In the twentieth century, several accounts arose from the philosophy of language and the philosop... more In the twentieth century, several accounts arose from the philosophy of language and the philosophy of logic, as to how to understand the content of a sentence and the effect of pragmatic factors on it. In this paper, we highlight the three views that we consider most relevant to the contemporary philosophy of information: (a) Kripkean defence of the existence of a posteriori necessary truths, (b) truth-conditional pragmatics that incorporate into the content of the utterance part of what, according to Grice, would have previously been understood as pragmatic implicatures, and (c) inferential expressivism, a position in the philosophy of logic that stems from Frege and Wittgenstein, presently held by Brandom, whose main point is that the semantic role of sentences that include logical constants is to display inferential relations among the propositions involved. We conclude that there are different kinds of necessary truths, each one with its own particular characteristics. We do not offer a substantial position but simply introduce the alternatives stressing their relevance for a theory of semantic information.
In the twentieth century, several accounts arose from the philosophy of language and the philosop... more In the twentieth century, several accounts arose from the philosophy of language and the philosophy of logic, as to how to understand the content of a sentence and the effect of pragmatic factors on it. In this paper, we highlight the three views that we consider most relevant to the contemporary philosophy of information: (a) Kripkean defence of the existence of a posteriori necessary truths, (b) truth-conditional pragmatics that incorporate into the content of the utterance part of what, according to Grice, would have previously been understood as pragmatic implicatures, and (c) inferential expressivism, a position in the philosophy of logic that stems from Frege and Wittgenstein, presently held by Brandom, whose main point is that the semantic role of sentences that include logical constants is to display inferential relations among the propositions involved. We conclude that there are different kinds of necessary truths, each one with its own particular characteristics. We do not offer a substantial position but simply introduce the alternatives stressing their relevance for a theory of semantic information.
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