This article is a revised and updated version of a paper originally published as Institutionalizi... more This article is a revised and updated version of a paper originally published as Institutionalizing Adaptation: It's Time for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps by the Center for a New American Security in June 2007. These views are the author's own. "Arguably, the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries. How the Army should be organized and prepared for this advisory role remains an open question, and will require innovative and forward thinking." -Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 10 October 2007.1 ARMY DOCTRINE and recent events on the ground in two wars have demonstrated that the achievement of American goals in Iraq and Afghanistan will increasingly depend on the performance of the security forces of those countries themselves. U.S. Army and Marine Corps Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, describes the many complicated and interrelated tasks that should be conducted simultaneously to defeat an insurgency and then notes, "Key to all these tasks is developing an effective host-nation (HN) security force."2 In recognition of the enduring need for American advisors to coach, teach, and mentor host-nation security forces in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and in dozens of other countries around the globe, the Army should create a permanent standing advisory command with responsibility for all aspects of the advisor mission-from doctrine through facilities. An advisory command is essential to enable and empower the security forces of our allies to defeat extremism. Most importantly, any advisor command should have responsibility over a standing force of some 20,000 soldiers. It has been argued that foreign forces cannot defeat an insurgency-the best they can hope for is to create the conditions that will enable local forces to do so.3 The most important contribution the U.S. Army makes to the development of security forces like the Iraqi Army (IA) and Afghan National Army (ANA) is embedded advisory (or "transition") teams. These teams coach, teach, and mentor host nation security forces, training them before deployment and accompanying them into combat; the mission is described by the acronym FID, for "foreign internal defense." Advisors bring important combat multipliers to the fight: artillery and close air support; medical evacuation and support; and, perhaps most importantly, a culture of leadership and training, two crucial pillars of success for all effective armies. From a strategic perspective, competent advisor teams also communicate a commitment to legitimacy. Since host-nation security forces have important cultural awareness and linguistic advantages over U.S. forces and are likely to be far more palatable to the local public whose support is ultimately the key in any counterinsurgency campaign, the advisory role of U.S. forces has become increasingly important. Strategic outcomes now hinge on advisor mission competence and success for at least two reasons. First, because America does not have enough ground forces to meet all security threats everywhere and must therefore rely upon the strategic leverage foreign troops provide; and second, because those forces have more legitimacy than do American troops who can be perceived as occupiers. American advisors serve as enormously efficient combat multipliers; the whole is far more than the sum of its parts, and effective host-nation forces, enabled and empowered by dedicated combat advisors, are now the foundation of U.S. strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq, years of hard work to train, equip, and mentor the Iraqi Security Forces are beginning to show results. After effective U.S.-led counterinsurgency operations dramatically improved security in Iraq in 2007, consecutive Iraqi-led operations in Basra, Sadr City, and Mosul in the spring of 2008 have, following a shaky start, led to further gains that dramatically increased confidence in the government and Iraqi Army. …
Battle is the ultimate to which the whole life's labor of an officer should be directed. He m... more Battle is the ultimate to which the whole life's labor of an officer should be directed. He may live to the age of retirement without seeing a battle; still, he must always be getting ready for it as if he knew the hour of the day it is to break upon him. And then, whether it comes late or early he must be willing to fight-he must fight. -Brigadier General C.F. Smith1 THE MILITARY OFFICER must fill a number of roles, often simultaneously. He has responsibilities as a warfighter, as the Nation's servant, as a member of the profession of arms, and as a leader of character. These four roles are interrelated almost to the point of inseparability, but examining each separately allows a better understanding of their inherent complexities. The central premise of this article is that preparing for battle is a lifelong developmental process and a worthy life's work. While fighting America's wars is not the professional soldier's only task, it is the task that only the professional soldier can do. Warfighting's complex arrangement of activities includes generating, applying, and sustaining combat power from the fort to the port to the fighting position to achieve the aims of policy. Most of the examples cited come from the realms of direct and indirect fire, but that fact stems more from our inability to discuss the other critical aspects of warfighting than it does from any contention that the point of the spear is somehow more important than the shaft. Developing the set of skills necessary to manage violence in the Nation's service is a lifelong developmental process that begins when an officer receives his commission and continues throughout a career. Professionalism is a combination of competence and devotion to service that grows over time, and growth occurs differently in each individual. There is no rank or position or level of education that clearly delineates the professional from the mere jobholder. Furthermore, the relationship between professionals at differing stages of career development is symbiotic. The younger professional benefits from the older one's wisdom and dignity, while the older benefits from the younger one's idealism and energy. Mastering the art and science of warfighting encompasses every aspect of the human experience-- physical, intellectual, and moral.2 To understand fully the officer's responsibilities as a warfighter, we must explore in detail each of these aspects. The Physical Dimension The Army inspires soldiers to have the strength, the confidence, and the will to fight and win anywhere, anytime. -The Army Vision, 2002(3) This statement from Army Vision, 2002, is as applicable to General George Washington's crossing of the Delaware in 1776 as it is to Task Force Eagle's crossing of the Sava in 1995. Warfighting always has been and always will be a struggle, not only against hostile forces but also against hostile environments. The officer as warfighter has a duty to prepare himself and his subordinates to cope with such physical rigors. This duty begins at the earliest stages of an officer's service. After arriving at his first duty station, a second lieutenant is expected to set the standard for his platoon in physical toughness. Toughness, not mere fitness, is the standard by which soldiers measure leaders. That the lieutenant be in excellent physical condition is necessary, but not sufficient. More important is his willingness to share his soldiers' physical hardships. Sergeant Major John Stepanek, addressing a group of officer candidates, stated succinctly what they could expect from noncommissioned officers (NCOs): "You can expect loyalty to your position, devotion to our cause, admiration for your honest effort, courage to match your courage, guts to match your guts, endurance to match your endurance, motivation to match your motivation, esprit to match your esprit, a desire for achievement to match your desire for achievement. …
We live in an age of "heavy peace. "... There will be other Kosovos, and, whether for s... more We live in an age of "heavy peace. "... There will be other Kosovos, and, whether for strategic or humanitarian reasons---or just muddled impulses-we will not be able to resist them all. ... We cannot enter upon such commitments under the assumption that they will be temporary and brief... We must stop pretending those challenges will disappear--that "something will turn up "and prepare to meet them.1 -Ralph Peters WITH THE END of the Cold War and the rise of ethnonationalisticconflicts, complex humanitarian emergencies (CHEs) have proliferated around the world. Internal conflicts that combine large-scale displacements of people, mass famine and fragile or failing economic, social and political institutions are becoming commonplace. War remains a common feature of the international landscape despite growing global interdependence. While the end of the Cold War has reduced the risk of great-power conflict, it has also decreased the perceived constraints on proxy wars, and as a result, over 40 unresolved conflicts currently fester, simmer or rage. International peacekeeping forces alone are unlikely to achieve lasting results in most cases, but they can stop the fighting and help implement fair and lasting resolutions.3 While the US Army prepares to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars, it will frequently be called upon to provide the military forces necessary to implement our nation's multifaceted respouse to CHEs.4 Even though peace operations and preventing deadly conflict are becoming increasingly common missions, the Army currently treats each CHE as an exception; it engages in little routine preparation for such events.5 This problem is now known and discussed beyond the corridors of the Pentagon or the fields of Fort Bragg. Major newsmagazines and newspapers regularly debate the issue, including the report that "of all the services, the Army has had the most difficult transition from a Cold War force ready to defeat the Soviet Union to the sort of nimble force needed to fight wars like the one in Kosovo."6 The Army has conducted a number of joint, multinational, multiorganizational, multiagency and multicultural exercises to better prepare our troops for these new challenges, but they are still administered ad hoc. Because the US military, particularly the Army, is overwhelmed by internal debate concerning when and how to provide humanitarian assistance, it has not created the necessary precrisis training that numerous after-action reviews have stressed is crucial for success in these operations.7 The Army must immediately adjust while continuing to debate the options of creating a twotier military establishment complete with a constabulary force, changing the structure of the force to make deployments easier or simply not getting involved.8 Such modifications are crucial, for involvement in CHEs will not wait until the debate over America's role in the post-Cold War world has been resolved.9 The Army must create a routine training program to make the US response to CHEs more successful. Unless the Army creates specialized units whose primary mission is to respond to CHEs, all units must have the ability to perform them. Hence, in keeping with our "train as you fight" philosophy, all National Training Center (NTC), Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) and Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotations should include a CHE scenario both leading up to and building down from a typical mid-intensity conflict (MIC) scenario (see figure). This scenario more accurately reflects the situations in which our military is likely to find itself involved and presents a greater training challenge to US forces. The Army must more actively prepare for CHEs. RAND researcher Jennifer Morison Taw noted that "the Army is the most likely of all US military services to pay the price for failings in interagency coordination."10 US policy implementation in Bosnia lacks a mechanism to ensure effective integration of the civilian and military peacebuilding programs at the tactical, operational or strategic level. …
The events of 11 September 2001 shocked the Western world, catapulting the US and its allies into... more The events of 11 September 2001 shocked the Western world, catapulting the US and its allies into Afghanistan and Iraq. Ten years on, those conflicts have cost blood and treasure in the name of the ‘War on Terror’. How will history judge 9/11 and the decade that followed? A number of eminent policy-makers, academics and commentators offer their thoughts on
The Way Forward in Iraq John A. Nagl and Brian M. Burton John A. Nagl is a senior fellow at the C... more The Way Forward in Iraq John A. Nagl and Brian M. Burton John A. Nagl is a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) and the author of Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (University of Chicago, 2005). He was also a member of the writing team that produced the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual and has recently returned from visits to Iraq and Afghanistan sponsored by U.S. forces there. Brian M. Burton is a research assistant at CNAS and a graduate student in the security studies program at Georgetown University.
The US military went into Iraq with no clear understanding of or preparations for counterinsurgen... more The US military went into Iraq with no clear understanding of or preparations for counterinsurgency. This fact, combined with poor postwar planning and failure to recognize the early development of the insurgency, severely hamstrung the American effort to secure ...
... 2008. Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, New York: Co... more ... 2008. Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, New York: Columbia UP. 8. Gordon, Michael R. 2003. ... Reuters, 12 July; 10. Hashim, Ahmed S. 2006. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP. 11. Hoffman, Bruce. ...
This article is a revised and updated version of a paper originally published as Institutionalizi... more This article is a revised and updated version of a paper originally published as Institutionalizing Adaptation: It's Time for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps by the Center for a New American Security in June 2007. These views are the author's own. "Arguably, the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries. How the Army should be organized and prepared for this advisory role remains an open question, and will require innovative and forward thinking." -Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 10 October 2007.1 ARMY DOCTRINE and recent events on the ground in two wars have demonstrated that the achievement of American goals in Iraq and Afghanistan will increasingly depend on the performance of the security forces of those countries themselves. U.S. Army and Marine Corps Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, describes the many complicated and interrelated tasks that should be conducted simultaneously to defeat an insurgency and then notes, "Key to all these tasks is developing an effective host-nation (HN) security force."2 In recognition of the enduring need for American advisors to coach, teach, and mentor host-nation security forces in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and in dozens of other countries around the globe, the Army should create a permanent standing advisory command with responsibility for all aspects of the advisor mission-from doctrine through facilities. An advisory command is essential to enable and empower the security forces of our allies to defeat extremism. Most importantly, any advisor command should have responsibility over a standing force of some 20,000 soldiers. It has been argued that foreign forces cannot defeat an insurgency-the best they can hope for is to create the conditions that will enable local forces to do so.3 The most important contribution the U.S. Army makes to the development of security forces like the Iraqi Army (IA) and Afghan National Army (ANA) is embedded advisory (or "transition") teams. These teams coach, teach, and mentor host nation security forces, training them before deployment and accompanying them into combat; the mission is described by the acronym FID, for "foreign internal defense." Advisors bring important combat multipliers to the fight: artillery and close air support; medical evacuation and support; and, perhaps most importantly, a culture of leadership and training, two crucial pillars of success for all effective armies. From a strategic perspective, competent advisor teams also communicate a commitment to legitimacy. Since host-nation security forces have important cultural awareness and linguistic advantages over U.S. forces and are likely to be far more palatable to the local public whose support is ultimately the key in any counterinsurgency campaign, the advisory role of U.S. forces has become increasingly important. Strategic outcomes now hinge on advisor mission competence and success for at least two reasons. First, because America does not have enough ground forces to meet all security threats everywhere and must therefore rely upon the strategic leverage foreign troops provide; and second, because those forces have more legitimacy than do American troops who can be perceived as occupiers. American advisors serve as enormously efficient combat multipliers; the whole is far more than the sum of its parts, and effective host-nation forces, enabled and empowered by dedicated combat advisors, are now the foundation of U.S. strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq, years of hard work to train, equip, and mentor the Iraqi Security Forces are beginning to show results. After effective U.S.-led counterinsurgency operations dramatically improved security in Iraq in 2007, consecutive Iraqi-led operations in Basra, Sadr City, and Mosul in the spring of 2008 have, following a shaky start, led to further gains that dramatically increased confidence in the government and Iraqi Army. …
Battle is the ultimate to which the whole life's labor of an officer should be directed. He m... more Battle is the ultimate to which the whole life's labor of an officer should be directed. He may live to the age of retirement without seeing a battle; still, he must always be getting ready for it as if he knew the hour of the day it is to break upon him. And then, whether it comes late or early he must be willing to fight-he must fight. -Brigadier General C.F. Smith1 THE MILITARY OFFICER must fill a number of roles, often simultaneously. He has responsibilities as a warfighter, as the Nation's servant, as a member of the profession of arms, and as a leader of character. These four roles are interrelated almost to the point of inseparability, but examining each separately allows a better understanding of their inherent complexities. The central premise of this article is that preparing for battle is a lifelong developmental process and a worthy life's work. While fighting America's wars is not the professional soldier's only task, it is the task that only the professional soldier can do. Warfighting's complex arrangement of activities includes generating, applying, and sustaining combat power from the fort to the port to the fighting position to achieve the aims of policy. Most of the examples cited come from the realms of direct and indirect fire, but that fact stems more from our inability to discuss the other critical aspects of warfighting than it does from any contention that the point of the spear is somehow more important than the shaft. Developing the set of skills necessary to manage violence in the Nation's service is a lifelong developmental process that begins when an officer receives his commission and continues throughout a career. Professionalism is a combination of competence and devotion to service that grows over time, and growth occurs differently in each individual. There is no rank or position or level of education that clearly delineates the professional from the mere jobholder. Furthermore, the relationship between professionals at differing stages of career development is symbiotic. The younger professional benefits from the older one's wisdom and dignity, while the older benefits from the younger one's idealism and energy. Mastering the art and science of warfighting encompasses every aspect of the human experience-- physical, intellectual, and moral.2 To understand fully the officer's responsibilities as a warfighter, we must explore in detail each of these aspects. The Physical Dimension The Army inspires soldiers to have the strength, the confidence, and the will to fight and win anywhere, anytime. -The Army Vision, 2002(3) This statement from Army Vision, 2002, is as applicable to General George Washington's crossing of the Delaware in 1776 as it is to Task Force Eagle's crossing of the Sava in 1995. Warfighting always has been and always will be a struggle, not only against hostile forces but also against hostile environments. The officer as warfighter has a duty to prepare himself and his subordinates to cope with such physical rigors. This duty begins at the earliest stages of an officer's service. After arriving at his first duty station, a second lieutenant is expected to set the standard for his platoon in physical toughness. Toughness, not mere fitness, is the standard by which soldiers measure leaders. That the lieutenant be in excellent physical condition is necessary, but not sufficient. More important is his willingness to share his soldiers' physical hardships. Sergeant Major John Stepanek, addressing a group of officer candidates, stated succinctly what they could expect from noncommissioned officers (NCOs): "You can expect loyalty to your position, devotion to our cause, admiration for your honest effort, courage to match your courage, guts to match your guts, endurance to match your endurance, motivation to match your motivation, esprit to match your esprit, a desire for achievement to match your desire for achievement. …
We live in an age of "heavy peace. "... There will be other Kosovos, and, whether for s... more We live in an age of "heavy peace. "... There will be other Kosovos, and, whether for strategic or humanitarian reasons---or just muddled impulses-we will not be able to resist them all. ... We cannot enter upon such commitments under the assumption that they will be temporary and brief... We must stop pretending those challenges will disappear--that "something will turn up "and prepare to meet them.1 -Ralph Peters WITH THE END of the Cold War and the rise of ethnonationalisticconflicts, complex humanitarian emergencies (CHEs) have proliferated around the world. Internal conflicts that combine large-scale displacements of people, mass famine and fragile or failing economic, social and political institutions are becoming commonplace. War remains a common feature of the international landscape despite growing global interdependence. While the end of the Cold War has reduced the risk of great-power conflict, it has also decreased the perceived constraints on proxy wars, and as a result, over 40 unresolved conflicts currently fester, simmer or rage. International peacekeeping forces alone are unlikely to achieve lasting results in most cases, but they can stop the fighting and help implement fair and lasting resolutions.3 While the US Army prepares to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars, it will frequently be called upon to provide the military forces necessary to implement our nation's multifaceted respouse to CHEs.4 Even though peace operations and preventing deadly conflict are becoming increasingly common missions, the Army currently treats each CHE as an exception; it engages in little routine preparation for such events.5 This problem is now known and discussed beyond the corridors of the Pentagon or the fields of Fort Bragg. Major newsmagazines and newspapers regularly debate the issue, including the report that "of all the services, the Army has had the most difficult transition from a Cold War force ready to defeat the Soviet Union to the sort of nimble force needed to fight wars like the one in Kosovo."6 The Army has conducted a number of joint, multinational, multiorganizational, multiagency and multicultural exercises to better prepare our troops for these new challenges, but they are still administered ad hoc. Because the US military, particularly the Army, is overwhelmed by internal debate concerning when and how to provide humanitarian assistance, it has not created the necessary precrisis training that numerous after-action reviews have stressed is crucial for success in these operations.7 The Army must immediately adjust while continuing to debate the options of creating a twotier military establishment complete with a constabulary force, changing the structure of the force to make deployments easier or simply not getting involved.8 Such modifications are crucial, for involvement in CHEs will not wait until the debate over America's role in the post-Cold War world has been resolved.9 The Army must create a routine training program to make the US response to CHEs more successful. Unless the Army creates specialized units whose primary mission is to respond to CHEs, all units must have the ability to perform them. Hence, in keeping with our "train as you fight" philosophy, all National Training Center (NTC), Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) and Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotations should include a CHE scenario both leading up to and building down from a typical mid-intensity conflict (MIC) scenario (see figure). This scenario more accurately reflects the situations in which our military is likely to find itself involved and presents a greater training challenge to US forces. The Army must more actively prepare for CHEs. RAND researcher Jennifer Morison Taw noted that "the Army is the most likely of all US military services to pay the price for failings in interagency coordination."10 US policy implementation in Bosnia lacks a mechanism to ensure effective integration of the civilian and military peacebuilding programs at the tactical, operational or strategic level. …
The events of 11 September 2001 shocked the Western world, catapulting the US and its allies into... more The events of 11 September 2001 shocked the Western world, catapulting the US and its allies into Afghanistan and Iraq. Ten years on, those conflicts have cost blood and treasure in the name of the ‘War on Terror’. How will history judge 9/11 and the decade that followed? A number of eminent policy-makers, academics and commentators offer their thoughts on
The Way Forward in Iraq John A. Nagl and Brian M. Burton John A. Nagl is a senior fellow at the C... more The Way Forward in Iraq John A. Nagl and Brian M. Burton John A. Nagl is a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) and the author of Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (University of Chicago, 2005). He was also a member of the writing team that produced the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual and has recently returned from visits to Iraq and Afghanistan sponsored by U.S. forces there. Brian M. Burton is a research assistant at CNAS and a graduate student in the security studies program at Georgetown University.
The US military went into Iraq with no clear understanding of or preparations for counterinsurgen... more The US military went into Iraq with no clear understanding of or preparations for counterinsurgency. This fact, combined with poor postwar planning and failure to recognize the early development of the insurgency, severely hamstrung the American effort to secure ...
... 2008. Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, New York: Co... more ... 2008. Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, New York: Columbia UP. 8. Gordon, Michael R. 2003. ... Reuters, 12 July; 10. Hashim, Ahmed S. 2006. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP. 11. Hoffman, Bruce. ...
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