Fernanda Brollo

We study spillovers in learning about the enforcement of Bolsa Familia, a programme conditioning benefits on children’s school attendance. Using original administrative data, we find that individuals’ compliance responds to penalties incurred by their classmates and by siblings’ classmates (in other grades/schools). As the severity of penalties increases with repeated noncompliance, the response is larger when peers are punished for ‘higher stages' than the family’s, consistent with learning. Individuals also respond to penalties experienced by neighbours who are exogenously scheduled to receive notices on the same day. Our results point to social multiplier effects of enforcement via learning.

Do politicians manipulate the enforcement of conditional welfare programs to influence electoral outcomes? We study the Bolsa Familia Program (BFP) in Brazil, which provides a monthly stipend to poor families conditional on school attendance. Repeated failure to comply with this requirement results in increasing penalties. First, we exploit random variation in the timing when beneficiaries learn about penalties for noncompliance around the 2008 municipal elections. We find that the vote share of candidates aligned with the president is lower in zip codes where more beneficiaries received penalties shortly before (as opposed to shortly after) the elections. Second, we show that politicians strategically manipulate enforcement. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find weaker enforcement before elections in municipalities where mayors from the presidential coalition can run for reelection. We provide evidence that manipulation occurs through misreporting school attendance, part...

This essay brings a synthesize of the doctoral thesis named "Essays in Political Economy:;Evidence from Brazil", which provides relevant contribution towards our understanding regarding the incentives and constraints that local governments face in the context of a federalist system. The analysis goes through theoretical and empirical analysis at the microeconomic level with specific reference to Brazil, including original and rich

This essay brings a synthesize of the doctoral thesis named "Essays in Political Economy:;Evidence from Brazil", which provides relevant contribution towards our understanding regarding the incentives and constraints that local governments face in the context of a federalist system. The analysis goes through theoretical and empirical analysis at the microeconomic level with specific reference to Brazil, including original and rich

One of the basic principles that allow a smooth operation of the markets is the equilibrium between supply and demand. According to this principle, when demand exceeds supply, the price mechanism will try to bring the system back into equilibrium. When this thinking is applied to the housing market, it leads to the conclusion that any inequality in housing supply

This paper presents evidence that central government has a very important role in improving the quality of oce-holders when political clientelism is present. Exploiting the exogenous variation of the release of the audit reports and the Brazilian institutional scheme, there is evidence that the central government reduces the amount of infrastructure transfers to municipalities with unveiled corrupt mayors after the

The paper studies the effect of additional government revenues on political corruption and on the quality of politicians, both with theory and data. The theory is based on a version of the career concerns model of political agency with endogenous entry of political candidates. The evidence refers to municipalities in Brazil, where federal transfers to municipal governments change exogenously according

This article uses a regression discontinuity design in close electoral races to disclose purely political reasons in the allocation of intergovernmental transfers in a federal state. We identify the effect of political alignment on federal transfers to municipal governments in Brazil, and find that—in preelection years—municipalities in which the mayor is affiliated with the coalition (and especially with the political party) of the Brazilian president receive approximately one-third larger discretionary transfers for infrastructures. This effect is primarily driven by the fact that the federal government penalizes municipalities run by mayors from the opposition coalition who won by a narrow margin, thereby tying their hands for the next election.

The paper studies the effect of additional government revenues on political corruption and on the quality of politicians, both with theory and data. The theory is based on a version of the career concerns model of political agency with endogenous entry of political candidates. The evidence refers to municipalities in Brazil, where federal transfers to municipal governments change exogenously according