This paper extends a model of symmetric oligopoly with linear demand and constant long-run margin... more This paper extends a model of symmetric oligopoly with linear demand and constant long-run marginal costs to include more general forms of demand and examines the effects of non-linearity upon dead-weight welfare losses at the monopoly and oligopoly outcomes.
This paper extends a model of symmetric oligopoly with linear demand and constant long-run margin... more This paper extends a model of symmetric oligopoly with linear demand and constant long-run marginal costs to include more general forms of demand and examines the effects of non-linearity upon dead-weight welfare losses at the monopoly and oligopoly outcomes.
ABSTRACT The general complexity of demand interrelationships including the co-existence of comple... more ABSTRACT The general complexity of demand interrelationships including the co-existence of complements and substitutes make traditional methods of regulating network industries problematic. Collusive pricing is preferred to independent pricing on complementary sections of a network whilst the reverse is true where goods/services are substitutes. However, the costs of market failure in the context of complementary goods, in particular, make appropriate regulatory involvement in such industries all the more important. In this paper, we explore alternative competitive and regulatory strategies within a simple theoretical network with differentiated demands. We show that the employment of an independent profit-maximising agent may offer a partial solution to the problem of network regulation, yielding outcomes which involve all parties pursuing their own interests yet being desirable to both firms and a welfare-maximising social planner.
ABSTRACT We examine the effects of and the incentives for increasing input efficiency within a sp... more ABSTRACT We examine the effects of and the incentives for increasing input efficiency within a spatially segregated Cournot duopoly with monopoly trade unions whose utility functions depend on both wages and employment. We show that with neoclassical as well as Leontief technology, unions raise wages to appropriate fully the gains from labor-saving technological (or organisational) improvements, leaving the firm with no incentive to invest in increasing the efficiency of workers. However, capital-saving technological improvement may be profitable depending on the elasticity of substitution. Finally, we examine the implication of a fixed minimum wage (or competitive labor market) in one country.
Http Dx Doi Org 10 1080 00036840500330532, Feb 2, 2007
ABSTRACT An original index is introduced for measuring the extent of the overall bilateral balanc... more ABSTRACT An original index is introduced for measuring the extent of the overall bilateral balance of migration among countries within a region which allows comparisons of the balance over time as well as between regions and various possible sub-regions. It is shown that having constructed the index it is also possible to establish a weighting of the contribution of each country to the overall degree of migration balance within a region. The new index is applied to three sub-groupings of the European Union (EU): (a) a mix of nine northern and southern EU15 countries; (b) seven northern EU15 countries; and, (c) four southern EU15 countries. It is shown that in each case migration in the 1990s was highly balanced and improving significantly over time. However, there was a substantial difference between the northern and southern countries with the former enjoying significantly higher overall balance in migration than the latter, although the rate of improvement in balance was much higher amongst the southern countries. Finally, whilst the UK and Portugal were persistently low contributors to the overall balance in EU migration, Germany's contribution was the highest.
Whilst firms often prefer secrecy to patents and process innovations particularly lend themselves... more Whilst firms often prefer secrecy to patents and process innovations particularly lend themselves to secrecy, we establish a rationale for process innovators who patent. Using a simple two-period model, we show that under myopic optimisation, the incentive to patent rather than pursue secrecy increases as the probability that the rival firm attaches to it being low-cost falls and as the proportion of the cost reduction due to the innovation, secured by the rival firm in the period after the patent has expired, falls. However, the gain to the innovating firm from patenting rather than secrecy strictly increases if the cost reduction due to the innovation is sufficiently small that the high-cost firm could profitably bluff that it is low-cost. Finally, allowing the low-cost firm the option of using an output signal in such cases, may make the patent strategy more or less attractive relative to the case of myopic optimisation.
We derive a measure of welfare loss as a proportion of the value of sales under quantity-setting ... more We derive a measure of welfare loss as a proportion of the value of sales under quantity-setting symmetric oligopoly in terms of the equilibrium industry price elasticity of demand, the number of firms in the industry and a conjectural variation term in the context of the standard linear model. This generalises the monopoly measure in James and McHardy (1997).
This paper develops a framework to explore firm corruption taking account of interaction with an ... more This paper develops a framework to explore firm corruption taking account of interaction with an auditor. The basic idea is that an auditor can provide auditing and other (consultancy) services. The extent of the other services depends on firm profitability. Hence auditor profitability can increase with firm corruption that may provide an incentive to collude in corrupt practices. This basic idea is developed using a game theoretic framework. It is shown that a multiplicity of equilibria exist from stable corruption, through auditor controlled corruption, via multiple equilibria to honesty on behalf of both actors. Following the development of the model various policy options are highlighted that show the difficulty of completely removing corrupt practices.
In this paper we explore alternative pricing and regulatory strategies within a simple transport ... more In this paper we explore alternative pricing and regulatory strategies within a simple transport network with Cournot duopoly and differentiated demands. We show that whilst firms always prefer to offer integrated ticketing, a social planner will not. With integrated ticketing, the firms always prefer complete collusion but there is not a uniform ranking of some of the less collusive regimes. Society generally prefers the less collusive regimes to complete collusion but prefers some collusion to independent pricing.
The general complexity of demand interrelationships including the co-existence of complements and... more The general complexity of demand interrelationships including the co-existence of complements and substitutes make traditional methods of regulating network industries problematic. Collusive pricing is preferred to independent pricing on complementary sections of a network whilst the reverse is true where goods/services are substitutes. However, the costs of market failure in the context of complementary goods, in particular, make appropriate regulatory involvement in such industries all the more important. In this paper, we explore alternative competitive and regulatory strategies within a simple theoretical network with differentiated demands. We show that the employment of an independent profit-maximising agent may offer a partial solution to the problem of network regulation, yielding outcomes which involve all parties pursuing their own interests yet being desirable to both firms and a welfare-maximising social planner.
The general complexity of demand interrelationships including the co-existence of complements and... more The general complexity of demand interrelationships including the co-existence of complements and substitutes make traditional methods of regulating network industries problematic. Collusive pricing is preferred to independent pricing on complementary sections of a network whilst the reverse is true where goods/services are substitutes. However, the costs of market failure in the context of complementary goods, in particular, make appropriate regulatory involvement in such industries all the more important. In this paper, we explore alternative competitive and regulatory strategies within a simple theoretical network with differentiated demands. We show that the employment of an independent profit-maximising agent may offer a partial solution to the problem of network regulation, yielding outcomes which involve all parties pursuing their own interests yet being desirable to both firms and a welfare-maximising social planner.
This paper extends a model of symmetric oligopoly with linear demand and constant long-run margin... more This paper extends a model of symmetric oligopoly with linear demand and constant long-run marginal costs to include more general forms of demand and examines the effects of non-linearity upon dead-weight welfare losses at the monopoly and oligopoly outcomes.
This paper extends a model of symmetric oligopoly with linear demand and constant long-run margin... more This paper extends a model of symmetric oligopoly with linear demand and constant long-run marginal costs to include more general forms of demand and examines the effects of non-linearity upon dead-weight welfare losses at the monopoly and oligopoly outcomes.
ABSTRACT The general complexity of demand interrelationships including the co-existence of comple... more ABSTRACT The general complexity of demand interrelationships including the co-existence of complements and substitutes make traditional methods of regulating network industries problematic. Collusive pricing is preferred to independent pricing on complementary sections of a network whilst the reverse is true where goods/services are substitutes. However, the costs of market failure in the context of complementary goods, in particular, make appropriate regulatory involvement in such industries all the more important. In this paper, we explore alternative competitive and regulatory strategies within a simple theoretical network with differentiated demands. We show that the employment of an independent profit-maximising agent may offer a partial solution to the problem of network regulation, yielding outcomes which involve all parties pursuing their own interests yet being desirable to both firms and a welfare-maximising social planner.
ABSTRACT We examine the effects of and the incentives for increasing input efficiency within a sp... more ABSTRACT We examine the effects of and the incentives for increasing input efficiency within a spatially segregated Cournot duopoly with monopoly trade unions whose utility functions depend on both wages and employment. We show that with neoclassical as well as Leontief technology, unions raise wages to appropriate fully the gains from labor-saving technological (or organisational) improvements, leaving the firm with no incentive to invest in increasing the efficiency of workers. However, capital-saving technological improvement may be profitable depending on the elasticity of substitution. Finally, we examine the implication of a fixed minimum wage (or competitive labor market) in one country.
Http Dx Doi Org 10 1080 00036840500330532, Feb 2, 2007
ABSTRACT An original index is introduced for measuring the extent of the overall bilateral balanc... more ABSTRACT An original index is introduced for measuring the extent of the overall bilateral balance of migration among countries within a region which allows comparisons of the balance over time as well as between regions and various possible sub-regions. It is shown that having constructed the index it is also possible to establish a weighting of the contribution of each country to the overall degree of migration balance within a region. The new index is applied to three sub-groupings of the European Union (EU): (a) a mix of nine northern and southern EU15 countries; (b) seven northern EU15 countries; and, (c) four southern EU15 countries. It is shown that in each case migration in the 1990s was highly balanced and improving significantly over time. However, there was a substantial difference between the northern and southern countries with the former enjoying significantly higher overall balance in migration than the latter, although the rate of improvement in balance was much higher amongst the southern countries. Finally, whilst the UK and Portugal were persistently low contributors to the overall balance in EU migration, Germany's contribution was the highest.
Whilst firms often prefer secrecy to patents and process innovations particularly lend themselves... more Whilst firms often prefer secrecy to patents and process innovations particularly lend themselves to secrecy, we establish a rationale for process innovators who patent. Using a simple two-period model, we show that under myopic optimisation, the incentive to patent rather than pursue secrecy increases as the probability that the rival firm attaches to it being low-cost falls and as the proportion of the cost reduction due to the innovation, secured by the rival firm in the period after the patent has expired, falls. However, the gain to the innovating firm from patenting rather than secrecy strictly increases if the cost reduction due to the innovation is sufficiently small that the high-cost firm could profitably bluff that it is low-cost. Finally, allowing the low-cost firm the option of using an output signal in such cases, may make the patent strategy more or less attractive relative to the case of myopic optimisation.
We derive a measure of welfare loss as a proportion of the value of sales under quantity-setting ... more We derive a measure of welfare loss as a proportion of the value of sales under quantity-setting symmetric oligopoly in terms of the equilibrium industry price elasticity of demand, the number of firms in the industry and a conjectural variation term in the context of the standard linear model. This generalises the monopoly measure in James and McHardy (1997).
This paper develops a framework to explore firm corruption taking account of interaction with an ... more This paper develops a framework to explore firm corruption taking account of interaction with an auditor. The basic idea is that an auditor can provide auditing and other (consultancy) services. The extent of the other services depends on firm profitability. Hence auditor profitability can increase with firm corruption that may provide an incentive to collude in corrupt practices. This basic idea is developed using a game theoretic framework. It is shown that a multiplicity of equilibria exist from stable corruption, through auditor controlled corruption, via multiple equilibria to honesty on behalf of both actors. Following the development of the model various policy options are highlighted that show the difficulty of completely removing corrupt practices.
In this paper we explore alternative pricing and regulatory strategies within a simple transport ... more In this paper we explore alternative pricing and regulatory strategies within a simple transport network with Cournot duopoly and differentiated demands. We show that whilst firms always prefer to offer integrated ticketing, a social planner will not. With integrated ticketing, the firms always prefer complete collusion but there is not a uniform ranking of some of the less collusive regimes. Society generally prefers the less collusive regimes to complete collusion but prefers some collusion to independent pricing.
The general complexity of demand interrelationships including the co-existence of complements and... more The general complexity of demand interrelationships including the co-existence of complements and substitutes make traditional methods of regulating network industries problematic. Collusive pricing is preferred to independent pricing on complementary sections of a network whilst the reverse is true where goods/services are substitutes. However, the costs of market failure in the context of complementary goods, in particular, make appropriate regulatory involvement in such industries all the more important. In this paper, we explore alternative competitive and regulatory strategies within a simple theoretical network with differentiated demands. We show that the employment of an independent profit-maximising agent may offer a partial solution to the problem of network regulation, yielding outcomes which involve all parties pursuing their own interests yet being desirable to both firms and a welfare-maximising social planner.
The general complexity of demand interrelationships including the co-existence of complements and... more The general complexity of demand interrelationships including the co-existence of complements and substitutes make traditional methods of regulating network industries problematic. Collusive pricing is preferred to independent pricing on complementary sections of a network whilst the reverse is true where goods/services are substitutes. However, the costs of market failure in the context of complementary goods, in particular, make appropriate regulatory involvement in such industries all the more important. In this paper, we explore alternative competitive and regulatory strategies within a simple theoretical network with differentiated demands. We show that the employment of an independent profit-maximising agent may offer a partial solution to the problem of network regulation, yielding outcomes which involve all parties pursuing their own interests yet being desirable to both firms and a welfare-maximising social planner.
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