed that the Muenster Epistemic Trustworthiness Inventory (METI) is composed of these three factors. A subsequent experimental study (n = 137) showed that all three dimensions of the METI are sensitive to variation in source characteristics. We propose using this inventory to measure assignments of epistemic trustworthiness, that i...
To discuss reflexive practice in relation to epistemic cognition, we posit informed reflexivity as an epistemic virtue that is informed by its particular context and purposes of knowing and action and promotes use of reliable processes to... more
To discuss reflexive practice in relation to epistemic cognition, we posit informed reflexivity as an epistemic virtue that is informed by its particular context and purposes of knowing and action and promotes use of reliable processes to achieve epistemic aims. It involves reasoning about social relationships in which a person is embedded when acting in a specific kind of context—whether academic or real-world—that requires construction, evaluation, and application of knowledge. Informed reflexivity is the learned disposition to reason about one's knowledge-related actions, entailing context-specific epistemic characteristics. It involves an intentional stance about the need to reason about oneself and the context. Discussions of two disciplinary competencies (science and history) and two cross-disciplinary competencies (critical thinking and writing) illustrate how epistemically competent practices instantiate informed reflexivity. Promoting informed reflexivity as an epistemic virtue might dispose students toward reliable processes of knowing and making epistemically informed resolved action appropriate to the context.
Research Interests: Psychology, Epistemology, Reflective Practice, Science Education, History of Education, and 14 moreVirtue Ethics, Critical Thinking, Reflexivity, Reading, Epistemic Justification, Virtue Epistemology, Role of the Educational Psychologist, Reflection, Epistemological beliefs, Epistemic Virtue, Reflective Teaching, Virtue, Personal epistemology, and Teacher Reflection
The experimental studies presented here investigated whether discussing ethical implications of preliminary scientific results in a science blog would impact blog readers' perception of the responsible scientist blogger's... more
The experimental studies presented here investigated whether discussing ethical implications of preliminary scientific results in a science blog would impact blog readers' perception of the responsible scientist blogger's epistemic trustworthiness (on the dimensions expertise, integrity, and benevolence). They also investigated whether it made a difference in who had brought forward the ethics aspects: the responsible scientist blogger or another expert. Results indicate that by the mere introduction of ethics, people infer something about the blogger's communicative intentions: Introducing ethical aspects seems to raise vigilance about an expert's benevolence and integrity. Moreover, ratings of epistemic trustworthiness differed depending on who added ethical arguments: If ethics were introduced by the scientist blogger himself, his benevolence and integrity were rated higher than when ethics were introduced by another expert. These results are relevant for science ...
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When risky technologies are debated in the media or when cases of scientific misconduct are made public, inevitable discussions arise about public loss of trust in science. However, trust in science reaches far beyond such incidents:... more
When risky technologies are debated in the media or when cases of scientific misconduct are made public, inevitable discussions arise about public loss of trust in science. However, trust in science reaches far beyond such incidents: trust is of much more fundamental importance for science. Clearly, trust is pivotal in doing science, since researchers in their everyday practice rely on the knowledge produced by other experts with different specialization and expertise. In the same way, trust is fundamental for the public understanding of science. Laypeople depend on the knowledge of scientific experts when developing a personal stance on science-based issues and arriving at decisions about them. Laypeople only possess a bounded understanding of science, but nowadays they are able to rapidly access all kinds of scientific knowledge online. To deal with scientific information, laypeople have to trust in scientists and their findings. We will at first describe the role of trust in doing and understanding science. Then a summary of international survey results on the general public’s trust in science are presented. Starting from these results and questions that arise from them, we extend and revise past conceptualizations of trust, arriving at a conceptualization of epistemic trust. Epistemic trust rests not only on the assumption that one is dependent on the knowledge of others who are more knowledgeable; it also entails a vigilance toward the risk to be misinformed. Drawing on empirical findings, we argue that the critical characteristics that determine the epistemic trustworthiness of a source of science-based information (for example, a scientist or a scientific institution) are the source’s expertise, integrity and benevolence. These characteristics have already been described in the model of trust provided by Mayer et al. (1995), but when it comes to trust in context of science, they must be redefined. Furthermore, trust judgments are not based solely on these characteristics, but depend on further constrains, which will be discussed in this chapter.
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Supplemental material, HenKienBrom_Replication_Supplementary_Materials_final for Replication crisis = trust crisis? The effect of successful vs failed replications on laypeople's trust in researchers and research by Friederike... more
Supplemental material, HenKienBrom_Replication_Supplementary_Materials_final for Replication crisis = trust crisis? The effect of successful vs failed replications on laypeople's trust in researchers and research by Friederike Hendriks, Dorothe Kienhues and Rainer Bromme in Public Understanding of Science
Given their lack of background knowledge, laypeople require expert help when dealing with scientific information. To decide whose help is dependable, laypeople must judge an expert’s epistemic trustworthiness in terms of competence,... more
Given their lack of background knowledge, laypeople require expert help when dealing with scientific information. To decide whose help is dependable, laypeople must judge an expert’s epistemic trustworthiness in terms of competence, adherence to scientific stan-dards, and good intentions. Online, this may be difficult due to the often limited and some-times unreliable source information available. To measure laypeople’s evaluations of experts (encountered online), we constructed an inventory to assess epistemic trustworthi-ness on the dimensions expertise, integrity, and benevolence. Exploratory (n = 237) and confirmatory factor analyses (n = 345) showed that the Muenster Epistemic Trustworthiness Inventory (METI) is composed of these three factors. A subsequent experimental study (n = 137) showed that all three dimensions of the METI are sensitive to variation in source char-acteristics. We propose using this inventory to measure assignments of epistemic trustwor-thiness, that is, ...
In methodological and practical debates about replications in science, it is (often implicitly) assumed that replications will affect public trust in science. In this preregistered experiment ( N = 484), we varied (a) whether a... more
In methodological and practical debates about replications in science, it is (often implicitly) assumed that replications will affect public trust in science. In this preregistered experiment ( N = 484), we varied (a) whether a replication attempt was successful or not and (b) whether the replication was authored by the same, or another lab. Results showed that ratings of study credibility (e.g. evidence strength, ηP2 = .15) and researcher trustworthiness (e.g. expertise, ηP2 = .15) were rated higher upon learning of replication success, and lower in case of replication failure. The replication’s author did not make a meaningful difference. Prior beliefs acted as covariate for ratings of credibility, but not trustworthiness, while epistemic beliefs regarding the certainty of knowledge were a covariate to both. Hence, laypeople seem to notice that successfully replicated results entail higher epistemic significance, while possibly not taking into account that replications should be c...
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Scientific debates are, in an epistemological sense, argumentative approaches aimed at coming to the most appropriate conclusion. However, as these debates sometimes involve interpersonal rather than content-driven attacks (e.g., an... more
Scientific debates are, in an epistemological sense, argumentative approaches aimed at coming to the most appropriate conclusion. However, as these debates sometimes involve interpersonal rather than content-driven attacks (e.g., an argument between scientific experts might involve personal dislike), the following question arises: How do such communication behaviors affect people’s perception of the argument? In an empirical study, we presented prospective teachers (N = 222) with a newspaper article about two scientific experts controversially discussing the pros and cons of a fictional vocabulary training program. Using a 1 × 2 between-subject design, the article contained either a neutral or an incivil discourse style. The dependent measures evaluated how participants perceived the experts’ trustworthiness and how they viewed the practical relevance of the scientific topic at hand. Results revealed that participants who read the neutral-style discourse perceived the two experts as...
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To discuss reflexive practice in relation to epistemic cognition, we posit informed reflexivity as an epistemic virtue that is informed by its particular context and purposes of knowing and action and promotes use of reliable processes to... more
To discuss reflexive practice in relation to epistemic cognition, we posit informed reflexivity as an epistemic virtue that is informed by its particular context and purposes of knowing and action and promotes use of reliable processes to achieve epistemic aims. It involves reasoning about social relationships in which a person is embedded when acting in a specific kind of context—whether academic or real-world—that requires construction, evaluation, and application of knowledge. Informed reflexivity is the learned disposition to reason about one's knowledge-related actions, entailing context-specific epistemic characteristics. It involves an intentional stance about the need to reason about oneself and the context. Discussions of two disciplinary competencies (science and history) and two cross-disciplinary competencies (critical thinking and writing) illustrate how epistemically competent practices instantiate informed reflexivity. Promoting informed reflexivity as an epistemi...
Research Interests: Psychology, Reflective Practice, Science Education, History of Education, Virtue Ethics, and 10 moreCritical Thinking, Reading, Epistemic Justification, Virtue Epistemology, Role of the Educational Psychologist, Reflection, Epistemological beliefs, Reflective Teaching, Personal epistemology, and Teacher Reflection
Abstract Laypeople need to trust experts, because they lack sufficient background knowledge to handle scientific evidence. This study investigates if a science blogger’s expertise, integrity, and benevolence are affected by an admission... more
Abstract Laypeople need to trust experts, because they lack sufficient background knowledge to handle scientific evidence. This study investigates if a science blogger’s expertise, integrity, and benevolence are affected by an admission of a study’s flaw in contrast to a critique by another scientist. Results ( N = 90) showed that ascriptions of expertise were lower when a flaw was disclosed, no matter by whom. However, ascriptions of integrity and benevolence were higher when admitted vs. when introduced via critique. Hence, epistemic trustworthiness is inferred from objective data (a flaw was made), but also from communicative actions (admission of the flaw).