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  • Washington, DC, United States

Francesco Femia

Climate change and its attendant impacts on natural resources have traditionally been treated as a “soft security” question—a challenge to be managed, but not necessarily a disruptive factor in international security. Until recently,... more
Climate change and its attendant impacts on natural resources have traditionally been treated as a “soft security” question—a challenge to be managed, but not necessarily a disruptive factor in international security. Until recently, climate change was primarily the domain of specialized negotiators, such as environmental ministers and individuals present at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. However, this has begun to change. In response to a growing body of research demonstrating a significant relationship between a changing climate and state fragility, the foreign policy and security establishments of a growing number of nations have grown increasingly concerned—suggesting in a flurry of national security strategies, defense papers, and intelligence assessments that climate change is a “threat multiplier” and an “immediate risk to national security.” Although security establishments have been attuned to climate change risks since at least 2003, the amount of strategy, planning, and implementation documents addressing climate change risks to security have increased significantly in recent years. . A reasonable question follows: “What does this mean for state sovereignty, and the world order that rests on that foundation?” This article is a preliminary attempt at answering such a question. The general conclusion is that climate change, by exacerbating stresses to the natural resources that sustain the nation-state, presents a significant risk to state sovereignty and world order.
Syria’s current social unrest is, in the most direct sense, a reaction to a brutal and out-of-touch regime and a response to the political wave of change that began in Tunisia early last year. However, that’s not the whole story. The past... more
Syria’s current social unrest is, in the most direct sense, a reaction to a brutal and out-of-touch regime and a response to the political wave of change that began in Tunisia early last year. However, that’s not the whole story. The past few years have seen a number of significant social, economic, environmental and climatic changes in Syria that have eroded the social contract between citizen and government in the country, have strengthened the case for the opposition movement, and irreparably damaged the legitimacy of the al-Assad regime. If the international community and future policy-makers in Syria are to address and resolve the drivers of unrest in the country, these changes will have to be better explored and exposed.
Syria’s current social unrest is, in the most direct sense, a reaction to a brutal and out-of-touch regime and a response to the political wave of change that began in Tunisia early last year. However, that’s not the whole story. The past... more
Syria’s current social unrest is, in the most direct sense, a reaction to a brutal and out-of-touch regime and a response to the political wave of change that began in Tunisia early last year. However, that’s not the whole story. The past few years have seen a number of significant social, economic, environmental and climatic changes in Syria that have eroded the social contract between citizen and government in the country, have strengthened the case for the opposition movement, and irreparably damaged the legitimacy of the al-Assad regime. If the international community and future policy-makers in Syria are to address and resolve the drivers of unrest in the country, these changes will have to be better explored and exposed.
In this article we examine the role of climate change and climate hazards, their attendant impacts on water and food security in the Arab world, and the inability or unwillingness of governments to cope with these forces in the years... more
In this article we examine the role of climate change and climate hazards, their attendant impacts on water and food security in the Arab world, and the inability or unwillingness of governments to cope with these forces in the years leading up to, and during, the Arab uprisings. In one case study we investigate how long-term drought in Syria, large-scale human displacement, and the lack of an effective government response, may have contributed to social and political unrest in Syria, fueling a conflict with significant national, regional and international security dimensions. In a second case study, we explore the phenomenon of hazard globalization, whereby climate hazards have serious implications for food and water security far from the event epicenter. Specifically, we examine how drought in China and Russia may have influenced the rebellion in Egypt.
The United States military has a long history of developing innovative technologies for improving war-fighting that are eventually repurposed for civilian life. This includes society-altering technologies like the computer and the Global... more
The United States military has a long history of developing innovative technologies for improving war-fighting that are eventually repurposed for civilian life. This includes society-altering technologies like the computer and the Global Positioning System (GPS). As an institution with the capacity to assess long-term risks, and develop technologies to address those risks, the U.S. military is uniquely placed to lead in this arena. Today, we are faced with a new set of critical nontraditional security threats. And true to form, provided that fiscal constraints do not get in the way, the U.S. military is once again leading the way in developing critical new technologies to meet them.
Climate change and its attendant impacts on natural resources have traditionally been treated as a “soft security” question—a challenge to be managed, but not necessarily a disruptive factor in international security. Until recently,... more
Climate change and its attendant impacts on natural resources have traditionally been treated as a “soft security” question—a challenge to be managed, but not necessarily a disruptive factor in international security.  Until recently, climate change was primarily the domain of specialized negotiators, such as environmental ministers and individuals present at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. However, this has begun to change. In response to a growing body of research demonstrating a significant relationship between a changing climate and state fragility, the foreign policy and security establishments of a growing number of nations have grown increasingly concerned—suggesting in a flurry of national security strategies, defense papers, and intelligence assessments that climate change is a “threat multiplier” and an “immediate risk to national security.”  Although security establishments have been attuned to climate change risks since at least 2003, the amount of strategy, planning, and implementation documents addressing climate change risks to security have increased significantly in recent years. . A reasonable question follows: “What does this mean for state sovereignty, and the world order that rests on that foundation?” This article is a preliminary attempt at answering such a question. The general conclusion is that climate change, by exacerbating stresses to the natural resources that sustain the nation-state, presents a significant risk to state sovereignty and world order.
Research Interests:
The interactions between climate and security are complex. They must be better understood in order to ensure that governments, societies and communities advance responsible policy solutions that are commensurate to the risks. Three basic... more
The interactions between climate and security are complex. They must be better understood in order to ensure that governments, societies and communities advance responsible policy solutions that are commensurate to the risks. Three basic principles for governments include avoidance of the oversimplification and underestimation of climate-security risks, a broadening of risk assessments to include a wider range of climate-related factors, and a lowering of the “certainty” threshold needed to precipitate preventive solutions.
Research Interests:
In this article we examine the role of climate change and climate hazards, their attendant impacts on water and food security in the Arab world, and the inability or unwillingness of governments to cope with these forces in the years... more
In this article we examine the role of climate change and climate hazards, their attendant impacts on water and food security in the Arab world, and the inability or unwillingness of governments to cope with these forces in the years leading up to, and during, the Arab uprisings. In one case study we investigate how long-term drought in Syria, large-scale human displacement, and the lack of an effective government response, may have contributed to social and political unrest in Syria, fueling a conflict with significant national, regional and international security dimensions. In a second case study, we explore the phenomenon of hazard globalization, whereby climate hazards have serious implications for food and water security far from the event epicenter.  Specifically, we examine how drought in China and Russia may have influenced the rebellion in Egypt.
Research Interests:
Research Interests: